

THE
Congress of Vienna.

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PREFACE.

THE Work on the Congress at Vienna, now offered to public notice, may be considered as a continuation of those which I have written on the principal events of the past eighteen years.

At Rastadt, the Germanic empire supported the weight of negotiations, which proved as useless in their results as the forms which accompanied them were painful. At that time, appeared the "*Antidote to the Congress at Rastadt*;" a Work, in which it was attempted to correct the mistakes of the Congress, either by an exposition of the nature of revolutions, and the consideration of which appeared to have escaped its notice; or by pointing out a system more appropriate to circumstances than that which was adopted.

In 1799, Austria, Russia, and a part of the empire, marched against the reigning authority in France. It was very clear that all their efforts, without the co-operation of Prussia, would be of no avail, and that, with it, their success would have been certain. It was not less evident that Prussia, entangled in the web of a policy, of the nature of which she herself was neither aware, nor could foresee the result, by thus separating herself from Europe, advanced towards

the catastrophe she experienced within the course of six years. The consideration of the dangers attached to this conduct occasioned the publication of the work, entitled "*Prussia and her Neutrality. 1799.*"

Ten years since, the West India colonies were, some of them, subverted, and others threatened with the disorders, that, since the year 1790, have affected the colonial system. At that time, the great American continent, in some of its divisions, experienced the effects of revolutionary principles, proceeding either from the events of a protracted contest, or the influence of its neighbour, the United States. In a word, the fundamental principle of the colonial system was attacked, as well as its actual situation. An attempt was made to re-establish this principle, and to call the attention of Europe to the state of the colonies, in a Work, entitled "*The Three Ages of Colonies. 1801.*"

The Congress at Vienna, destined to put an end to the agitation of Europe, and to determine its situation for a long succession of ages, offers a most extensive field for reflection, on a subject infinitely more important than the circumstances to which we have alluded. Europe should, for a length of time, have considered the Congress of Vienna as the commencement of a new æra. From that period the spirit by which it was actuated should have been regarded with an high interest, as well as the results to be expected. Its object was no less than the arrangement of a political futurity for all Europe. If the edifice was solidly constructed, if its parts were well proportioned, it would remain, and Europe would, for a considerable time, have reposed under its tutelar protec-

tion. If, on the contrary, it erred from a want of the qualities essential to every species of construction, then the Congress will have proved itself to be a lesser benefit; and its acts will not be found of such a character as we could have desired. It partakes more of the nature of a system of warfare than an establishment for the preservation of peace. The former is, in its very nature, transient. One campaign may repair the false calculations of another; but the object of peace being to correct the errors of war, it is more durable, and deserves a more serious consideration. If we seek for the causes of the wars that have crimsoned the plains of Europe for many ages, we shall trace their origin to the very treaties which, under the appearance of putting an end to existing war, in fact did nothing else than lay the foundation of a new one. Since that which, in his energetic language, the illustrious Burke called the *market of Basle*, how many treaties of peace have there been, that have not produced new wars? Therefore, it would have been curious to ascertain whether the Congress of Vienna, the absolute master of the subject, an advantage not possessed in any other negotiations, would make use of this advantage with the latitude that circumstances required, and the power with which it had been invested. To ascertain whether this was or was not effected, is the object of this Work. It is not a history of the negotiations of the Congress, but an investigation of the spirit by which it was actuated, and the probable consequences of the system it established. The determinations of the Congress are become public acts; they concern the world,

and should become the object of its scrutiny. We have proceeded in this investigation with the most perfect candour, and free from any party or local spirit. If we have expressed our opinion on every subject, it is because we have written for every person, and because truth is the interest of all. In uniting an accurate observation of this principle, to that regard which is due in its application to individuals, and more especially to the chiefs of nations, we believe that we have equally availed ourselves of what were our rights, and fulfilled the duties prescribed to us.

If our earlier productions have been stamped with a sufficiently impartial character, not to be more attributed to an inhabitant of France, than to one of any other country, we may presume to hope that the same character will be no less distinguishable in the present. We might even say, that the more extensive the scene, it becomes the more difficult to abandon this impartiality. In fact, can personal feelings find a place in the midst of such important interests? Thus it is by no means with a view to favour Prussia, that our opinions on the subject of that state have been so fully expressed in the present work. Truth has alone guided and supported us in the ideas, which we well know will not suit every taste. The same observation may be applied to an opinion on the subject of the union of Belgium and Holland, which will occasion a great loss to France, and be as contrary to our inclinations as our interests. But, in rejecting every personal idea, we have balanced the advantages and disadvantages of a political act, resulting from an

established system, and the actual state of things, wherever may be found their origin.

In treating of the Congress of Vienna we wish to remark :

First ; the extent of its labours, which embraced an immense mass of interests. At other periods, many years would have been scarcely sufficient to arrange this chaos ; even when ability and sincerity in the agents, as well as good order, were supposed to exist.

Second ; The vigour and determination displayed in the pursuit of the enemy, who appeared in the month of March. The Congress did not show a moment's hesitation, or division of opinion. By this conduct, the first expression of Napoleon, when he landed on the French shores, "*The Congress is dissolved,*" was rendered vain. Business and war have gone hand in hand. More time was not lost in the cabinet than in the field. If, from the first appearance of the revolution, such promptitude of action had been exhibited, what misfortunes would not have been prevented !

Third ; The liberality of the sentiments professed and carried into execution by the Congress. Its object was not confined to individuals, whom they sought to unite in bonds of mutual friendship, but it also had the interests of nations in view ; with regard to Switzerland particularly, it evinced an honourable solicitude. The sovereigns, the guardians of its interests, have shown a perseverance in powerful efforts, that cannot be too much applauded, in order to overcome all the principles of hatred and dissension that divided the interests of Switzerland,

and the various parties existing in that country. We have seen them arm themselves one against the other. We have seen the allies interfere between men ready to quarrel, labour to dissipate their prejudices, to conciliate their pretensions, and at last succeed, by leading them into the bosom of the same family. To their care will Switzerland be indebted for the enjoyment of a durable repose under the laws of her ancient association, and remain as she ever has, the last asylum of innocence, the most happy residence in Europe.

Because we do not enter into all the views of the Congress, because we have dared to compare our own ideas with those it adopted, it does not follow that we call for their revision, still less for the destruction of its work.

Too cruel experience has taught us the danger of proceeding so violently. We have only wished to show the probable consequences of the system established by the Congress, and, at the same time, to indicate the correctives which may be applied for public benefit. To time alone it belongs to produce the circumstances favourable to their application. Above all, it was of importance to render the condition of the various parties permanent; to distinguish the powerful and the weak; and thus to furnish the first elements of reflection to those men, who are every where charged with the maintenance of a system that, however imperfect may be its arrangements, has cost them dear.

Some may class part of this work with Utopian productions; an accusation very common with those who themselves possess neither foresight nor the means of action. This is granted. But let them also

be careful in recollecting, that the Utopian ideas of "The Congress at Bastsdt," of "Prussia and its Neutrality," "The Three Ages of Colonies," have been, in a great measure, and long since, realized.

The order of argument observed in this Work has often led us to refer to the acts of Napoleon, of which we shall for many ages experience the effect. He has covered Europe with wrecks and monuments. Modern states are erected with the scattered fragments of his empire, as in former ages they were formed out of the wrecks of the Roman empire. This prince, who had visited Egypt, must have remarked, that the pyramids, for four thousand years, had braved the ravages of time, because they rested on their base. He preferred placing his own on its point, and giving for its support piers, formed of a continually increasing number of bayonets. A storm proceeding from the North overturned the building, and buried the architect under its ruins. The error, evident in the construction of this edifice, was as much for the want of a foundation, as a supposition that its events would only be such as occur in the ordinary course of nature; and an expectation that, at least, it would have sunk in a less violent, though, in good truth, a manner no less certain.

We have taken great care to distinguish the divisions of Europe into two confederations; the one continental, the other maritime. These for the future form the pivot of her policy. Correctly speaking, Europe in its present state has only three great interests :

First; To disarm and destroy the military spirit.

Second ; To confirm good order in France.

Third ; To terminate the troubles of Spanish America, by the emancipation of that country.

The two first objects will form the safety of Europe ; the latter its wealth. To become quiet, it is necessary she should repossess herself of her wealth, and repair the losses occasioned by the disorders of the past twenty-five years. Men contented with their lot, gradually advancing towards a happier futurity, will be more easily governed than those interdicted from alleviating the feelings of past losses, by the hope of there being a period to their privations and their sufferings.

It is satisfactory to think, that, with the exception of these events, which surpass all belief because they surpass all sort of calculation, nothing appears to prevent our announcing to Europe that this is the commencement of a prolonged scene of repose. We may say that the *contentious matter* is exhausted. Every thing is regulated. On the other hand, Europe is protected from every attempt at extensive conquest. In three hundred years it has suffered under three enterprises of this nature. One by Spain under Charles the Fifth and Philip the Second. By France, under Louis the Fourteenth and Napoleon. All have had equal success, and have terminated by plunging the two countries into an abyss, which they will for a long time bear in mind. Hence, Europe may be disarmed ; may return to her civil state, and relieve her inhabitants from the burden of immense armies ; the establishment of which exhausts the wealth of its people, and the spirit of which is only calculated to extinguish that of liberty.

We may also remark, as a circumstance favourable to the maintenance of peace, that there prevails such an uniformity of age among the sovereigns who have concurred in its conclusion, as to enable us to hope that the same hands which have contributed to establish, will for a long time continue to preserve it. This correspondence of age will prevent those sudden transitions from one system to another, that too often distinguish the changes in a reign ; for, to succeed to the same situation is not to succeed to the same ideas and the same inclinations. We may also congratulate ourselves on being able to think, that these princes are equally induced by their own virtues, as the interests of their states, to consolidate this great work.

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONGRESS.

THE thirty-first day of March 1814! A day that will be memorable to eternity! No longer did Madrid, Vienna, Berlin, Warsaw, behold their former masters flying, and their conquerors planting their ensigns on their battered and degraded walls. The thunder has returned to peal over those places whence, for the past twenty years, it has never ceased to issue. In its turn, Paris has received its conquerors. They entered into the city that had conveyed terror, with its decrees, into every empire. He who for a long time had burst from the capital with the rapidity of the eagle and the strength of the lion, in order to seize, either as an easy prey, or as a trembling victim, every people in Europe, tamely submitted to the triumphant entry of the enemies he had produced, and whom he was less able to deceive than to conquer. He approached near enough to hear the cries that distinguished the overthrow of his throne—silent and pale, he separated himself from the city he knew not how to defend, and which, for the happiness of France, he ought never to have revisited.

Similar to the condition of a man relieved of a most oppressive load, Europe gave a long sigh, and began to breathe. Henceforward, all the revolutionary policy;

which had been established with such difficulty, disappeared, like the decorations of a theatre. In an instant, from **Hamburgh to Rome**, the marks of the new government are effaced; the former ones are brought forward; the ill-assorted ties uniting twenty various nations, formed by violence, burst of their own accord. Then sovereigns re-entered the palaces where acclamations, of which they were no longer objects, had but recently resounded. Never had there been witnessed such a scene—one day changing the face of the whole world, and destroying the work of twenty ages; for in the revolutionary scale, it is not by years, but by ages, that we are to reckon. France, that has occasioned all this subversion, must be first quieted. This great body must be fixed, in order that Europe shall not vacillate: so much, even in its fall, does it preserve its influence. A treaty recalled this country to its ancient possessions, and there it remained. But all that the war had affected, and what has it not affected? was to be regulated. The one sought for spoils; the other found itself too weak for its more powerful neighbour. Here the situation was vacant: there many disputed it. One implored an indemnity for the past; another showed the dangers of the future. On all sides were heard cries of justice, indemnity, peace, and the balance of power. Who was to organize this chaos, and oppose a barrier to this torrent of pretension? Arms had produced their effect. It remained for policy to avail itself of their operations and complete the work; or, in the words of the Roman orator, *Cedant arma togæ*. Vienna is to become the noble theatre of the most expanded and generous patriotism that ever existed; for it embraced Europe—through it, the universe. Already has the scene commenced; and this august assemblage will take place, after the short space of time of which the sovereigns had made use to revisit those places whence the cares of war had so long withdrawn their attention. For in our days, as in those of the Crusades, war has brought sovereigns into the field. At last the hour

arrived, and pleasures, interpreted as sincere pledges of mutually benevolent dispositions, gaily introduced these arbiters of the destinies of Europe into the sanctuary where they were to be decided. The Congress was opened.

CHAPTER II.

REAPPEARANCE OF DIPLOMACY.

HERE Europe discovered that which it had for a long time lost—diplomacy reappeared.

It had for ages afforded to those distinguished in its services the exalted honours reserved in all countries for the most eminent personages. The names of celebrated negotiators are united, in history and the archives of nations, with those who have rendered them the most illustrious. Men who have defended the interests of the state by the extent, the force, the suppleness of their talents, may place themselves, without fear, in the same rank with those who have exerted their valour in the field; and their wise combinations have not obtained less honour, or had a less right to the admiration of mankind, because they have not possessed an *eclat* so brilliant as the successful effort of the warrior. Often, nay, almost always, the latter has been but the instrument of diplomacy, the agent of the statesman.

Since the peace made between the Convention (of France) and the powers of Europe in 1795, and which was signed by Count Carletti, in the name of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, there have been no real negotiations in Europe. We have seen stipulations, acts signed, truces clothed with the name and deceitful appearance of peace; but there have been none of those negotiations

to which Europe had been so long accustomed. Strength was too much on one side—weakness too marked on the other. Dangers too imminent, too grave, to constitute that species of discussion, to be termed diplomacy. It exists only among equals. Hence, what equality can be found with those who have the power of taking every thing, and those who can retain nothing; between those who have lost all, or almost all, and those who have obtained every thing; between those who painfully defend a mere wreck, and those who command in the capital of the sovereign with whom they treat, who occupy his states, and make use of their resources to supply their wants, with as little discretion as fear? Thus have all the negotiations been characterized for the past twenty years—negotiations in which the Gauls have always put their swords into one of the scales. In short, all these treaties have been traced by the sword.

After a lapse of eighteen hundred years, we have seen Europe return to that state of things established in Rome, in which the conquered, at the feet of the conqueror, received what was convenient for him to let remain, and what he was neither able to take nor distribute. A little more, and even this limit would have been over-stepped. The Congress of Vienna will stop these invasions of force; it will banish these Roman practices; it will re-establish those humane habits that have governed Europe; and, in the silence of arms, reason will be heard.

Surely, after so many years of distress and violence, of attacks without motives, of battles without end, of convulsions without result, of transactions without unity or solidity, without a guarantee for their duration, it is an imposing spectacle to see the senate of Europe assembled under its most powerful and august chiefs, formed by all the names whom policy recommends to the public confidence; of all those who, having known how to cut the Gordian knot of the power of Napoleon, will not find it difficult to unravel the thread of the labyrinth in which

his policy has bewildered them. Many other difficulties have been overcome; and surely it is nearer from Paris to Vienna, than from Moscôw to Paris.

CHAPTER III.

OBJECT OF THE CONGRESS.

BUT on what subject, I could almost say on what materials, will this Congress begin to work? On a new world. Twenty-five years have changed every thing. Seek no longer in Europe for the men who once were there, who agitated it, and who shone in more recent epochs. All is passed. From the pole, to that delicious climate inhabited by the children of great Greece, discover, if you are able, what existed in those days, of which the twilight is scarcely extinct. What is become of thou, son of Vasa? What is this new crown, which, taken from the forehead of Margaret of Waldemar, is united with yours, on that of a successor, that in your time you would not have acknowledged? Why is one part of Scandinavia detached from the sceptre of Christian, which it cherished, and separated from him by new laws, as it is by its shores? What are the cries and tears that resound and flow around this king, whose possessions would for ever have remained inviolable, if virtue would have been sufficient to defend men? Whom have ye offended, countries of Jagellon and Sobieski? Into what hands will your wrecks fall, uncertain of a place of repose? And thou, throne of the Cæsars, consecrated by immortal recollections, prolonged by the respect of ages, a veneration for whom has survived their power, how has it happened that you are not occupied by your former possessor? What are the new majesties, the recent sove-

reignities that have replaced sovereignties, still more recent in the bosom of Germany? The Rhine no longer flows under its ancient laws. The division that religion created between the Belgians and the Batavians, approaches its term. Amsterdam and Brussels reassume the ties of their ancient fraternity under the same sceptre. Venice, notwithstanding its ancient wisdom, has disappeared. Austria, not the Adriatic, has swallowed it. Italy had scarcely tasted the cup of independence, and already has the Austrian eagle pounced upon her. Genoa will not see its doges at Versailles; still more astonished to behold themselves there than of all the wonders of their pompous residence. For the future she will receive her laws from Turin; her groans will not be understood; her complaints will not be heard. Naples was a long time astonished by its new master. For many years Sicily remained separate from Italy, as in the days of Syracuse and Hiero. Ask not the Isle of Elba for that which it possessed, nor why Europe has demanded, in the solitudes of the ocean, a more secure depositary. Lisbon asks Brazil to terminate her widowhood. The new has begun to draw kings from the old world: soon will it furnish them itself from among its own children. There thrones are not wanting. The feeble bonds that unite the vast America with its rigorous and distant metropolis, are bursting. Throughout this new soil the cry of liberty is heard. Mexico communicates with Peru. It resounds in this immense continent, that the ocean encloses in its at once tumultuous and tranquil waves. All is agitation and bustle: they cast off the leading strings of their political childhood. Nature acts agreeably to its eternal laws, and America, become adolescent, escapes from a decrepid and desolated mother, like robust youth from the tutelage of their infantine days.

The errors of the revolution have spared nothing, and it is on the ruins heaped up by inexorable fate that the Congress should begin its work.

But it would require little trouble to depict the poli-

tical changes produced in this age of convulsions ; or, to use the expression, that it has sown on the face of the globe. It exists still more in the dispositions of the mind. The moral infinitely surpasses the political revolution. Above all, it has surpassed it in extent and duration. For, in fact, whatever may be the latitude of the changes that affect the latter, there are certain limits and bounds in its mode of application ; whereas the changes that affect the moral faculties naturally augment and know no other limits than those of the human mind. To these none can be affixed.

CHAPTER IV.

DIVISION OF EUROPE INTO TWO ZONES.

AT the period of the restoration, Europe, if the expression may be permitted, appeared to be divided into two zones : each mingled in the contest. The people of the north and of the south all partook of the strife, and endeavoured to bring it to a conclusion. But, it may be said that the sovereigns of these two divisions were differently inspired, and had different objects in view.

On one side we beheld the sovereigns of the north and of Germany, themselves conducting their legions towards Paris, which they at last gained, as the period and price of a sanguinary contest, in which all might have been lost, had calculations been made upon seasons, dangers, fatigues, and, I may say, sacrifices.

On the other hand, the possessors of those thrones that the fall of that of Napoleon had restored, and even brought forth by an action of the same spring, beheld themselves reinvested without any other trouble than going from the seat of their exile to that of their power.

One half of Europe was transferred to the other on the throne, without any effort on the part of the latter. It is here that we see the difference of disposition between those who give and those who receive.

Hence, sovereigns who we may believe to have been exasperated by the greatness of the losses they have sustained, the grossness of the outrages they have experienced, by the length and impetuosity of the contest, speak only of liberty for the people, of clemency for individuals, of the forgetfulness of the injuries they have suffered; but of wishes for the approximation of minds. They have only conquered for the triumph of clemency; and behold princes, that the chance of events have replaced on their thrones, as if they had never been removed, who have taken a part neither in the dangers nor the labour of the scenes of which they have reaped the advantage. Scarcely in possession of power, than here have they attributed it to force alone; there they seem to consider it but an emanation of it, and declare themselves its source; elsewhere, they pretend that a breath from their lips will occasion every thing to disappear that has been ardently cherished during the course of a revolution that has occupied the quarter of a century, and which has been as various in its appearances, as it has been rapid in its progress.

If ever a country deserved good treatment, and that its king should wholly devote himself to its happiness, surely it was Spain. What devotion! What patience! What blood! And what the reward—the Inquisition, and all the terror it inspires—the return of all the monastic institutions, from which the spirit of the times has taken the force that the barbaric ages could alone have communicated them, and that nothing will be again able to give to them. Exile, confiscation by the hands of avarice, the separation and the tears of families, and, that which cannot fail to follow, the dilapidation of the public stock, which, in scenes of violence and gloom, uniformly disappear.

Europe contemplates with horror that fatal contempt which induces a young prince to attempt an apology for its oppressor, and permits those cries to be heard which combine to occasion a regret that it should have contributed to restore a power so cruelly employed*. The first victims, those most severely treated, are precisely those who, inaccessible to fear and every species of seduction, who fixed to the last spot of earth that should remain to Spain, and, by a courage of the most obstinate and unexampled character, have chased their enemies from the Spanish soil, and to restore a prince who weighs them down with the very hand whose fetters these very men broke into pieces. Doubtless the cortes gave umbrage, and took precautions against the royal authority. Doubtless they have removed a part of the power necessary for the good of the people; but was not this measure necessary for the real benefit of Spain? But what crimes are there for Spain to punish? What occasioned Spain being deprived of a constitution, a benefit common to all Europe, and her being abandoned to the storms of those ancient doctrines that had already rendered her desolate, and which again began to rise in order to render her completely barren?

Let it not be said, that the situation of Spain left no other choice of government than an illiberal one, and that it was consonant to her intelligence and her wishes. To assert this, is to vilify Spain and human nature.

Spain is calumniated if we attribute to her a want of generosity and intelligence, a desire for vengeance and intellectual darkness. On the contrary, Spain is filled with generous and enlightened men. We have been struck with the circumstance when chance led us among them.

* Every thing which has been written on the subject of Spain is well known. We will not allude to the language of the opposition in England; they rarely confine themselves within limits. But we cannot reject the testimony of Lord Castlereagh. He has termed the conduct of the one party to the other in Spain, "*Disgusting proceedings.*"

If a great number of acts of abuse have marked the resentment of Spain to an unjust aggression, they have been balanced and redeemed by a far greater number of acts distinguished by their humanity, generosity, and fidelity. In Spain, as in France, the history of the revolution may be written so as to bear two aspects, that of virtue and vice; and surely, if an exact account is to be kept, it is on the most honourable side that the balance should incline.

That which induces us to believe the contrary is, that, generally speaking, we are more struck with crime. In its very nature it is notorious. Virtue is silent. Moreover, is it so astonishing that barbarity and ferocity should prevail in the classes that are ignorant, and passionate because ignorant; that excess should be committed by the dregs of a nation, inflamed by provocations, and intoxicated with fury? Spain has only reacted that which was done in France, when the populace, springing as it were from the bowels of the earth, placed the statue of Moloch on the altar, in the public places, on the tribunes, with inflammatory orations, and chose the priests from among the lowest and most depraved of mankind. Is it to be believed, that because she bent the knee, that France adored this disgusting idol? On the contrary, have we not seen with what transport she has overturned and broken it into pieces, as soon as the mob was driven to its disgusting hiding places? At the departure of this *cortege* of barbarism, civilization was reinvested with its rights. It would have been the same in Spain, if, instead of what has taken place, a call had been made on the generous principles that pervade the breasts of almost all Spaniards. The evil has arisen, because that elevation of sentiment common to Spaniards has not been duly appreciated. Of this we have had a fine proof; and all that has occurred, proves the resources to be found in such men.

•Let us cease to assert, that to govern thus is to govern with the dominant party in Spain; as if the lowest classes

of a nation could ever be the powerful party; as if that which was constituted to obey could *ever* be called to command.

To talk thus is to calumniate human nature, and to assert that government ought not to rest with virtue, but that it ought to remain with low, dull, vicious dispositions—a ruinous doctrine, as injurious to the honour as the morality of man.

If from Spain we pass into Italy, shall we find that the governments restored in that country have shown themselves much superior in intelligence and generosity?

One of them appears to think, that to hate the past, to bring back former times, is every thing, and sufficient for the happiness of the people. There, as elsewhere, hatred has become the most commendable of qualities. Not to administer the government with a view to the public happiness, but to purify it after its own manner, appears to be the object. There also there is no idea of the rights of the people, nor of a constitution, called for by their wants, balanced by a general council, and consecrated by the safeguard of an intelligent representation.

What new glory awaited the sovereign pontiff, who, shielded by the milder and courageous virtues, had found means to triumph over the arm that levelled all before it? Was there ever a more lively interest, were there ever more ardent wishes than those which accompanied him to the capitol, where, differently from the ancient heroes in their triumphal car, this prince of peace ought to have conducted in chains the bickerings, the hatred, the love of revenge—passions that disturb the repose of man. Would his triumph have been less splendid, if on his triple crown had appeared that of universal charity? If the common father of the greater part of the children of Europe, venerated even by those separated from his own communion, had called for a general reconciliation? If he had afforded the influence of his mild and insinuating virtues to quell those passions that the times had aroused? It seemed that this part, pointed out by the very nature

of his good qualities, had been reserved for him as their price. The pope, offering his hand to those that had offended him, deprived vengeance of apology. It was Constantine repelling the solicitations for avenging the insults offered to his statues, by these admirably simple expressions: "I am not wounded." Instead of this, what have we beheld? Some princes of the church citing before their tribunal other princes of the same church; the grave restoring with regret a society said to be demanded by the whole Christian, while it was repulsed by all the social world. What prince is there that would not have found himself more dependent at the appearance of these phantoms that had, for a length of time, insinuated themselves among the secret springs of government? What father did not feel himself less the master of his family at the announcement of this strange resurrection*?

From one end of Europe to the other, religion has exhibited her complaints, and most pressingly implored succours. The time was occupied on the subject of the inquisition and the free masons. The religious edifice tottered on all sides, and it was the return of the monks,

* Montesquieu, speaking of the Jesuits, observes, "that they view the pleasure of domination as the chief good of life."—*Spirit of Laws*, Vol. I. book iv. chap. vi.

This is a pleasure that this society enjoyed for a century. While it harrassed France, it is singular enough that it made some happy efforts to carry civilization into the American colonies. Its true glory consists in its missionaries, its preachers, and its professors. In this triple career, its place has not been filled up.

It is said, that the revolution would not have happened if the Jesuits had still existed. Is this assertion founded? Have not the men accused of putting in motion or preparing the way for the revolution, been for the most part educated in the colleges of the Jesuits? It would be unfair to conclude, that from them they have imbibed the ideas. This is far from our intention. But the education of these establishments, with all the advantages that must be allowed them, were not sufficient to form men sufficiently strong to resist the torrent of innovation. Hence, we may conclude, that it would have been inefficacious in our times.

said to be its ornaments, that occupied the attention. The south of Europe prosecuted, as the pest of society, these associations, which in other countries were only objects of amusement and curiosity, and which the sons of kings honoured with their connexion. The corals of the north became the terror of the south. Let us turn our eyes from this picture, one which we never wished to have contemplated.

If we return to France, shall we be more satisfied? A nation still labouring under the pangs of a severe and bloody contest of twenty-five years' duration; more proud of, than intimidated by, its wounds; not forgetful of its errors, but unwilling to be reproached for them; almost wholly grown up amidst these new doctrines; for the most part ignorant of the character of the masters that chance has restored to her; expecting every thing, and fearing nothing, from them: in such an attitude, a nation forbids the exercise of discretion.

Had she a charter, but without her immediate participation—she possessed it, but not in virtue of an acknowledged right. And when she prepared herself to enjoy its fruits, new convulsions retarded this happy time, and compelled her to trust to the future for the amelioration of the laws destined to ameliorate herself*.

* In the kingdom of the Low Countries the fundamental act was proposed for the investigation and acceptance of the notables. The same circumstance occurred in Holland, when the Prince of Orange wished to give it a constitution, after the recovery of that country. He assembled a numerous body, the object of which was to discuss and accept the proposed charter.

The King of Prussia went still farther. Crowned by victory, after three years of exertion, that had re-established his throne in all its splendour, he has of his own accord ordered the plan of a constitution, which has for its object the greatest extension of the liberty of his subjects. There is no Prussian that will not be called upon to deliberate and pronounce for its acceptance or rejection. It is to be examined and discussed at Berlin, in an assembly formed of the most distinguished men among the public functionaries, and the principal

It appeared that the general tendency of the conduct of the southern sovereigns, had for its object power, as the inherent right of the prince; that every thing was made to assimilate with this idea, and every attention was paid in order to establish it as a principle, before which all considerations of the public service were to bend. Above all, it appears that it was intended generally to efface the remembrance even of the twenty-five past years, and that it was wished that they should not confine themselves to banish them altogether from history, after the example of the muse of Chantilly, but to leave the pages blank in history itself.

The northern princes, who have been either established or re-established, have done nothing similar; and, it is much to be regretted, that detaching themselves from the ideas, otherwise so correct, of that independence which belongs to each sovereign, those of the north, the saviours of those of the south, have not, in virtue of the right that the restoration has given them, assumed the *initiative* of general conduct and general direction; and that, on an occasion when it influenced not merely the

inhabitants of the monarchy. There does not exist in history a greater trait of generosity. It only wants to be removed from us by the lapse of ages, to excite universal admiration.

The King of Wurtemberg has proposed a new constitution to his states. They have rejected it. The contest still continues.

The states have called for the interference of the powers guaranteeing the constitution of the country. Their address is very curious. We there find that the king has given them such a constitution as he has thought proper, and added modifications that circumstances required. Such is the nature of the complaint made by the states.

This state paper is still more remarkable, by the guarantee given to the former constitution of Wurtemberg by three powers. How can foreigners guarantee the constitution of a country? We know what has happened in Poland, when it had a constitution guaranteed by three of its neighbours.

What would the English say if it was proposed to them to guarantee their constitution?

dignity of some men, but the safety of all, that they should not have chalked out a path not conducting us so immediately to new precipices.

The error of this great omission has already cost the whole world dear. It furnished an opening for the return of Napoleon, attracted rather by his knowledge of the interior state of France, than called by the machinations of his accomplices. Those who contributed to the restoration, ought to have seen how it was employed.

It is worthy of remark, that princes, remounting their thrones, in a manner as sudden as it was unexpected, did not consider themselves as united in their views, and establish a concert among themselves that would have afforded much assistance to each. As great an error as that into which we fall when we commit one blunder without reference to another; that the despotism established in Spain should not dread the liberty of other countries; that Italy should cover herself with inquisitors and Jesuits, forgetting that elsewhere she had seen these phantoms reassume possession of the soil! Hence an unfortunate opinion is formed, bordering on distrust, interpreting every thing in an unfavourable sense, and calculated to facilitate the attacks which might be made on an edifice already sapped by a concomitance of causes, the injustice or futility of which did not preserve them from dangerous consequences*.

* The Court of Naples magnanimously declared itself opposed to a system of reaction, and Naples has not been persecuted by a spectacle, similar to that of which a different plan had rendered it the theatre in 1799.

The Court of Florence has conducted itself in that mild and liberal manner, characterizing a government truly paternal. It is said, that, since the age of the Medicis, there is something in the air of Tuscany, which only disposes the hearts of men to sensations of mildness and mutual benevolence.

The second return of the pope to Rome, and his restoration to the three legations, have been distinguished with that moderation well calculated to ensure the tranquillity of these countries. We cannot but congratulate ourselves on the general direction of the affairs intrusted to

CHAPTER V.

THE NEW STATE OF NATIONS.

"*It is not the coalition which has dethroned me: liberal ideas have effected it,*" said Napoleon, on his departure for Elba*. Princes! people! hear! The destiny of all of you is included in this sentence.

Behold him acknowledging, that, for having outraged the civilized feelings of his age, he, who of all men had it in his power to triumph over them, if this frightful privilege were given to any one among us, had lost his throne.

Believe his words, because they are those of a man who never was equalled in sagacity; because they are those of a man who was never surpassed in self-love; who was merely led to the confession by the conviction of the irremediable consequences of his error. "*I have sinned against liberal ideas, and I die.*" Behold the will, the *amende honorable* of the greatest warrior, of the most powerful monarch, that ever appeared on the vast theatre of the world. He overturned, he subdued every thing, people and sovereigns; but, destitute of liberal ideas, he perished.

Learn from this the power of civilization, the natural tendency of the information of the age, the spirit which

Cardinal Gonsalvi, one of the most moderate and enlightened statesmen in Europe. Austria does not appear to recollect that a revolution of many years had happened in her Italian states. For this moderation she will be rewarded by many years of tranquillity.

* At the same time he said, "*I cannot re-establish myself, I have offended the people.*"

We have seen with what alacrity foreign nations have advanced against him, and whole countries have abandoned him! After experiencing such grandeur, he finds himself alone for having offended the world!

impels and directs every thing, you who, whatever title you bear, govern and instruct mankind; for, princes or professors! it is empire, whatever name it bears, on which it operates. Be careful of what you say, as well as of what you do; for contempt is sure to be followed by dangerous consequences.

Whence arises this circumstance? From the rapid strides that the human race has made within one hundred years. Nothing is to be recognized which existed previous to that epoch. The soil has remained, but a new race has inhabited it. It remains under the same sky; but under the domination of a different mind.

In its turn, each people have shone in the world. In its turn, each sentiment has enjoyed a period of influence. If we trace the march of human nature, war, religion, have formed the principal occupation of nations. Little else is to be found in the pages of history. The round of civilization is at last complete. No one can assume peculiar honour; each has furnished his contingent.

As soon as a communication of the arts, of language; of travel, of correspondence, of commerce commenced, the character of mankind underwent a change. Shut up within themselves, their domestic affairs alone excited their attention, obtained their admiration, and called forth their applause. There were no objects of comparison. Since this period, nations communicating one with another have been struck with objects hitherto unknown to them, and their minds have been expanded. Then commenced with them, as with children, a period of age and instruction. Heretofore, their attention had been divided among a multiplicity of objects, of the nature of which they scarcely had been aware. They gave themselves up to new discussions. Things have been elevated, enlarged, while men have diminished them in proportion. Discussions of right took place of discussions of fact. By the natural progression of ideas, they no longer confined themselves

to a knowledge of the laws under which they lived, but have endeavoured to learn the spirit of those laws. They have even questioned the nature of the laws themselves, and have gone so far as to demand whether or not they were founded in justice?

Arrived at this point, the world assumed a different appearance. As has uniformly happened, powerful geniuses appeared, and possessed themselves of the new arena. Their intelligence, that at other times would have been exhausted in questions of fact and mere abstraction, has been rendered useful in the examination of questions vitally important to humanity. After the manner of genius, these writers dived into the nature of principles, and found themselves firmly established in exalted situations. The remainder of society followed in their train. Opinions extended themselves every where, were circulated and confirmed. It would have been as ridiculous to have appeared under other colours, as to have assumed a dress forbidden by the taste of the day. The communications established between nations served as the vehicle of change. A new language was introduced among all classes. The re-discovered titles of the human race became the channels of the rising generation. After a lapse of five thousand years, the world has learned that it no longer belongs to masters. Hence, the contract binding all human society has been dated from this period; and the nature of the ancient sovereignties have been altogether changed.

If there can be any doubt entertained of this general tendency of opinion in Europe, it is only necessary to examine the writings of the past sixty years;—to behold, whatever are the subjects to the elucidation of which they have been directed, that in their career the authors have acquired glory;—to recollect the school to which Catherine and Frederick were attached, and the applauses those illustrious monarchs received.

Doubtless all their works do not bear the same

stamp, nor the same grandeur of character, nor are they recommended by the same merit in their execution; but all have a similar tendency. We need not add to that union which already exists; a union which, like the instruments of a concert, cannot be heard without being distinguished. The education of all nations thus found itself suddenly completed. Formerly they understood without speaking; now, by means of the revolution, for twenty-five years they have been taught to speak. This terrible interpreter has frightened, but not separated, them. Hence, as in most cases, justice has been done. That which it possessed of barbarism, and a contempt of the rights of the people, and which inspired horror, has been rejected. The good which it contained, and which was productive of benefit to the people, has floated, been gathered up, and now remains among the treasures of nations.

The revolution only gave despots to France. Civilization has destroyed despotism in Europe. But, above all, it has brought constitutions to light, and occasioned the want of them to be universally felt. The revolution gave twenty years of war to Europe. It has pressed the deceiving delusions accompanying it farther than they ought to have been carried. Civilization, in conferring honour on generous warriors, brought war into disrepute. For the future it has rendered impracticable the character which hitherto has been the most seducing, the most alluring, to man; that of conqueror, is for the future rendered unattainable. It has banished it to Tartary. Barbarism burned Moscow—civilization preserved Paris. The revolution banished commerce, to place it under the yoke of power and war. Civilization, spreading its wings, has dismissed its gaolers and opened its prison. The revolution paid no regard to religion. Civilization has fully confirmed the feeling which convinces us of the want of a mild and tolerant religion; the protectress of order, in its social and domestic state. Civilization has served as a safeguard

for the world in the terrible career that it has ran: through it, and with the assistance of beneficent arts, of methods, more appropriate to the preservation of men, the sithe of death, that nothing can wholly destroy, has been in a small measure blunted. Population has been extricated from all the pits into which war had precipitated it for twenty years. It is to obey the dictates of civilization, that men have been uniformly engaged in impelling their battalions on their enemies, calling forth the arts, raising monuments, appropriating those of genius to the decorations of their country — destroyers on the one hand, restorers on the other. On one side they appeared to labour, to efface the outrages which, on the other, they committed against civilization; and thus acknowledging that they could not support themselves without its assistance.

We cannot but condemn that blind hatred that induces people to regard all the chiefs of the revolution as enemies of civilization. However they may have conducted themselves on other points, to it they have always been obliged to have recourse; and the instant they deserted it, they have perished. Robespierre fell when he had made France a field of civil carnage, and had completed the effectual banishment of civilization. Napoleon, who in no point of view is to be compared with him, perished in his turn, when he made Europe a field of military carnage; when he wished to form a civilization of his own, or rather to render it his slave.

The spectacle offered by this potentate is very strange. Covering with monuments of the boldest and most exquisite character every land that he visited; conveying to the learned honours and fortune as useless as they were unprecedented; erecting the most learned polytechnic schools in the universe; and all in order that the same men whom he had armed with all the means of science and of art, should increase the progress of the human mind, and acquire this mass of power, but to lay it at his feet; but to be silent for

eighteen years, and confine themselves to composing hymns in his praise.

The Turks, with their gross ignorance, which they apply to every thing, look more to results.

But the reward of blind temerity was not expected. The explosion of compressed light has overturned the author of this anti-social system. The electrical machine has given a fatal shock—the inexpert mechanic was ignorant of its springs and its play. By his fall, he learned that light shines at all times, and is quite as apt to be the means of an overthrow, as instrumental to our comforts.

In the midst of the world this terrible machine is established. To destroy it is impossible. We can only direct its operations.

If men should be afflicted with this truth, let them console themselves by looking more closely at it. They will find that that which agrees better with others, is also that which agrees better with themselves; that it is to these lights which they would so boldly extinguish, that they hitherto owe their preservation, and that they still may be preserved: and finally, that it is but in direct and good roads that they run no risk of precipices and robbers!

Nationality, truth, publicity! Behold the three flags under which the world for the future is to march. Misfortune will attend those who will not enlist under them.

The people have acquired a knowledge of their rights and dignity. They know that they are the principle and object of society, and of its exertions; that they do not exist for a few individuals, but that individuals exist for them.

More than a century ago, Fenelon uttered this truth, which but for him would never have been heard. It is known now, and it is to a pontiff educated in the most idolatrous court of his king, that the world owes

the publication of this maxim, the most important ever heard, and which has now become common property.

Hence, every thing should comport with the happiness of nations. But how is this to be effected? By them or by others? Will nations resemble indolent proprietors, who commit the charge of their affairs to other hands? Because they have done so hitherto, will they do so always?

Therefore the necessity of a government which will permit nations to interfere in their own affairs and take an immediate cognizance of them; that in due time they should determine the forms arising from the varieties that distinguish different people. That this interference should exist is indispensable.

What are its guarantecs? Truth and publicity. To claim them is to ask for that which cannot be refused; that which inevitably exists in all polished countries. Otherwise, after all that has passed, is it possible for men to be deceived? Deceive them! For how long? To hide even for a moment! for with the multitude of eyes that are open to public events, how is it to be expected that the mystery of day will not be exposed in the public squares tomorrow? Daylight has burst into all cabinets. Their proceedings are read through walls, through the most secret despatches; and the wings lent them by their couriers add but to their publicity. Europe is covered with a population of readers, of writers, of men accustomed, some to manage affairs, others to provide and become instrumental to the increase and care of their fortune. Society is a species of tribune that does not remain empty, and who can flatter themselves with changing men possessed of so many means of knowing and understanding every thing? If they cannot be deceived, still less can any thing be concealed. That which is not published in one country is sure to be so in another; and while there is a parliament in England, there will be

a tribune for all Europe. But what would be the fruit of this concealment? That which was gathered by Napoleon—a general incredulity. In the actual state of the mind of man, every thing that does not appear clear occasions distrust. They have been so deceived, that they have adopted a system of incredulity, against even what is uttered and established by authority. A giant of falsehood elevated himself in France; he made use of deceptions to establish his power. Well! he was unable to establish one. They were all contradicted by truths, the escape of which could not be prevented. Its evidence was disputed; and the man who could make every body obey him, could make no one believe him. Men, driven from the domains of truth, seek refuge in those of imagination. There only can they reach.

It may be calculated that there are in France four millions of men who, by education, profession, and fortune, can pay an attention to public affairs. It is proper to deduct from this number one hundred thousand persons, whose personal feelings render them willing to afford confidence to the authority that speaks. All the rest are on the alert. And, nevertheless, this population represents the manly and active part of the nation, and that which influences its motives. It fills almost all the inferior ranks of public administration. It serves it with eyes and with hands. It directs the interests of all the citizens, and by means of commerce it provides for their wants. This class is more numerous in the states of the North, among whom the first classes have less social consistence than in France. These are the classes that, in foreign countries as well as in France, have sapped the power of Napoleon; in France, by separating the people from him; in Germany, by raising them against him.

Therefore the relations of governments with the people are changed. Nations are become more enlightened, and consequently stronger than the governments. Hitherto it has been directly the reverse. Then the

light came only from above; now it flows in on all sides*.

Governments act only according to their own intelligence—nations with that of the mass. On what side rests the advantage? It is that which we must acknowledge, because a proof of it has just been afforded. It is the people that have redressed the governments, and have forced them to rouse themselves. Falling one after another, they had almost all sunk at the feet of Napoleon; they humiliated themselves—the nations trembled—a refuge was sought in a concealment of the outrages—the nations burned to be avenged—they joined their flags to the troops of Napoleon—they deserted his ranks, and flew into those of his enemies. Was it the Prussian government or the Prussian people that gave the signal for the German insurrection against France? When General Yorck, calculating on the new situation of Napoleon, that of his enemies, and the disposition of the Prussian nation, ranged himself on the side of the national feeling when he declared against France, in opposition to that of the Cabinet of Berlin, where were to be found intelligence and strength? Of all the men of modern times, General Yorck has struck the most decisive blow. How many times would the Cabinet of Vienna have been able to maintain its alliance with France? The nation abjured it. The army acted with regret. How did the Saxon and other German troops act? What did the Spaniards do when Ferdinand abdicated, and sought for the title of the adopted son of Napoleon?

* Montesquieu would not now say, “ *The prince impresses his character on the court, the court on the city, the city on the provinces. The soul of the sovereign is the mould which gives its form to all others.*”

There is in this assertion an evident allusion to what passed in the time of Louis XIV. Montesquieu wrote in the twilight of his reign. Now we look to nothing but substantial things. The court does not influence the city, nor the city the provinces; as much is known on one side as on the other.

Hence, it is evident that there has arisen in every country a new power, called opinion, from the empire of which nothing can be taken, at the tribunal of which governments themselves incessantly appeal; for there is not one of their acts which is not a request, or rather an appeal to this power that conducts itself mildly to those willing to make their submission to it, but which, like a torrent, swallows those who would act otherwise. It is this opinion which, introducing into Europe one change, confirms those already existing, and opens a road for others. This is manifestly its work. On all sides constitutions are established, or are promised. On all sides, in dividing the nearly-equal distances of the social contract, respect is yielded to it, and its turn is come to reign. Thus is realised that which General Buonaparte said to the Directory in 1798, on his return from Campo Formio: "*The æra of representative government is arrived.*" Therefore nations are in possession of the exercise of rights, of which, for one hundred years, they had not an idea. What a progress made by one step!

When these constitutions shall be established, will the one become the safeguard of the other? It will be with them as with books; to destroy one, it would be necessary to annihilate all the libraries and the arts with which the world abounds.

To how many improvements will not this comparison of national codes give rise? This is the most important event ever known, and one of those which will be most generally felt, and which will lay the foundation of the greatest benefits to society.

This it was that produced to France all the intelligent minds she possessed at the commencement of the revolution. Chance has otherwise disposed it; but the thing itself is so essentially good, that after twenty-five years' aberrations, it is still deemed fortunate that we have this port of common safety.

The natural course of things will lead to the British constitution. One or two examples liberally made, will

introduce many others. Besides, how will it be possible to prevent men, sooner or later, from becoming possessed of it? How will it be possible to resist a disposition which leads every one to seek what is best for himself? If they traverse the seas to gratify the most frivolous taste, how are they to be interdicted from seeking that which they think of more consequence to their own comfort, and which is to be found at their own doors? It is true, that to the titles of glory already possessed by Great Britain, she adds another, that of legislatrix of the universe; peaceable and beneficent laws; a sceptre more honourable than that which she wields over the ocean. This uniformity of legislation will establish very powerful bonds of union among men. It will render wars less frequent and more mild. The more wars become national, they will be the more rare and the less cruel, and widely different from the ancient wars, between people who had no communication with each other. There are very few causes of war among nations! When the ministers of a people shall have to propose the payment of the expenses of a war of which they cannot justify the motives, their conduct will be more closely canvassed. By an astonishing effect, the more the popular influence is increased, the higher will the power of the sovereign be elevated; the more deeply will its foundations be placed, and the more widely will its branches extend.

This Great Britain, to which we must ever refer in political legislation, presents at once to people and kings this double guarantee of their stability. What sovereign is more powerful than in the midst of a people associated with him in power? The Stuarts failed, for having wished to monopolize it. The Brunswicks behold theirs increase from day to day, because they know how to let the nation partake of it. The Stuarts erred in wishing to act separately from the national will and national interests. The Brunswicks freely unite themselves with the people, and, full of confidence in the princes, who place all confidence in them, load with their gifts those whom

they find connected with them in interest and in opinion.

Such is the route now traced out for governments. There is no embarrassment as to choice—it is civilization that has determined it. Let them remain intimately connected with their people; and, above all, not separate themselves from the power of knowledge. This separation is fatal to whomsocver it happens. To advance with the times, is like embarking on a stream that we can safely navigate.

Behold the particular character of the age in which we live; a character, the traits of which will every day be strengthened. Civilization, that divinity, the protectress of the human race, shall for the future cover all with her beneficent ægis. Ask not what particular climes. She is every where; she is with us in all situations. All her acts are at once cause and effect. Do not seek to restrain her; still less to banish her. It would be necessary to extinguish her at a blow throughout the world, and he who should be guilty of this great rashness, would hasten to recall this noble exile, and again seek for the benefits she communicates; benefits as requisite to our moral existence as the air is to sustain us by its freshness, and the sun to illuminate us by his beams.

Civilization has provided, that science, which formerly was the *apanage* of a few, should become the property of all. Knowledge is a common benefit. There is not more mind than there was formerly. We remark that there are fewer great geniuses. It is with them as with wealth. Its division affords fewer large fortunes, but creates a more general degree of comfort. Occupations that some men exclusively possessed an ability to exercise, have become common to all. How many men in France knew, thirty-years ago, what the *taille* and the *gabelle* produced? Administration, and, above all, the finances, were an occult science, in which adepts were alone initiated. Now where is it hidden in a sanctuary? Europe is filled with statistics, with the balance of all

nations. A hundred journals offer every day some tribute of knowledge, that is become a want of the first necessity, and of which, at no very distant period, we had not an idea. Public discussions, deliberative assemblies, have communicated other conceptions to the mind, and other opinions, far different to those that formerly occupied its attention. But a short time since public situations belonged exclusively to some classes or professions. Now, who has not been minister, ambassador, deputy, general, *king*? The consideration of places has, in proportion, lowered the number of candidates. We have seen the French at Grand Cairo, at Moscow, and the Russians at Paris. What a sensation will not the battles of Ivary and Bouvines excite! It is this change, which, penetrating at once into all nations, by communications that unite them, has given them another mind, other eyes, other tastes, other inclinations; and which, throughout the world, induces another conduct. At the same time, whatever may be said, nations were never more sound in their judgment. It would be as impossible to establish among them a system, destructive of their true interests, as to establish one in geometry. They have acquired so correct, so fine a *tact*, that if, for a short time, governments proceed in the wrong road, they immediately withdraw, and give them their lesson by their retreat and the silence of their language. There is no greater error than that which induces a belief, that nations consent because they are silent. Reflect a moment, and you will see if it is not then that they call out the most loudly. It is equally certain that nations, in becoming more enlightened, are not become more difficult to govern; they only wish to be governed differently. Do not attempt to propose the same thing to the wise and the ignorant man, to put the same bit into the mouth of the unbroken horse as into the mouth of one whom habit has taught to regulate his paces. In order easily to govern nations possessed of intelligence, they must be governed agreeably to their intelligence.

If you proceed in a contrary manner, they will become restless. Would it be possible to govern the British one single day in opposition to the wishes of the nation? while, on the other hand, making use of it, the government is at perfect ease, as powerful at home as it is feared in every quarter of the globe.

The disrepute into which liberal ideas have fallen do not prevent us yielding them our homage. If much error has existed under their sanction, they have, on the other hand, admitted of a sober and correct application; for there is not a liberal idea known that has not been duly acted upon within the last twenty-five years.

Reason and justice, these two inseparable sisters, require that we should not confound liberal ideas with the blunders of those who adopt them. The material is one thing, the workman another.

Those who at their ease ridicule liberal ideas, should think of their personal interests, and reflect, that it may so happen that they will not be permitted to laugh at them. In such a case it is prudent not to commence it.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE POLITICAL BALANCE OF EUROPE IN GENERAL.

FOR a century past the political balance of Europe has been the object of the solicitude of statesmen, of publicists, and, we may say, that of all the thinking men of Europe. During this whole period there has not been a book written on political subjects that has not directly, or indirectly, had the political balance for its object, of

animal version or research. The intimate communication recently established among all nations, has rendered this an inevitable circumstance*.

“ This system, foreseen by Henry IV., created by
 “ Cardinal Richelieu, confirmed by the Treaty of West-
 “ phalia, received much elucidation from King William,
 “ during the course of his protracted contest with Louis
 “ the Fourteenth. From that period to the revolution,
 “ as a matter of habit and routine, it has uniformly re-
 “ ceived an attention. That event enveloped it in a
 “ general ruin, and proved the frailty of this so much
 “ boasted edifice.

“ There are two species of political balances.

“ The one natural and independent; the other de-
 “ pendent and factitious.

“ The first consists of a proportionate equality be-
 “ tween states, that possess nearly an equal portion
 “ of power in territory, in population, in wealth, and in
 “ geographical position. Frequently very substantial
 “ inequalities are recompensed by particular advantages,
 “ and which, in fact, completely counteract them. Such
 “ as between France and Great Britain; commerce, a
 “ marine, and an insular position. These advantages
 “ compensate for the relative inequality of population,
 “ of territory and military force. Whence results a cor-
 “ respondence of strength, by means that possess no
 “ similarity? Thus the British fleets counterbalance the
 “ armies of France. They obtain by sea advantages
 “ equal to those gained on land by France. Commerce
 “ gives a wealth to Great Britain, by which she is
 “ enabled to pay those armies she procures on the Con-
 “ tinent to enter into a contest with France. Rome and
 “ Carthage also were rivals; but their power and re-
 “ sources were not equal. Prussia and Austria, Austria
 “ and Russia, Russia and Turkey, have among them,

* In this chapter, all within inverted commas is extracted from the
 “ Antidote to the Congress at Radstadt.” By M. de Pradt.

“ notwithstanding very apparent inequalities, a real
 “ parity of force. This parity of force has been the
 “ pledge of their independence, and in it they have
 “ possessed the means of defending and preserving it.
 “ The second species of balance proceeds from the
 “ natural jealousies of great states among themselves,
 “ of the protection they afford to smaller ones ; in fact,
 “ of the attention paid by each of them to the conduct
 “ of the other, in order to prevent those encroachments,
 “ which, if permitted, would prove too advantageous for
 “ one power, and too detrimental to others.

“ France, by her population, by her industry, and the
 “ character of her subjects ; by her position in the centre
 “ of Europe, commanding two seas, belted with a triple
 “ frontier, which almost as much isolates her as she
 “ could be by the ocean ; France, with all these advantages, really influences all her continental neighbours,
 “ and fully justifies the expression of the celebrated
 “ Marquis of Ormea, ‘ *Do you speak of the political
 “ balance of Europe,*’ said this intelligent minister of
 “ Victor Amadeus ; ‘ *It rests with the cabinet of Versailles, if it knows how to hold it.*’ This expression
 “ says every thing : and the conquests of Louis XIV.,
 “ and the recent triumphs of France, sufficiently prove
 “ the preponderance that this nation, well managed, can
 “ always obtain, before Russia and England can increase
 “ their establishments, and occupy her place.

“ Spain is a species of colony, for France, as well as a
 “ counting-house for other nations ; but she has no specific weight in the balance of Europe : singly, she can
 “ do nothing, being as powerless by land against France
 “ as by sea against England.” It is with Spain as with
 Turkey. Neither possess a political activity, and are
 only connected with Europe by a commerce, that both
 have permitted to be carried on to their own disadvantage. Far from effectually contributing to the balance of Europe, Europe, on the contrary, is obliged to
 look to their preservation. Great Britain should always

be ready to defend Spain against France. In the last century, Sweden, Great Britain, and Prussia, often exhibited a similar disposition, in order that they might protect Turkey against the attacks of Austria and Russia.

“ Portugal is of still less consequence in the balance
 “ of European powers. She is to be sought for at the
 “ Brazils. The body of the state is there—its head only
 “ is in Europe. Its extremities are too distant to have a
 “ real existence and self-action. Hitherto this country
 “ has not been any thing else than a commercial colony
 “ for Great Britain; such a one as Spain has been for
 “ France.” The removal of the Prince Regent to the
 Brazils has altered all the relations of this country. It
 will have an immense influence on all the nations of
 Europe. The sovereign of Portugal, who was the first
 to give the example of removing himself into another
 hemisphere, will have repeated for Europe the benefit
 that it owes to another king of that country, who dis-
 covered the Cape of Good Hope. It is not always the
 smallest states that furnish the most trivial advantages,
 and render the least service to the world.

“ Before the revolution Italy was but a gallery of
 “ pictures; a museum that all the world visited; but
 “ she never had any influence on political affairs. It
 “ was always this Italy, of which the author of the Per-
 “ sian Letters says, that, divided into an infinity of
 “ states, its princes are, properly speaking, martyrs of
 “ sovereignty. Our glorious sultans often have more
 “ wives than individuals among them have subjects.
 “ Their habitual divisions keep their states open, like cara-
 “ vauseras, for the first who choose to take up their abode.
 “ This it is that compels them to attach themselves to
 “ great sovereigns, and partake of their fears, as well
 “ as of their friendship. This picture remained un-
 “ changed till the French invaded this beautiful country,
 “ and they had well studied it. There was no part of it
 “ for which they might have not fought longer, but the

“ efforts* would have been fruitless; from a distribution
 “ of powers, in which it was impossible to trace any
 “ plan, or any thing that announced the least appear-
 “ ance of order in the arrangements for this country, all
 “ these contests produced but a wretched result.

“ Thus Germans reigned at Milan, and could only
 “ reach there by crossing the territory of Venice. The
 “ King of Sardinia, placed between Austria and France,
 “ could balance neither the one nor the other. Each
 “ wished to devour him. In these disputes he furnished
 “ the road and the field of battle; and, in fact, the
 “ jailor of the Alps was too feeble to keep the keys.
 “ On the side of the Milanese his position was still
 “ worse; for, in his affairs with the Germans, he did
 “ not possess the advantages that the Alps offered him
 “ against the French. Hence Italy was defended neither
 “ against France nor against Germany. His passive
 “ state was aggravated by the dissensions of her petty
 “ princes, all prepossessed the one against the other, and
 “ always at variance.” Thus the King of Sardinia
 feared and encroached on the Duke of Milan*; who, in
 his turn, frightened Genoa.

France surprised Italy in the midst of this confusion of
 inclinations and interests; of this absence of any Italian
 public spirit; but its interference in the affairs of Italy
 has, at least, had its effect; and this effect will continue
 to create a determined spirit of independence. At this
 moment we may speak of Italy as we speak of liquors in
 a state of fermentation; we must wait for their preci-
 pitation in order to ascertain their quality.

“ The south of Europe was wholly a stranger to the
 “ balance of Europe. We only begin to perceive traces
 “ of it on arriving in Germany and advancing towards
 “ the north. There at least there existed a species of
 “ plan, and a general corrective, for the innumerable

* “ The Milanese is an artichoke that we must eat leaf by leaf,” said
 Victor Amadeus.

“ defects that existed in the bosom of its states. The
“ Treaty of Westphalia had regulated the political state
“ of Germany, and formed its code of public law. A
“ great number of powers had concurred in its formation
“ and support; and, in later times, states, foreign even
“ to Germany, had attached themselves to it. But the
“ multitude of changes, produced in the course of time,
“ had so altered the substance of this treaty, as to render
“ it wholly inadequate to actual circumstances. The
“ cessions made to Louis XIV. violated its integrity.
“ Some of the powers that had assisted at its formation,
“ particularly Sweden, had lost their influence, and were
“ not attached to the empire by other than impercep-
“ tible ties. New powers, such as Prussia, had raised
“ themselves in the bosom of the empire. Russia ad-
“ vanced towards it every day. On the contrary, Austria
“ detached herself in a similar proportion, and appeared
“ more willing to bear the title than the burthen.

“ The constant opposition of Austria to Prussia had
“ divided Germany into two parts: all were ranged
“ under two banners; so that there was nothing more
“ rare in Germany than a German:” there were only
Austrians and Prussians. The necessity of defending
themselves in the latter periods of Napoleon, has revived
the German spirit, but it visibly tends to make it again
fall into its first division. In fact, a higher and lower
empire still exists in Germany.

“ Austria possesses an immense extent of territory,
“ which contributes as much to her weakness as her
“ strength: for she has neighbours every where, and
“ frontiers no where. In her distant possessions in the
“ Low Countries she succeeded to a degree of embar-
“ rassment still greater than that experienced by Spain:
“ the latter could send those armies by sea which
“ Austria could only despatch by land. These conti-
“ nental colonies do not answer; inasmuch as maritime
“ powers can always invade them, and at a little
“ expense.

“ The Low Countries placed Austria in a state of
 “ dependence on France and on the north. The Mila-
 “ nese made part of Italy his enemy. With all these
 “ embarrassments, Austria had to encounter those of the
 “ empire ; a body inert as to useful political action, but
 “ ever in a state of agitation.

“ Poland, for one hundred years, has not had a profit-
 “ able existence for Europe. If the partition of this
 “ country outraged morality, its government outraged
 “ reason. Morally speaking, nothing will authorize
 “ partition ; but, since the appearance of Russia on the
 “ great theatre of the world, it has become indispensable.
 “ A new river has begun to flow from the pole to the
 “ south of Europe. A part of the globe, if the expres-
 “ sion may be allowed, has altered the direction of its
 “ course, and has imposed a new load on Europe. It
 “ now has to support a burthen that heretofore it would
 “ not have been able to bear. Similar to those rocks,
 “ that, separating from the mountains, tumble to the
 “ bottom ; and, dragging down every thing that comes
 “ in the way, the unwieldy body of the Russian empire,
 “ once put in motion on the side of Europe, will pursue
 “ its career till she meets barriers strong enough to
 “ arrest it. These barriers are in Poland.”

Prussia is a power newly created. She has scarcely
 existed one hundred years, and has passed the eighteenth
 century in aggrandizing herself. Not being able to ex-
 tend her territory at the expense of powers stronger than
 herself, nor of those which are weaker ; sought after
 by France, dreaded by Austria, the safeguard of the
 German empire, the shield of Holland ; also strong in
 the necessity she is under of using her own means,
 capable of defending, unable to destroy ; before the revo-
 lution Prussia was one of the main supports of the
 balance of Europe. None of the innovations that have
 since taken place have sprung directly from her. She
 has known how to lend and conform herself to them for
 her own safety, in order to remain in a state of relative

inferiority, that, in politics, is equal to an effectual deprivation; but far from provoking invasions, effected or projected against other states, she has armed herself against them. For instance, the treaties of Teschen, of Reichenbach, and the line of demarcation from 1795 to 1801. If, since this period, Prussia has accepted territories that did not belong to her, we may say that, in sinning against morality, (on this subject we do not presume to judge,) she has not sinned against the European balance; for these additions of territory were either compensations for losses experienced, or equalizations proportioned to the acquisitions of the neighbouring powers, which it was necessary she should approach in the same proportion as they approached her territory: and that which finally demonstrated the importance of Prussia in the political balance was, that rather surprised than conquered, more beaten by the inexperience of her officers than the strength of her enemy, Prussia fell in her first contest with France, at the very moment that the great empires of France and Russia came into contact, and fought battles which gave the world a new appearance. Of such importance is Prussia to Europe:—placed as the centre of her political balance, and always sufficiently strong to prevent one of the scales outweighing the other.

Russia, like Prussia, born as to Europe in the eighteenth century, has uniformly disturbed it. Instead of steadying the balance, her conduct has been diametrically opposite. The Russian empire is one that for the last century has continued in a state of increase.

Finland, one of its great objects, was not annexed to it. In the hands of Sweden, this country was to Petersburg what Normandy would be to Paris in the hands of Great Britain. Neither the one nor the other could escape from a power so effectually surrounding them. These are objects, the possession of which nations regard as of the first necessity; so much so, that they cannot be quiet until they have gained them.

At this time, Russia asked Europe to watch her forward march, promising that this step should be the last; and protesting, that having thus arrived at the height of her desires, she should only wish to enjoy repose, and contribute to that of others.

This would surely be the most noble employment for her immense forces; as much the more formidable, as an extensive experience has just proved, that to her alone on ~~one~~ the continent belongs the frightful privilege of being able to commit an outrage on others that they cannot retaliate upon her.

When Sweden possessed a large territory in Germany and in Russia, she influenced the former nearly as much as Prussia does in our times. The latter had not yet an existence; Poland was in a state of chaotic barbarism: but, since Sweden, in consequence of the wars of Charles the XIIth, lost almost all her continental possessions, her sovereigns, withdrawn into the extreme regions of the north, were rather spectators than actors on the great theatre of the world. If the union of Calmar could have been preserved, it would have given an importance to Sweden very superior to that which she now enjoys. But, by the annexation of Norway to Sweden, this power has assumed a rank nearly equal to that assigned her by the union of Calmar.

Invulnerable at home, unable to conquer, not liable to be conquered, formed into one body by the acquisition of Norway, as she was divided into two parts by the possession of Finland, Sweden has obtained a very great defensive force and offensive strength, very proper for the support of the political balance. For the future, Sweden can have but two enemies. To Russia, she will be the England of the north; and the guardian of the Baltic against England, as well as the ally of the powers on its shores. Having no longer to defend her interior, she will be able to turn all her attention to internal and foreign commerce. This com-

merce will give her wealth, and her foreign traffic will furnish her with a numerous and hardy marine; which, united with that of the other powers of Europe, will one day perhaps force England to temper with justice the exercise of her maritime superiority. “Denmark weighs heavier in the balance of commerce than in that of politics. Her states are too small, too much separated from the Continent, too detached from one another; and, for the most part, too much neglected by nature. The loss of Norway completed her loss of any species of importance. By the side of the great states that are formed on all sides, Denmark is nothing more than a great and fine lordship, invested with a royal crown. Since the war of the succession in Spain, Holland has lost all active influence in the affairs of Europe. Devoting herself entirely to commerce, she has given up playing the part acted by William and his magistrates, who were the constant enemies of Louis the XIVth. As to England, it is a matter of question whether she maintains or subverts the political balance. She governs the seas, reigns over commerce, and gathers the wealth of all nations. The latter were sometimes compelled to unite against her. Inattackable in her islands, present every where with her thousand ships, she enjoys with satisfaction the storms she raises on the Continent. They constitute her safety; and, if she takes any pains to assuage them, it is when differences proceed too far, or when they threaten some of the parties that she has an interest in preserving, with ruin. Thus, in 1790, England assuming the part of France, prevented Turkey from falling into the clutches of Russia.”

Fortunate is the lot of England; for undoubtedly she is the most powerful nation in Europe. Inaccessible at home, it is not possible to arrive at London by the roads, of the nature of those that lead to Vienna, Berlin, and Moscow; and, may I say? even to Paris.

The element that must furnish the road belongs to her. For how many ages will Europe have to labour, in order to enable her united flags to brave those of England alone! Imprudent provocations have taught her how to defend her shores. Other provocations have led her to the formation of armies, and have furnished her with names illustrious by their exploits. In vain has the most intelligent of her enemies sought for her vulnerable points. On all sides he found a robust body, rendered impenetrable by the double shield of the best constitution existing in the universe; and that unanimity and patriotism that have attached her people to the interests of their country. In vain has he attempted to unstring the nerve of her power, in attacking her finances and the commerce of which they are the soul. In vain has he directed against them all the efforts of his mind and his strength. Similar to those singular productions of nature that revive after the steel has mutilated them, her power has augmented in proportion to the measures taken to restrict it; and England attacked in its credit, deceived the hopes entertained on the subject of her exhaustion, and enjoyed the delusions of her enemies. She replied to those prognostics which were formed as to her future distress, by miracles of wealth hitherto unknown to the world, by a devotion that had the air of calling for sacrifices, in order that she might make them*.

* Financial predictions have not been more fortunate in England than in France.

For a long time Mr. Pitt founded his hopes on the assignats, the mandats, and rescriptions; and on all the financial operations which the Convention and the Directory successively adopted.

Also for a long period M. d'Ivernois did not permit a year to pass, without announcing that the French government was about to sink, in consequence of the state of its finances; and even fixed the day, the 31st December.

On the other hand, the French were not in arrear, as to predictions equally sinister and quite as vain.

Happy, the people with whom every new want has the effect of opening a new source of wealth. For example, to what an elevation has not the power of Great Britain raised her? The war has rendered her mistress

It seems that on both sides the question was not understood. On the side of England, they fancied a cause of destruction that which was not even a cause of embarrassment to the French government, still less to the French people. Behold the facility with which money, sufficient for all wants of the country, has been obtained, after all the paper that Ramel, comptroller-general of the finances after Cambon, had valued at not more than forty-five milliards, had disappeared. During all this time, there was not an acre of ground less cultivated, nor one house less built. Where, then, was the embarrassment of the finances?

On the side of France, the error was in searching for the wealth of England in her budget, and not in her resolution to sacrifice all her wealth for her preservation. Here it was that she found a resource for every *deficit*. It had for its mortgage, England, Scotland, Ireland, India, America, and the commerce of the world. All would have been exhausted, rather than she would yield. Hence, what signifies the *deficit* and the prognostic to which they gave rise? We have only to look to what has happened.

Besides, it is a false doctrine that a state necessarily sinks in consequence of the bad state of its finances. If it were true, there would not be a state in existence in Europe. The financial affairs of Austria, for fifteen years, have been in a most pitiable state. The monarchy has never been more powerful, more victorious.

For eighteen years, the finances of Prussia have scarcely had an existence. Prussia is more powerful than ever, and the Prussians have been at Paris twice in fifteen months.

A general rule: financial difficulties only affect the weak and the timid. Another general rule; in revolution there are no finances, neither for one party nor another; for the states that create them, and who attack, nor those who defend themselves. It is only after the contest that financial systems can be established.

America, for instance, did she think of her financial system during the war of independence? Assuredly not. Besides, they were in great disorder when General Hamilton took charge of them, and established a system which attracted to America the great treasures of the whole world, until the moment when she had the imprudence to enter into the contest with Great Britain; a contest in which, to adopt a vulgar expression, she had "*nothing to gain but blows.*"

of the most important parts of the globe. See, how fearless she floats on the ocean, and casts her anchor at every spot that commands every sea; thus enclosing the world in the net that she appears to have thrown over it. The domination of Great Britain differs widely from that of the great continental powers. It is very true that she cannot, as France has so often done, march her armies to all the capitals of Europe. They never can reach her's. She strikes at a distance, and always makes a sure blow. Her armies are at once in India, and before Boston*.

To this direct influence it is necessary to add that of the wealth, which, for the past twenty-five years, has furnished Great Britain with the means of supplying the wants that other powers experience in the commencement of their operations; and by which she makes vassals of these people, just as much as if they were tributary to her. Hence Great Britain is the preponderating power; and still more preponderating, as this power is the combined result of a state of things of which nothing can deprive her; namely, her insular position; her marine strength; her constitution and public spirit†.

“The result from this picture of Europe is, that

* In 1811, we have beheld a British armament leaving the coasts of Malabar and Coromandel, in order to go and disembark twenty-five thousand men on the shores of the Isle of France. This circumstance is unequalled in the annals of the world. In the space of ten months, a British army left Bayonne and Bordeaux, appeared before New Orleans, in Canada, and returned to the plains of Picardy.

We here behold the value of the sea to those who have made themselves its masters. Thus do we see realized in favour of England what a French poet has said,

“Le trident de Neptune est le sceptre du monde.”

† Speaking of the British, Montesquieu says, “They are the people who best understand to render themselves superior in three great things; religion, liberty, and commerce.” Spirit of Laws, book xx. chap. viii.

“ that there never has been a balance of power formed
 “ on fixed and regular bases.

“ The treaty of Westphalia is the only monument
 “ of this kind. Still it was applicable to but a small
 “ portion of Europe. It has given rise to an idea of
 “ a balance, as well as of a necessity, of restraining one
 “ great power by the efforts of another, and to guarantee
 “ the smaller ones by an honourable dependence. But
 “ in this plan there is more of habit than of calculation
 “ to be discovered ; it is true that some powers are
 “ tolerably well balanced ; but they do not form a com-
 “ bined whole, nor are they adapted to a general
 “ system.

“ The shocks which Europe has experienced since
 “ the peace of Westphalia have not been sufficiently
 “ powerful nor general to render it desirable to go
 “ much farther. The favourable opportunity offered
 “ at the commencement of the war of the succession of
 “ Spain was lost. Also that, at the epoch of the con-
 “ test for the succession of the Emperor Charles the
 “ Sixth, was missed.

“ At a critical period Europe was surprised by the
 “ French revolution, produced by an infinity of causes,
 “ all of them calculated to exhibit the weakness of her
 “ system. They were,

“ First, The resentment of Great Britain to France,
 “ for having become the auxiliary of the United States
 “ in the war of independence.

“ Second, The war made by Russia on the Ottoman
 “ Porte.

“ Third, The quarrels of Austria in the Low Countries.

“ Fourth, The discontent in Holland with Joseph
 “ the Second, on account of the war of the Scheldt.

“ Fifth, The imprudence of the latter, in his war
 “ against the Turks.

“ Sixth, The internal dissensions in Holland, pro-
 “ duced by Prussia.

“ Seventh, The coolness that this interference, produced between France and her ancient ally. ’

“ Eighth, The rapacity of the three powers as to Poland, to whose political existence they gradually put an end.

“ Ninth, The apprehensions of Austria on the score of Italy.

“ Some powers found themselves in a state of increase, or, to use the expression, at their acmé, such as Prussia and Russia. Others, on the contrary, experienced a decline, and were at the lowest ebb.

“ Hence, all was disorder and division in Europe. Never were the bonds of association more relaxed. The revolution had not much trouble in breaking up interests so discordant. There was no compact and well-connected body that could offer any resistance.”

We shall soon see whether the Congress at Vienna has put more cement into its work.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE OPPORTUNITIES LOST DURING THE LAST CENTURY OF ESTABLISHING THE POLITICAL BALANCE OF EUROPE.

IN the fortune of nations, as in that of individuals, there are always circumstances decisive of their fate. • It is but seldom that they meet with those opportunities, of which it is necessary that they should avail themselves, for they perhaps will not again occur but after a long interval of time. Fortune, attentive to the welfare of nations, often offers them this species of resource, in order that they may be enabled to correct their errors, or repair their losses. But it is rare that they ever take advantage of

the opportunity, and prove themselves, by embracing it, more intelligent than individuals. The passions that preclude the latter from profiting of these happy correctives of their situation, do not operate less actively on nations, and in the same manner divert their attention from making the attempt to give their affairs a direction by which a good use of these favourable opportunities might be made.

Europe will afford us four great examples of a forgetfulness of this sort, exhibited during the past century.

Charles the Second, King of Spain, died without children, but not without states. The latter were to be found every where.

His will, made not unlike those of which a picture is to be found in the theatres, by the manœuvres of avaricious heirs, was opposed by other acts more or less clear, more or less legitimate. But it was attacked more efficaciously by almost all Europe, which, under the guidance of the greatest politician of his time, King William, who, having been twenty-five years in arms, and greatly jealous of Louis the Fourteenth, was not disposed to behold the house of this prince receive an inheritance that gave him for an ally even the power that had fought with France for two hundred years; an inheritance which, under the grandson of Louis the Fourteenth, would make the Spanish Low Countries a French province, place at the gates of Holland, and without a blow, the same sovereign whom the patriotism of the Hollanders exalted, so far as to inundate their own country, and leave themselves only able to shut the gates of Amsterdam.

Europe could not behold with tranquillity, that this arrangement should be permitted to destroy its liberties, in giving to France, under the name of Spain, a great part of Italy and the wealthy America. The war of the succession burst out and embroiled Europe in a bloody contest for twelve years; and as it had been instigated by some with a view to personal interests, and by others, more from a hatred of Louis the Fourteenth than an

attachment to Europe, it failed in its object. Spain remained to Philip the Fifth; and the branches torn from this superb tree were not employed for the general benefit of Europe, but to satisfy individual ambition, or rather to consolidate pretended rights. The war of the succession terminated like a cause between fatigued and exhausted lawyers, rather than as an affair between statesmen; and however Europe at that time may have calculated on names, both in the course of war and the business of the cabinet, their celebrity has not long since been surpassed. It was not at that period as it is at present throughout Europe. With the exception of the British, all individuals were excluded from any participation in public affairs. Hence, political transactions centred in the cabinets of princes, partook, under their hands and in those of their ministers, of a complexion purely personal, and which induced them to prefer the affections of their families, and the private taste of princes, to the general interests of the people. So much is the state of nations changed, that at this time such a system could not be established without great clamour.

The succession of the Emperor Charles the Sixth presented to the European powers a second opportunity for a regular arrangement of policy among the various members of which they were composed.

Surely there was great injustice in speculating on the youth and weakness of a princess, presuming her in the age of inexperience, and thinking her fortunate in preserving one part of her states by the sacrifice of the others. It was a horrible act of violence; and with the exception of the imperial dignity, elective in its nature, and which may without impropriety be transferred to another person, we cannot conceive how they could apply to Maria Theresa any other public law than that which had existed among other sovereigns; and how she would not have been able to inherit the possessions of her father, by the same title that all other

princes inherit theirs. It partakes of ideas highly injurious to public law, and is most essentially forgetful of that of nations. The latter are not litigious; and a thousand wars occasioned by the right of succession in princes, would have been averted by an understanding of the positive rights of the people.

Instead of turning her attention to herself, Europe devoted it to Prussia; the imperial dignity, and the apanages that were to be created in Italy, in favour of some cadets of the House of Bourbon. Then it was that the great Frederick averted the danger, by his appearance on the political theatre, and then first dawned the Aurora of his reign—a reign, the glory of which never has been eclipsed. Then it was that Messieurs de Belleisle, so blustering and noisy, and now so perfectly forgotten,—a fate reserved for every administration that possesses a character neither national nor European,—succeeded in plunging Cardinal Fleury into a war, of which that venerable statesman wholly disapproved. The courage, the unconquerable firmness of Maria Theresa, surmounted all these obstacles. They disappeared before the imposing character of a young princess, as distinguished by the beauty of her person, as by the elevation of her rank, and which so well knew how to inflame and arouse her subjects by one of those traits which constitute the true secret of a mother's heart.

Thus for many years chances were balanced, and the war terminated, as wars will ever terminate, when it was waged without a great object, by weakness and intrigue, by family arrangements; and eventually, by a total forgetfulness of the general interests of Europe.

Maria Theresa preserved the central part of her states and the imperial crown, the ancient apanage of her family, by the sacrifice of Silesia, and that of some parts of her dominions in Italy. The Low Countries were restored to her; but much less on her own account, than of the step being hostile to France and

friendly to Holland. The barrier treaty was renewed, instead of advantage being taken of the opportunity to unite Holland and Belgium, and to establish a kingdom in Italy. But these grand measures surpassed the policy of the times. Hence, this second epoch was not more favourable to the balance of Europe than the first had been. The succeeding periods have not secured it more essentially. If ever a time had occurred when it might have occupied the attention, it was at the epoch of the revolution, which having altered, renewed every thing, and which having placed Europe at the disposition of France, did not give, during the course of this long neglect of the general interests of Europe, any other tendency than to furnish this country, not with the superiority, (that she had already,) but the supremacy; not the general safety of Europe, but the administration of its government.

At Rastadt, at Campo Formio, at Presburg, at Tilsit, at Vienna in 1809, at Prague, there was not heard a single word, there was not a single look cast, that had the slightest tendency to establish a balance in Europe..

It was principally the Emperor Napoleon who showed himself the most destitute of this public spirit for Europe. For him this quarter of the globe only existed, but as a house in ruins, on the foundations of which he proposed to erect an edifice after new plans and according to views wholly personal. "I have," as this sovereign often said, "a great political system." This manner of operating was not more to the taste of France than to that of Europe, for he well knew that France, for her own reputation, would at all times, and in all places, applaud the victories of her armies, because they redounded to his honour, and were his work. But this motive did not induce her to applaud those enterprises that have merely produced to him the glory of triumph. Thus France was highly delighted with the victory of the Moskowa, but she was far from approving of the war with Russia.

In her conquests, France has exhibited a good sense, of which her chief has been destitute. For her, the line of demarcation and the point at which she wanted to stop, was the Rhine. That was the only thing of which France was truly desirous, and the abandonment of which she has deeply regretted.

How much is it to be deplored, that a mind, the views of which were so extensive and the ideas so luminous, as that of the Emperor Napoleon, should have suffered itself to wander so far as to dream of amalgamating of materials so hostile to one another, without the common bonds that are to be found in geographical situation, in language, in manners, in habits; that he should ever be able to make Rome and Lubeck members of the same state; that all people should consent to a common and voluntary forgetfulness of all the antecedents of the glory and the renown that belonged to them. On the contrary, why did Napoleon not discover the solidity that would have been attached to his own establishment, or that of an order of things that should have combined the interests of all Europe? How is it that he has measured not only the grandeur, the real grandeur that he would have acquired in the eyes of all Europeans, by resolving the still irresolvable problem of the true system of Europe?

No one can doubt, in fact, who recollects what has occurred in the last twenty-five years; (and who has not regarded the events that have passed in the course of them with indignation and disdain?) that no opportunity similar to that which presented itself to Napoleon has ever offered itself to any other man. He had done for people, what may be said of the Greeks, at the end of the Trojan war,

“ *Fracti bello, fatisque repulsi.*”

On all sides peace, stability, and a tolerable degree of order, were demanded. The fear inspired by France was great. The renown of her chief redoubled this fear.

He was able to propose any thing for which he wished, in order to effect the regular arrangement of Europe, and he could have obtained any thing. What do I say? They would have esteemed themselves happy in obeying him. Had he formed this establishment, which combined the interests of all, he would have received as many benedictions as he did in France for the re-establishment of religious worship, and for all that he had done in the cause of civilization: for it was less to the warrior, than the restorer of social order, that the wishes and submission of France were addressed. It would have been the same with Europe. Of the entire and absolute resignation with which France had given herself up to the direction of Napoleon, by her conviction of the superiority of his views and the purity of his intentions, all Europe would have partaken on the subject of the order of her policy.

More fortunate than ever had been any man in power, in the means of influencing his equals, Napoleon would have found the world so fatigued, that he might have done any thing in the name of the general repose. Every thing was so completely overturned, that he had the power of reconstruction, when and how he chose, completely within his reach. He found terror so perfectly established, that the absence of evil, or even of contests less rude, would have passed for a benefit.

If in the place of that mass of negotiations and treaties that parcelled out Germany — if in the place of the successive re-unions of Italy, he had founded a good order of things for the one, at the same time keeping within the limit of the Rhine, the loss of which is now so regretted; and if he had profited of the vacancy of a great part of the territories of Italy, in order to establish a system which we shall, in a future page, explain more fully, he would have seen every one fly to him, and make their own happiness the pledge of his stability. But it was otherwise ordered by Providence. It has willed that to the power with which he had been

invested to overturn every thing, he should not add the knowledge of establishing any thing; that to the ability he possessed to restore every thing, should not be added the means of assuring the existence of any thing; and that for having substituted himself for Europe, he should terminate his career by being expelled from her shores.

Thus was lost the finest opportunity ever offered for at last constituting Europe into a well organized body, and of finding in this establishment a reparation for the evils she has suffered, and a solid guarantee against their return.

We shall soon see whether the Congress at Vienna, which forms the last epoch, has legislated on the same occasion with a view to universality and stability, the absence of which has characterized the epocha of which we have just spoken.

CHAPTER VIII.

WHAT HAS BEEN DONE IN EUROPE FOR THE
LAST ONE HUNDRED YEARS TOWARDS ESTAB-
LISHING THE BALANCE OF POWER.

POLITICAL Europe, for the most part, resembles ancient cities, the plans of which appear to have been traced by a race of men hostile to right lines, the sun, and the air. To move about, to see clearly, and breathe freely, we must betake ourselves to the suburbs.

All the ancient political organization of Europe was tortuous and gloomy. The various states of which it is composed, were principally formed from the wrecks of the Roman empire. For fifteen hundred years, this political vulture has gnawed at this great body without having been able to exhaust it.

All the states have been formed by the fortuitous *aggregation* of a multitude of others, more or less extensive, and which a variety of causes have added to them.

At first France, with her Roman Gauls, then with the kingdoms of Arles, of Austrasia, of Orleans, of Soissons; with the duchies, the earldoms, and the sovereignties, which were successively formed from the wreck of the Roman empire, and which have terminated by being absorbed into that state now called France. Each had, as it happened, its king, duke, or earl.

Germany, Italy, took the same direction. On all sides they availed themselves of the circumstances of the times to arrondise their territories, and avail themselves of all the conveniences within their reach.

Eleanor of Guyenne, in the shape of a dower, invested a king of England with one of the finest provinces of France. This dower cost the two countries three hundred years of war. Maria, of Burgundy, transferred to the House of Austria a superb heritage, formed, in a great measure, of the spoils of France. The torches of this hymenical connexion lighted up a war of many years' duration between the two houses reigning over France and Austria. The rights of Louis the XIIIth to the Milanese, cost France sixty years of war in that country; which, occupied and lost a thousand times by the French, appeared, at each new attempt on their part, fully to confirm this sentence of Livy. *Non sine providentissimo deorum immortalium consilio, Alpes, Italiam et Galliam, diviserunt.* Nature even has issued a decree for their separation. But Europe has ever been governed in the spirit of property by patrimonial title, and not with a view to political and general good order.

If princes, whose numbers are few, have divided among their heirs those states too extensive or too much detached from one another, these arrangements have all been made with relation to their families, and not to the political order of Europe: This arose

from a want of civilization, and from the little communication which people had with each other.

The first trace of any solicitude for the general interests of Europe, is not to be found farther back than the treaty of Utrecht; by which it was stipulated that in no case could the two crowns of France and Spain be placed on the same head. This was an act truly European.

Besides, to take and keep for one's self has nearly formed the whole of the diplomatic dictionary of Europe.

The present period is not destitute of well assorted arrangements in the political constitution of Europe. We have just seen two formed that cannot be otherwise than highly favourable.

1st. The union of Norway with Sweden.

2d. That of Belgium and Holland.

We have already shown the advantages of the union of Sweden to Norway. That which is beneficial for both parties is equally so to Europe, very appropriate to the two countries, and an arrangement of which all Europe is called to reap the advantages.

Not less benefit will be derived from the union of Belgium and Holland; and the more extensive this connexion, the more it will become useful to the whole body of Europe. This subject requires a peculiar developement.

Holland, in her ancient state, did not serve for any useful purpose in the political balance of Europe. She was only its bank and storehouse, and she no longer formed one of its body politic.

The population of Holland was very contracted; too much occupied in commercial pursuits to be able to furnish a national army. In consequence of this circumstance, the Dutch army was almost wholly composed of foreign troops; in fact, this army had ceased to be so considered. Her marine was rather extensive: her colonies were badly provided with troops, and still were

difficult to keep, in consequence of those principles of dissolution that, for twenty-five years, had generally affected colonial affairs.

Belgium, abandoned to herself, did not present any stronger guarantees to Europe. Austria had actually, and intentionally, renounced the right. It was at Venice, and at Milan, that she completed the surrender of Brussels.

The Belgians have exhibited a persevering attachment to Austria. This circumstance does honour both to the government and the people. It could not fail to add to the mutual regret at their separation. But Austria had, for a long time, felt the inconvenience of this continental colony. She was unable, like Spain, to land there from her ships, and which thus placed her in a state of dependence on the whole world. One year of war would absorb the produce of ten years of peace. The country could be invaded before the corps destined for its defence could leave their garrisons. The enemy was at Lisle, and the defenders in Bohemia and Hungary.

In fine, the possession of Belgium by Austria deprived the country of the enjoyment of that commerce, for which, by her natural situation, she was so well calculated, by her rivers, her canals, and the genius of her inhabitants.

Belgium independent, under a particular prince, would not have placed her in such a state as to be useful to the general balance of Europe. It might have flattered the taste of the inhabitants, but it must terminate by proving itself a dear bargain to all. Thus isolated, Belgium was a prey to the whole world, without being of any direct utility to any one. In this condition they could continue to interdict her maritime commerce, and restrain her domestic traffic, by a multiplicity of laws framed by the custom-houses.

Her connexion with some sovereignty of the empire offered the least inconveniences. We cannot see to what sovereign of Germany, Belgium could have been assigned

with the least appearance of utility to the two countries and Europe.

It must be allowed that all these suppositions want plausibility. The more we examine them, the more evident appears their vanity, and the necessity of returning to the only combination that nature and the power of things have consecrated; that of the union of Holland with the Low Countries.

Let us developpe still farther the advantages likely to arise to the two countries and to Europe.

Geography, climate, language, habits, unite the two people. Religion does not oppose this union; for it is not possible to effect a community of political interests, if religious opinions and duties are at variance with them. Almost all the sovereigns of Germany present a picture of the same mixture, without any inconvenience. The king of Saxony exercises the Catholic religion with the greatest regularity, and has never lost the good opinion and affections of his people, who are zealous Lutherans. Near him the King of Prussia, a Lutheran, is an object of equal affection to his Catholic and Protestant subjects. Catholicism prevails in Silesia; and in the war which has just been terminated, this country has been distinguished by its attachment to Prussia. Surely an uniformity of religious opinions between the prince and his subjects, as well as between the subjects themselves, is a principle productive of tranquillity and ease to the government: but a difference of opinion does not exclude the possibility of a government calculated for the good of the country. Besides, the sixth part of Holland professes the same religion as the Belgians. Perhaps we may say that the great number of Catholics in the two countries will become the object of that particular regard and management which prudence will not fail to present. Hence all natural conveniences concur in the union of Belgium and Holland.

Let us add, that the conveniences of Europe are not less consulted by this union.

A state placed in such a situation as to be able to arrest the first movements of a powerful enemy, too feeble herself to conquer, but sufficiently strong not to be conquered without a contest, and without giving time to its defenders to come within succour; equally interested in protecting its neighbours, and to weaken any: this state, we say, is well constituted. It will not prove itself offensive to any. It will be an object dear to all.

These countries will contain a population of more than five millions of inhabitants. Their political wealth is sufficient for great public services. Let us recollect what Frederick performed with a much smaller number of subjects.

The riches of these two countries are very great, whether we estimate those arising from commerce or from agriculture. Hence it possesses financial resources equal or superior to those of greater states. Thus constituted, the kingdom of the Low Countries, and situated as it is, will place a weight in the balance of Europe at once conservative and pacific; and which, without it, would not exist. It covers France from the attacks of the north, and the north from the attacks of France.

Its principle should be not to permit the north to intrude upon France: on the other hand, not to allow France to encroach on the north. It is a body interposing itself to prevent the shocks, and deaden the blows, that may pass between them.

In this circumstance there is nothing disquieting to France. What, by its means, can be effected against her? If it should produce hostility, even with foreign assistance, it is into the centre of the Netherlands that its own armies would proceed from Lisle and Valenciennes, and there, as they have always done, establish the theatre of war.

On her part, France has no longer any interest in making an attack; for surely she will not continue to preserve this disposition. After all that has passed since

the occupation of Belgium, is it to be believed that an invasion of this country would not become a signal for a call to arms, that would be general throughout Europe? At the same time, is it to be credited that Great Britain, unconquerable as she is, so interested in the preservation of this arrangement, which is partly her work, would not cover the seas with her thousand vessels, interdict all communications with the ports of France, and lay open all her treasures, in order to arm the world against her? Hence, there can be no doubt, but that France would obtain Belgium at the price of a general war, and without the hope of eventually preserving it.

Let us be bold enough to say, that it is not its sincere regrets, but its true interests, that it is the duty of France to consult. It is at Bordeaux,—it is on its coasts,—it is in its colonies, that it ought to calculate on the price of a precarious acquisition; and that it will leave as much less on the one hand as it will produce on the other.

France ought to found her system on new circumstances; and these circumstances should induce her to consider the United Provinces of the Low Countries in the same light as she did when they were those of Spain, and to abandon a jealousy of their interests for a disposition that should have common preservation for its object.

An improper policy may tend to create disputes between the states. A more enlightened policy will tend to prevent them; will assimilate the two countries; will show them, that, in the new state of Europe, to divide their interests is to ruin them effectually, and that every attempt should be made to unite them. In fact, France and the United Provinces have one interest. Russia and Great Britain have created it.

In the state of continental increase in which we behold Russia, Europe requires many lines to defend herself against her. Prussia and Austria form the first; the states covered by the Rhine, the second. If Russia should fall upon Germany, would not the defensive line be naturally that

of the Rhine? Hence the powers on its border form the reserve of Europe; and are not France and the United Provinces those which cover its banks?

On the other hand, Great Britain is equal at sea to Russia on land. Hence Europe is situated between two giants, which menace her equally on both elements.

Should not the same motives induce France and the Low Countries to unite their marine as well as land force? Henceforth will not the maritime strength of Spain connect itself, from the nature of things, with that of France, as originally that of Spain? Independent of any other calculation, will not the superiority of that of Great Britain create a necessity for the union of all three? Being the second maritime power, will not France become the centre, around which all the powers of lesser rank ought to rally, in compliance with the general rule, of an union with the principal enemy of those who can exercise oppression? Hence the maritime strength of France and the Low Countries will be united against Great Britain, in the same manner as their armies will co-operate against any power who shall menace the passage of the Rhine.

We have had occasion to remark, that the former state of Holland rendered the preservation of her colonies, and particularly those in Asia, a very difficult task; that this charge very much exceeded her power; but the union (the Dutch colonies becoming the common property of Belgium and Holland,) will be sufficiently preserved by the means that the Low Countries, in their present state, offer for the purpose.

From this deduction of principles and facts, it follows, that the most important act of policy yet conceived, and executed for the general benefit of Europe, is certainly the union of Holland with Belgium. We did not attend at the conferences at Chatillon; we have not heard what was said at that place; but there is not much temerity in thinking, that the transactions there were very much opposed to that line of ideas of which we wish now to

show the nature. Of these ideas, the *initiative*, for many years, has not been assumed*.

It remains for us to speak of the effect, on the arrangements of the political balance of Europe, arising from the partition of Poland.

We believe that we have so sufficiently explained ourselves on the subject of the morality of this act, that we shall be excused from recurring to it. Therefore, let us cease to speak of its principles, in order that we may merely consider it in its relations to the general arrangement of Europe.

This partition commenced in 1773. It may be said, that then it only became visible. In embryo, it had existed ever since the commencement of the century. Men are accustomed to consider things only in their effects, without having a recurrence to causes. Politics even are not more exempt from this error than inferior subjects.

Thus both parties are equally mistaken as to the true epoch of this partition. They agree to date it from the day when it was proclaimed, although, if they had attended to the result of the following considerations, they would have gone still farther back. The existence of Poland was commensurate with its misfortunes, while Russia was not known in Europe. But from the very day that Russia, altering her course, to make use of a common expression, had faced about from Asia towards Europe, the condition of Poland became altered.

Russia could not invade Europe but through Poland. The elective sovereigns of that country,—sovereigns uniformly badly supported,—lived in a truly indefinable and indescribable state with Russia; alternately supplicating, fearing, and rejecting her patronage and expensive succour, to operate either against her domestic factions, or external intrigues, and attacks. The high Polish nobility,

* See "The Antidote to the Congress at Rastadt," 1798; "Prussia and its Neutrality," 1800; both by M. de Pradt.

who then formed the mass of the nation, had done nothing else for one hundred years than endeavour, by its intrigues, to induce Russia to assume the protectorate of Poland. The cause which has excited, and which still excites, a portion of the cries with which the west of Europe has resounded, on the subject of this partition, is the absolute ignorance that existed of all the events that had passed for seventy years between Poland and Russia. Poland is always represented as a free state, and independent at home. On the contrary, Poland had been morally invaded for half a century, and what remained of her strength she employed in disputes, to which there was neither object nor end.

After this internal anarchy, it was the change of the relations of Russia with Europe that produced the partition of Poland. Peter, and Charles the Twelfth, were the real authors of this work.

It was Peter who partitioned Poland by polishing his people; in converting them from Asiatics into Europeans, and making them look to Europe, instead of Tartary, as hitherto they had been accustomed to do; in founding at Saint Petersburg one of the principal capitals of Europe, instead of confining himself to a residence in the first capital of Asia. Moscow was not yet an European town.

It was Charles the Twelfth who partitioned Poland, in drawing upon Europe an enemy that hitherto had been a stranger; in forcing him to adopt the manners and customs of Europe; in losing, in the horrible game of war, the only one of which he had a knowledge and a fondness, his provinces in Germany, the fruits of the conquests of his predecessors. They bordered on the Baltic Sea, excluded Russia from it, and, by taking her in flank, effectually confined her within her ancient boundary. Charles the Twelfth, by his warlike disposition, attracted the Russians into Europe, as Napoleon, by a similar character, has drawn them to Paris; so

much were these thunderbolts of war deficient in understanding.

When Russia, once transplanted, if the expression may be used, from Asia into Europe, by the establishment of the principal seat of empire at St. Petersburg, enjoying a great extent of coast on the Baltic, had interested herself in the affairs of Europe, and had found out the roads leading into it, what means did there remain of driving her back into Asia, and excluding her altogether from Europe, by shutting all the avenues against her?

Like their ancestors, the Huns, when they became acquainted with the climate, the fruit, and the beauties of Greece, have the Russians acted. These are things of which men ought never to be permitted to taste; for a relish once contracted, is never forgotten. The Russians having thus entered into Europe, have never once quitted the road. Hence who furnished them with this road? Was it not Poland? Was it not across Poland that the Russian armies advanced to the Rhine in the war of 1740? Was it not again, by the way of Poland, that they marched each year against Frederick the Great, in that of 1756? For a century back, there have been but few years in which Poland has been wholly free from Russian troops. Indeed, we cannot consider Poland as existing any longer in a state which constitutes the sovereignty and independence of a country. Her neighbours, aware of her impotence, of the dangers arising from the anarchy of her government, divided her dominions, in order that she might not wholly belong to Russia, and be detrimental to their interest. Thus was Poland partitioned, in defiance of morality; but in consonance to the maintenance of the balance of Europe. On the contrary, this partition was favourable to Europe; and the more general it was, the greater the advantage. Austria, Prussia, and Russia backed, the one against the other, formed a mass of

power very capable of being balanced. In this state of contiguity it became useful to the princes in the west of Europe, because it afforded them the means of directing all their strength towards the ocean, on which are to be found their true power and their true enemies.

Surely, if Poland had been suffered to remain untouched, its neighbours must have occupied it, (and the care of their own repose imperiously prescribed it,) but to lead it into a less turbulent state of existence, and which had rendered it as insupportable for others as themselves. But when, notwithstanding the scruples of Maria Theresa, the partition had been permitted, it ought not to have been suffered to drag on for twenty-five years (from 1773 to 1797), but it ought to have been completed at once. The brevity of the scandal would, in some measure, have extenuated the profligacy of the act. It is impossible to conceive what they would do with Poland parcelled out; but not more than we are able to account for having made a duchy or kingdom of Warsaw.

It results from the above exposition, that the partition of Poland has not been injurious to the general balance of Europe; that, on the contrary, the consolidation arising from this partition has contributed to preserve it; that the union of Norway with Sweden, that of Belgium with Holland, are operations well adapted to the general interests of Europe; and that by these arrangements, in these latter times, there have been made more rapid strides, and more improved measures taken for the general benefit, than have ever been witnessed at any epoch of the history of modern Europe.

CHAPTER IX.

OF THE SPIRIT PRESUMED TO ACTUATE THE
CONGRESS.

IN every affair there exists a first sketch, a point of general view, out of which, from a conviction of its truth, and which represents it with some degree of certainty, we may say that an opinion proceeds. So long as we obey this first, or, so to express it, this native impression, we proceed quickly and surely. In consequence of the effect of a secret affection, from which we cannot wholly abstract ourselves, obstacles disappear, or are cleared away; resistance loses its intensity. It is the mind and the conscience applied to the business of life.

We too often meet with a multitude of contracted and narrow views, of prejudices, of personal interests, that endeavour to obtain a preponderance on their part. When we yield to these excitations, and give ourselves wholly up to them, then there is no certain course, no fixed object, no period assigned, no concert of the disposition, no persuasion in the mind, no satisfaction in the heart.

We may compare the *primum mobile* to the statesman, and the others to the people.

How many faults would be corrected and regrets saved, if men, at the moment of acting, would so far continue masters of their feelings, as to ask themselves to think about what they are going to perform; what price they affix to the object, the hope of possessing which occasions such violent desires; or, in what view they will consider the satisfaction that their passion, so violent in its calls to be heard, will leave them; to

think in the present time of that which is to come; to transport ourselves in thought, if it is the greatest effort of the human mind, it is also the surest guarantee for a judicious choice of action.

Hence, that which is good in morals, is not less so in politics. Not to act with a view to the present time, is not to act with a view to any time.

Merely to act for ourselves, is not to act for any one— in fact, not for our own true interest.

When men shall be able to act independent of each other, they will be able to act independent of the consideration of the relations that unite them: but, as long as they shall form a society, in which all parties are connected and firmly united, a society that cannot be dissolved even if an attempt shall be made, by it having then become an union, or, so to term it, an adherence of all parties to the social compact,—this society is inspired with one common spirit. In this case, each individual acts for his own interests, and pursuant to his own means, but under the general impression made on the whole body.

It is this which has rendered Europe a species of republic, of which war has not even relaxed the ties. The intercourse established among the different members of this body, only tends to extend and strengthen the bonds of association.

Agreeably to this principle, a public European spirit was to be expected from the Congress.

Every remedy should be proportionate to the nature, the duration, the strength of the disease.

All Europe had been subject to its attacks. From Petersburg to Cadiz there have not been witnessed, for twenty-five years, any other transactions than those arising from that of the revolution. From Cadiz to Petersburg, there was nothing to do but arrange all that which had been deranged; and not according to contracted views, but to those of a general character and tendency.

Hence the necessity of a public European spirit, that should proportion the reparation to the injury sustained, and that should have nothing else for its object.

But from St. Petersburg to Cadiz what was the general want? Stability and repose. What was the general wish? Stability and repose. And this voice, as the voice of the people, was the voice of God.

The work thus in hand, the Congress should no longer have neglected it. From this period, they should have done nothing but fix this place of repose—they should have known that it was only to be found in the general order of things in Europe, wisely combined, intelligently and liberally marked out, or in the gratifications of certain interests and certain systems.

Victory in favour of Europe was for a long time expected. Every thing appeared ready to announce it. The sovereigns, forgetting their mutual jealousies, their personal speculations, their common fears, were at last united. This was, indeed, a great step. The success attending their arms rendered it complete. It had been ennobled by the most generous declarations, by the announcement of every thing consistent with the general welfare. At no period had Europe proceeded with the same concert, nor towards so elevated an object; and elevated because it was general. Never had she held a language so consoling; and consoling because it was European and clear*.

It was in this light, and we dare affirm it without fear of contradiction, that every European beheld the Congress at Vienna, and thus did he expect to see it proceed. The continued good understanding among the sovereigns induced a belief, that a mode of concert had been established,

* “ Let repose and content at last return to the world! Let each people find its happiness in its own laws, under its own government; and let religion, the arts and sciences, again flourish for the general happiness and the welfare of the human race.” (*Words of the Emperor Alexander.*)

and arrangements made beforehand. The promptitude and facility with which the state of France had been determined; the same circumstances attending the union of Belgium and Holland, showed at once the nature of their operations, and the celerity with which they proposed to carry them into effect.

The allies, in quitting Paris to meet again at Vienna, after having regulated so important a part of the west of Europe, seemed to commence, by the regular arrangement of that country, thus leaving nothing of a disquieting nature behind them. They believed that they had before them the table of contents of a work already arranged.

Europe assembled at Vienna in the person of its greatest sovereigns, explaining its wishes by the organ of its most distinguished ministers, presented, in this senate, a spectacle such as we have never seen—such a one as the seriousness of the surrounding circumstances imperiously required.

We were then justified in expecting that the Congress would not confine its exertions to become a tribunal, judging trivial and unimportant causes, but a supreme court, that should proceed and pronounce in the name of the general interests of Europe, and prove itself wholly exempt from private attachments. In this new establishment, an establishment formed upon general principles, would have been found that stability and repose of which all Europe had been so long deprived.

By this great act, Europe exercised over itself the right of sovereignty in its fullest extent. It was an association decreeing and stipulating for itself. Then the Congress presented the character of a grand solemnity, celebrated in honour of the pacification of Europe. It was, so to express it, the festival of its repose. What advantages would not such a line of conduct have produced, if it had been pursued by the Congress?

Firmness and promptitude of resolutions add to the respect that they command. Those of the Congress

would have carried with them the impression of that superiority of command always so favourable to obedience.

The power of Europe would have borne down all opposition; the happiness of its subjects, at last assured of repose and stability, would have stifled trifling complaints. Europe would have experienced a new circulation—a circulation that had been so long stopped.

The sovereigns, in the name of the general interests of Europe, had been able to compel France to give up the fruit of her protracted and sanguinary contests; those who, in the same name, had united Holland and Belgium, might, in a similar character, have dictated to the other parts of it a regenerative plan, and, in consideration of a benefit of such general extent, forced those who opposed it to be silent. We do not understand how they could have denied their authority in some instances, when they acknowledged it in others.

The sovereigns collected at Vienna were, in point of fact, Europe. They were so recognised when they fought for it. How could they be refused this title after victory? The war had been of the most extraordinary nature. The coalition had not been less so. The union of so many flags, astonished with their new fraternity, was it no more than an ordinary circumstance? and the Congress, which was the result of the combination of so many elements opposite in their character and unknown to every established rule, was it only an assembly in the ordinary course of European transactions? No; the Congress was a tribunal that formed an exception to the general rule, unique in its kind, and intended for causes and circumstances as unique: and, as the nature of every judgement is that it should be correspondent to the nature of the cause, it follows that the Congress possessed all the powers that the nature of the cause and the circumstances could confer on it for the general benefit of Europe. The Congress was not the chamber at Wetzlar, nor a commission of the empire. We should

degrade it, too much if we compared its character to that of the Congress that made the peace of Westphalia. The jurisdiction of the one is as far as it is from that of the other, as the objects that engaged the attention of that assembled at Munster were different from those with which that at Vienna was occupied. We cannot render sufficient justice to the grandeur of the character assumed by the Congress at Vienna. This, perhaps, it did not do itself; and it appears not to have sufficiently known the extent of its power, and the object of its mission. When Europe was tranquillized by the peace of Westphalia, and when at last its inhabitants perceived the Aurora of those days of repose that for thirty years had flown before them, they did not ask of the Congress the right of disposing of this or that territory, to cede to the catholics that which had been protestant, to the protestants that which had been catholic; but they thanked them for having, by the establishment of general order, and independently of their private views, at last assured their repose, and that of their descendants. It acted with a view to the future.

Did not the Europeans interrogate the Congress at Vienna in the same manner on the subject of the use it intended to make of such a portion of sovereignty? but they demanded if, after so many storms, there was at last to be a calm; if, after so many agitations, there was at last to be repose; if, after so many changes, there was at last to be permanence; if, after so many spoliations, there was at last to be a security for property; if, after such uncertainty as to the employment of life, there was at last to be assured positions and certain indemnifications for what it costs to obtain it? They demanded not only under what governments, in what social order, they should live; but, if at last there was to be a certain government and social order, under which they could live? Because, for twenty-five years, they had not known how they had lived; and, if order was not to be restored,

what European was there that could say under what laws he, with his children, was destined to pass his life?

Hear, and do not doubt the truth of it, the language that Europe addressed to the Congress—language which indicated the high rank with which it had been invested. From the summit of Europe viewing, at one *coup d'œil*, the times past, present, and to come, it ought only to have thought of the order of things most consistent with the good of the whole; of that system which would have given most stability to the present, and which opposed the strongest barriers against those future changes that in the course of time are ever introduced. That the noble motives to this establishment should have been offered to Europe under those imposing colours that general principles always communicate—principles that have uniformly the effect of possessing themselves of men's minds, and producing an obedience to its dictates by the surest of all ways, conviction; that they should to this have added consolatory declarations in favour of humanity, such as the abolition of practices, as contrary to good sense as general order; then the work was complete, and left in the human mind a durable solace; and the Congress would have dissolved itself amidst the acclamations of all Europe.

It appears also that the Congress has not sufficiently appreciated the dangers attached to the prolongation of discussions on certain questions. Europe is no longer that Europe that it was when ten years were spent in negotiations at Munster and Osnaburg. The times are changed. Then no one occupied himself with public affairs. They were confined to a few heads. The people awaited the decisions, and complied with them. Then there was not a public paper in all Europe, no political union; now Europe is filled and covered with them.

At each political movement, the mass of private interests begin to operate and place themselves in motion. The times do not regulate their steps by the scale, that

it pleases the actors on the political theatre to prescribe to them. They go on without the assistance of the latter, and soon outstep them in their career: also, they are not long before they find themselves a great distance from the point of their departure; and when they fancy that they have reached the goal, they appear in such a light as to be no longer known. This happened to the Congress at Vienna.

While it exhausted three months in order to parcel out Saxony; to dispose of Genoa; while it multiplied its fêtes*, the enemy was on the alert, and, by his sudden appearance, changed the face of affairs, and compelled the Congress, surprised at having been so long engaged on a subject foreign to that which was the object of discussion, to reassume that situation at Paris which it had occupied about a year before. The tardiness and hesitation evident in the proceedings of the Congress, the divisions which reigned there, the complaints, of which many of its acts had become the subject in Europe, formed part of the elements of the attempt made by Napoleon. Happily his calculations, the children of his ordinary illusions, were, as they have been in a thousand other occasions, found to be erroneous; but it is no less true, that he reckoned on that part of the conduct of the Congress which he discovered was defective, and that it had furnished him with additional hopes. Napoleon perceived that public opinion had withdrawn its sanction from the Congress; from the heat of the disputes, the issue of which was ever certain, it had ceased to excite attention. In fact, it was very singular, and at the same time highly worthy of observation, that the Assembly, which had the power of sovereignly deciding the fate of princes and states, no longer inspired the least interest. The Congress was permitted to act; nothing it did was contested; but it no longer engaged the attention of Europe. It was necessary that Napoleon should reap-

* See what the Prince of Ligne said on this occasion.

pear, to give it a sensible life and the power of speech. In some measure it was resuscitated, inasmuch as the actual dispositions of men's minds required a degree of attention in the manner of conducting affairs, and differed from that which other times would have permitted.

CHAPTER X.

OF THE REAL SPIRIT WHICH ACTUATED THE CONGRESS.

As soon as the true public European spirit ceased to influence the Congress, the selfish or personal interests obtained an existence: with them appeared all the claims, all the questions of right and of fact, all the comparisons of losses and reparations, the times past, the times present, and those to come. The barrier broken, the inundation commenced.

This we have seen occur; and not to discover it were impossible, in the line of conduct the Congress thought proper to pursue.

It had established two distinct species of principles, relatively to persons and to things. The first were distinguished by the most generous liberality; and it was not without a lively emotion of gratitude for the spirit in which these honourable and reassuring stipulations were dictated; it was not without singular satisfaction, at the proofs it afforded of the real progress of civilization, that we have remarked the care which was taken to solace and consolidate the fate of individuals; to extend the general security by a total forgetfulness of the past, by the extinction of all the causes of injury: the only way to restore order among men, and dispose them to live together in a social state. The Congress has the

honour of having banished every species of reaction,—that scourge produced by revolutions—that element of revengeful hearts and contracted minds, and which is only calculated to enable vengeance to succeed to vengeance, to render men irreconcilable with men, and to present, in every country where such a melancholy system shall prevail, the appearance of that spectacle which Spain has exhibited; which has been offered to France, and of which there is too much reason to fear there will be experienced an eventual triumph.

The Congress at Vienna may be considered as the conclusion of that which had signed the treaty of Paris. Its political principles appear to have been,

First, To secure Germany from any new acts of supremacy on the part of France, and to prevent the latter from making use of Germany either against herself or against others.

Second, To keep in reserve certain vacant territories, as a common fund, whence they might draw such indemnities as it should be necessary to apportion.

Third, To stipulate for the establishment of constitutions, in which the people should discover a respect paid to their understandings, and a better guarantee for the future.

Fourth, To re-establish, as far as possible, each sovereign in his possessions; in only requiring sacrifices for the general benefit, and assuming legitimacy for the basis of the restitutions; and considering it as the principal title to the restoration of the so long violated order of Europe, and the conservator of that order, which it was the great object of the Congress to establish.

These views were distinguished by their generosity and elevation. To acknowledge it, is a source of satisfaction: but were they, at the same time, sufficiently extended, whether in themselves or in their application? Were they, in every point of view, adapted to the decisions of the Congress? This it is which we have now to examine.

The first part of this plan is evidently marked in the precaution they have taken to place, at the gates of France, apparently as sentinels,

First, The King of the Low Countries.

Second, The King of Prussia; who, by his possessions behind the Meuse and the Rhine, and by those which, with a view to these precautions, have been given him on the Moselle, supports it in the first line.

Third, The German Empire, guardian of the fortress of Luxembourg.

Fourth, Austria, by the cession of Mentz, and of parts of the departments of the Saar and Mount Tonnerre, which formerly belonged to France, and which extend the territories ceded to divers princes, called to occupy them from many parts of Germany.

The intention of confining France within strong and more efficient barriers than those in which, by the ancient order of Europe, she was kept, is particularly marked in the near approach of Austria; for, by this arrangement, the rule is violated that the two states appear to have made at the treaty of Campo Formio, of keeping at as great a distance as possible from one another, in order to prevent those quarrels that their contiguity had so often produced. Except it has been done with this intention, we cannot see why Austria, so magnificently treated in Italy and in Illyria, should have been allowed to acquire so great a territory, and at so great a distance from the body of the monarchy, and with which these stray (*epaves*) provinces can have no connexion. But it is evident that it was intended to place the keys of Mentz in powerful hands, and to load France with the weight of all Germany, joined to that of the kingdom of the Low Countries and of Great Britain, who will never separate itself from the latter state, more peculiarly its work, and who will always be ready to protect it against France, as a father would defend its child. France, surrounded as she will be by all the military powers of Germany, will, at no very distant period, find herself

enclosed; and she, who hitherto has been so vain of her triple rampart, will, for the future, have to witness the circumstance of being as firmly enclosed by her fortresses, as heretofore she has experienced that which has enabled her to make so powerful an offensive and defensive use of them. By this arrangement France loses all political importance on the Continent. Twice has she been taught, and by severe experience, that this renowned rampart of fortresses, in the actual state and number of the European armies, availed her nothing: it is to be observed, that it is on the weakest part of France that the forces of Germany will always press: for it is on the higher Meuse and the Sambre, which is the most feeble part, and through which an approach can be most easily made to the capital. This more clearly demonstrates the intention thus indicated.

Lord Castlereagh declared, in the parliament of Great Britain, that the scheme for bringing France and Prussia so nearly into contact, by the establishment of the latter between the Meuse and the Rhine, was to be dated from the time of Mr. Pitt, and that it was an idea of that illustrious minister. Whatever may be the respect due to the opinions of that celebrated man, it is impossible not to recognize a spirit in this plan truly anti-Gallican, but still not less anti-European. One danger is often resorted to from the fear of another.

Occupied as Mr. Pitt had been, for so many years, by a contest with France, whose power he saw increased and strengthened by the very game that would have ruined so many other states, he devoted his attention to the discovery of means proper to raise a barrier against France; and he lost sight of Russia, of whom he then endeavoured to make an use in his efforts to restrain his enemy. Therefore he laboured to divide that which was, and which, for the general benefit of Europe, should have continued to be united. This minister well knew, that to be neighbouring and hostile to each other, was, with states, synonymous: and, in this view of things,

he perceived no better method of substituting jealousy, for the friendship that had so long united Prussia and France, than making them border one on the other.

This was a political idea of no very high character ; it embraced but a short period, while those of a more correct nature embrace space and time. In his own time Mr. Pitt was unable to see his ideas realized ; and perhaps it is at this moment, when it has been fully accomplished, that it would have been to him a source of regret : for the intellectual light of a character, so superior as was that of Mr. Pitt, may reappear after a short eclipse, and replace him in that situation whence his pressing political wants had some times driven him.

But, in providing so well for the preservation of Germany from new invasions on the part of France, the Congress has forgotten that nothing whatever has been done in its behalf against those irruptions with which Russia, in her turn, may menace her. Look beyond the Vistula, and here we shall find that she touches on Germany. The defence of the latter is weakened by the parcelling out of Saxony, which in its actual condition is only fit to be engaged in interminable quarrels with Prussia.

The Russian fleets are able to threaten the German states of the Baltic, on which the French marine can never land. In this state of things there are many dangers ; and, unfortunately, nothing has been done to counteract them.

We feel convinced that the Congress has been hampered by the privileges of which all the great powers availed themselves, in order to obtain the peculiar objects of their convenience. The cause was not fully understood before the discussions commenced : therefore, the decisions could only be made upon objects of a secondary character, and powers of an inferior order. Making use of the privileges of the strong and the powerful, Russia went to the Congress with the Duchy of Warsaw retained beforehand. On her side Austria

retained Italy. Prussia did the same with Saxony. Surely England would not have permitted a discussion on the subject of Malta, Heligoland, and the Cape of Good Hope. In this situation of possessions, put as it were *hors de cause*, and the chiefs of the Congress pleading with their hands full, the latter could not any longer give a liberty and latitude to its discussions; but, on the contrary, they were confined to a very narrow circle.

It was evident that as soon as all those powers, who, before they had formed the coalition, had treated separately, should come to compare their different treaties, in order to produce a general agreement, they would find themselves in a state of embarrassment. Most of the princes did not understand how to save any thing: before they had put themselves to the expense necessary to their common safety, or even that of their persons, they had made new conditions. The King of Prussia made his treaty at Kalish. Naples had secured a convention that gave it an increase of 400,000 souls. Denmark, its treaty at Kiel. After these and many others come the *mediatisés*, Prince Eugene, and all those who on the preceding confusion had experienced losses.

Of course, the Congress always retained that essential and primitive quality, that rendered it a crucible, in which all the treaties were to be melted down and re-cast, in order to be rendered co-existent with the general good. From this circumstance it followed that all that preceded the Congress should have been considered in the shape of a preliminary to the Congress itself, in which all the interest and all the opinions should form one general interest; and public spirit acting at one and the same time, for all and in all. Without this method, at each instant the Congress would have encountered new difficulties, and some of them would have remained without solution.

It was equally clear that the plan adopted by the

Congress, calculated, perhaps, to procure a short repose, did not naturally create a durable order, in consequence of the general lassitude rendering the idea of the benefit arising from quiet very lively, and requiring that they should be satisfied with it. This momentary happiness did not prevent them feeling, with an equal degree of vivacity, on the subject of the future, the difficulties that must eventually result from the dispositions made by this Congress. It is true that this species of lassitude, which makes us accommodate ourselves to every thing else rather than that state of things which had excited and had produced such inconvenience. It is this poignant pricking at the moment, of which Bacon speaks : but, in a short time, the dispositions become changed, the idea of past evils is effaced, and gives rise to that of present inconveniences ; which, in their turn, make us seek for reparation with a similar ardour. Doubtless this is the fate that will attend the deliberations of this Congress. We sigh after repose. In the system we pursued, we imagined that we had obtained it ; soon we shall feel that there are inconveniences ; then will arise regrets, and all the sentiments ever naturally accompanying them.

The difference between the Congress at Westphalia and that at Vienna, consists in the circumstance, that the one had created a system, the other had formed only parts and proportions ; the one built a perfect and durable edifice ; the other, a mere foundation.

When Europe, delivered from the torment she had experienced, shall begin to feel the effect of its new condition, then will she clearly perceive the inconvenience of the false position in which she is placed ; then will she experience the necessity of a change, and these distressing sentiments will cost her new sacrifices, sacrifices that a better order of things would have rendered unnecessary.

The acquisition that Russia has made in Poland has deranged every thing. It has rendered every wise com-

bination impracticable. It has added to the views of aggrandisement that Austria may have formed. In fact, what in the Congress could have been opposed to Russia, after she had been permitted to make such rapid strides, and to menace the whole body of Europe? Therefore, Austria found herself at liberty to take possession of the major part of Italy: another great departure from the system that has for its object the safety of Europe. But Prussia could not remain a passive spectator of all these acquisitions; and, as not to increase in proportion to our neighbours is in fact to decrease, it was necessary that she should, on her side, obtain compensation, and the means of an equilibrium. Hence, every where have we beheld the parties seeking for indemnities.

By the increase of the territory of Russia in Poland, Prussia wholly lost the great proportion of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which had belonged to her.

By this arrangement she found herself exposed to the first attack of Russia: therefore she directed her attention towards Saxony. In this arrangement she beheld two circumstances.

First, An indemnity.

Second, A means of resistance to Russia by the principles of adhesions that its occupation would give to the different parts of her monarchy.

Whatever may be the amount of the personal interests contained in this system, it was not less European than Prussian. It corrected two great errors in the geographical situation of Prussia — the division of her states by the *interposition* of Saxony, and her extension of dominion towards the Meuse. The latter is an arrangement that has been allowed contrary to all established principles, whether for Prussia, France, the Low Countries, or Germany. That which is inconvenient to the whole world can be good for no one.

That Prussia should be re-established in the whole of her possessions in Germany and Poland, and Cleves, except

at a very remote period, the natural key of Holland. This even was conformable to the principle of the Congress; that then if Prussia should have wished to make an attempt on her neighbours, they had put her in mind of the laws of good neighbourhood, all the world would have applauded the act; but, that she should remain despoiled of all her former benefit, and prevented deriving any new one, whilst her powerful neighbours and antient rivals gratified themselves with every object pointed out by their conveniences:—was it, in good truth, to be supposed?

In leaving Saxony in a state of division substituted for that of total destitution, with which it at first was menaced, the Congress did at one and the same time too much and too little, as we shall soon have occasion to demonstrate. In the despoiling of Saxony, it established the monument of a contradiction of that principle of legitimacy which they had laboured to establish. Sovereigns should not be despoiled of their territories from mere motives of convenience; they could not be judged, as has been said with much reason, and with many marks of approbation, by the plenipotentiaries of France. But, is it not to despoil to take the half? Does not the violation of principle, which protects property, commence with the thus taken half? But is it not to be condemned, without being judged, to lose the half of one's property?

This very principle has been equally violated with regard to the republic of Genoa. This country, with the difference in its situation from that of Venice, consisted merely in the fact, that it had made no part of an anterior treaty. It passed directly from its original state of independence into that of a French province. It might, therefore, return into its ancient condition, without injuring any particular pre-existing interest: on the contrary, it might have been made the means of producing satisfaction. Instead of this, it has been given to the King of Sardinia, who has lost

nothing ; and who with this country is not rendered stronger ; for it is not Genoa, small or great, that makes Sardinia a power, nor a defence for Italy.

The Congress has not been more prudent in the distribution of the indemnities granted to the Queen of Etruria and to her son. If ever plunder assumed an odious character, it is surely that to which this branch of the House of Bourbon has submitted. It has been immolated on the altar of a system erected for the overthrow of the throne of Spain—it has been overcome by the grossest perfidy. Force has arrested her ancient dominions, without her having committed any wrong, or having given her consent. By the treaty of Fontainebleau, signed the 26th October, 1807, the treaty that laid open all the roads for the attacks upon Spain, this unfortunate family was called upon to receive a part of Portugal, which was to be divided between this Queen and the Prince of Peace, as an indemnity for Tuscany. All this was but a lure, in order that it might be made to cover the project then ready to be put into execution against the court of Spain. In despite of its principles, the Congress neither gave it its original or its second *apanage*. It has been given back to Lucca, and has almost been placed upon a level with Prince Ludovisi, the former proprietor of the Isle of Elba.

A crowd of petty princes, from all parts of Germany, are made masters of the territories in the ancient departments of the Saar and Mount Tonnerre. There is no principle of adhesion between the old and the new states. There is not an atom of political calculation in this arrangement. Sovereignty is distributed like common property. This latter part of the proceedings of Congress partakes of that lassitude, as well as of that haste, in public affairs, that is by no means profitable ; and which occasions us to pass from one subject to another, and to get rid of an affair rather than to bring it to a conclusion.

These observations might have been extended; but those circumstances that we are about to explain will be sufficient to show the spirit that reigned so decidedly in the Congress, and to establish a just comparison between it, and that with which it had been presumed to be inspired. The latter has been analyzed in the preceding Chapter.

CHAPTER XI.

OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THAT POLITICAL SYSTEM THAT EXISTED IN 1789.

BUT some persons will say, what is the use of so many questions? Why seek elsewhere for a new order of things? we have one ready to our hands. When that which existed before the year 1789 appeared, and, to use the expression, offered *itself*, and it was so good! To restore every thing to its place, and keep it there, would be at once the chastisement of past innovators, and occasion despair in those that shall arise in future. Very well. This system *was* good; but, it *is* no more.

Ancient Rome, Thebes, Tyre, Carthage, were also very fine towns, and their inhabitants found in them very commodious houses; but, unfortunately, they are no more. Time, ever in progression, has disposed of them, and on their ruins has established others, or perhaps none whatever. This simile will apply to the present times.

If at the proper time Europe could have been left as she was, and ourselves with it, all the world would thereby have gained twenty-five years of repose; but, in this prolonged contest, it has been shaken to its

foundations. Here its system has been shattered, there it has been divided — elsewhere it has been aggrandized, despoiled, amended: one part, esteemed living and active, has been found torpid and dead; — another, that had been believed to be dead, is discovered to be full of nerve and vigour. Those which were united, have experienced a tendency to separation; — those which were separated, have a similar disposition to union. Such a one, for which some persons solicited a dismissal at once, was almost in a situation to give it to others instead of receiving it from them.

Here we discover the foundation on which it was intended to fix the bases for the re-establishment of the former system.

In this case, what would have become of all the princes who have received the brilliant titles with which they are invested; of the events which this order of things would efface? Almost all the sovereigns of Germany have no other titles than those conferred on them in latter times, which have furnished to them a great part of their territory. Who is it that has decorated some princes of the House of Bourbon with their titles? Who has made kings of Etruria? Who precipitated from the throne the old King of Spain? Will the outrages of a favourite *legitimate* the overthrow of a *legitimate* monarch? How long since is it that an insurrection of body-guards would merely give to the son the right of sitting on the throne of the father? Is it not the Prince of Peace that they have dethroned in the person of Charles the IVth? To whom will they give the kingdom of Sweden? To the uncle, to the nephew, to his son, to one who has been chosen by the nation? This country should burst asunder the ties recently created between it and Norway. Russia should return Finland, as a revolutionary spoil. England restore Malta and other possessions, by means of which she governs the seas. Austria return peaceably to the Low Countries, which she left so short a

time since : in return, she should give up Venice, which she coveted for so many years. Great and Little Ragusa and France, Lucca and Prussia, ought equally to seek for the places that they once occupied, and there remain.

This system will prove itself most excellent when we shall be able to make the world stand still, and communicate to it that immovability that, in their ignorance of the laws by which it was regulated, our fathers attributed to it : but, as long as it continues to turn on its axis, its political movement will be co-existent with its physical movement, and will not continue in a lesser degree, because there is the want of better regulation.

Surely it is with very laudable views of public order that such ideas are proposed. But a mere wish for order is not sufficient. Means to ensure it must be found ; and, above all, great care should be taken that we do not open the road towards order by a general disorder.

It would also be as impracticable to re-establish the former order in Europe in general, as it would be to effect it in each particular state. The changes having had the same relative proportions, the same resistances would arise ; in the one instance they would lead to disputes among the citizens ; in the other, to strife and confusion between the states.

Let us reflect, whether it was from an attachment to the pursuit of pleasure, or motives of insensibility, or those of idleness, that governments have ordered so many of the victims of the subversions that have taken place, to attend at the feasts of which their spoils are to pay the expense ? Who could have entertained this barbarous idea ? On the contrary, the most enlightened one that could have directed them, would have been that which establishes in public order the means of indemnification for rights that have been subverted, and provides a safeguard to protect those

remnants that have been collected after the convulsion. None but a fool, like Xerxes, would have whipped the sea after a storm. On the contrary, common sense would direct you to assemble all those that have escaped shipwreck, and assure to them future enjoyment. Have those who would order the world to make these easy retrogressions, beheld the descendant of St. Louis, of Henry the IVth, of Louis the XIVth, in the midst of a legislative body, occupying a chair? What is become of old France? Where are the venerable clergy who only diverted their attention from another life, but to convey to their fellow citizens counsels or succour that might aid them in this? Where is that nobility, the flower of the chevaliers of France and the warriors of Europe, as brilliant in war as they were at the tournament, at once the ægis of the throne, and the frontier barriers of the state? Who has taken place of those humble representatives of the cities that Philip introduced six hundred years ago for the first time, and who appeared before him on their knees?

What should have determined the monarch, on his return to his newly-recovered states, to proclaim, that those great changes that had raised the tempest, and against which in other times he would have armed himself, were his work? What would be his own opinion of himself in so singular a situation? Europe and France thought, that in sacrificing at once the remembrance of the country of their forefathers, and the affection with which the heart of its citizen should be filled, he would exhibit to the world an act of heroism and intelligence; that he proved by this, that he knew how to command himself as well as others; that, as a just estimate of men and things, he knew how, by an equal distribution of strength, to participate with all parties; all of which he found in a state of equality. Let them apply to politics the lessons of superior wisdom, and in a short period the world

will not experience any more irritation, in consequence of its having the good sense to confirm the spirit of the times.

CHAPTER XII.

FRANCE.

FRANCE appeared at the Congress in a very singular attitude.

The government that had just been destroyed had armed all Europe against itself. It had received peace in the midst of its capital; and those whom it had rendered its enemies, who had not abused the right given them by the success of their arms, had determined its new situation, if not with generosity, at least without rigour. It must be allowed, this non-exercise of severity may, after all that has passed within the course of the last twenty-five years, pass for generosity. If the allies, masters of Paris, have done nothing for France, they have done nothing to injure her; as, in fact, was in their power. They did not come to Paris for the benefit of France, in order to render her powerful, to consult her inclinations, as well as the fooleries existing there; but to redress themselves for the blows they had received, and prevent their recurrence in future. The allies had to reconcile the permanent interests of Europe, with the rank that France was to occupy among the other powers. She was therefore replaced within her ancient frontier, without acquisitions and without loss. From having been an enemy, she had become an ally. She appeared in an assembly of paci-

ficators, by the side of those to whom she had but just before been hostilely opposed.

This change in her attitude was altogether remarkable, if any thing, after what we have witnessed, has the power of creating astonishment. It does honour to the minister with whom the plan originated, and it has given a new face to the affairs of the country. This trait of ability has not been sufficiently noticed; and it well deserves to be so.

But, although sitting by the side of other nations, and marching apparently in equal pace, she was far from finding herself in a situation parallel to that of the four great powers that formed the Congress.

Victory, after having been so long since her exclusive property; this evanescent goddess, who governs the world, had conferred on others those favours, of which, during an uninterrupted course of years, she had been so exclusively prodigal to France. With her vanished that domination which had been the fruit of her patronage, which was too *forced* for France, and too bitter for others, for the remembrance of it to remain long on the mind. That power which France still possessed, was in some degree that of concession. Her fate was fixed. The alliance existing between the powers of the first rank, to a degree unexampled in the history of states and sovereigns, left no hope of drawing from their rivalry any of those advantages that generally is the main object of able diplomatists. The great powers had given a sort of tacit consent on the subject of their respective pretensions. Hence, the game which France had to play out of doors was very difficult. The circumstances of her domestic situation rendered that which she had to manage at home not less so. France did not conduct herself at the Congress at Vienna as she once did at that of Munster. Every thing was in a very different situation. Louis the XIVth did not arrive in his country after the general subversion of his states. His throne has not been established by

people, whose name at that epoch was scarcely known in Europe.

This fortunate alteration has restored to France her ancient sovereigns. They returned there with sentiments the most truly French, but with the sentiments of old France only. It was ever to be recollected, that they were the descendants of St. Louis and Henry IVth who re-appeared in the land of their fathers: but all which has been done out of the 'country, may appear to them not to belong to it. Hence, no efforts will be made to retain it; and it will cost nothing to get rid of all the personal part of the power and glory which did not form a portion of the ancient personal glory of the crown of France, and which was all that they aspired to reach. Besides, it is comprised in the inventory of a revolution, the principles and the acts of which are too odious, and from which they have suffered so much, that such a conduct may be necessary to avert the dangerous consequences that may arise. Therefore it was without resistance, as without chagrin, that they have renounced every thing unknown to ancient France.

Hence, France, from the peculiar circumstances in which its government had been placed, was in an inferior situation. But these were not the only reasons. There were others, that contributed in many cases to weaken its operations.

Thus, France was, in the first place, completely disinterested on her own account. She entered into an arena, open to the pretensions of all other powers.

In the second place, she appeared disarmed, while the other powers assumed all the apparel with which power and victory could clothe them.

In the third place, she could not inspire that degree of consideration and confidence that results from the disposition which a state can make of its means, when its establishment is solid, complete, and protected from any appearance of convulsion. The government of

France was but just established. It was altogether new. Nothing within the kingdom had yet acquired the necessary degree of consistence. Calculations might have been made upon errors likely to exist on the part of the government; upon discontents on that of the governed; upon factious dispositions still existing in too great a number of minds; on an extremely doubtful fidelity on the part of the troops: in a word, it was possible to discover an immense multitude of causes of confusion, the melancholy prognostics of which have been too correctly realized.

In the fourth place, France, surrounded as she was by this number of embarrassments, could not possibly show any active dispositions. Besides, it is well known that it was not more in the power than it was agreeable to the temper of the government; and every menace that she made could not affect the states which were freed from those incumbrances that on every side hampered and paralyzed the movements of France.

In the fifth place, the great powers who were the arbiters of the proceedings of the Congress proceeded with an unanimity, of which the annals of diplomacy do not offer an example; and evinced an union of spirit, of which it was impossible to break or detach a single link. Hence, every trivial alliance with France was interdicted; its position deprived it of the advantages springing from that great political resource, and confined her to those exertions that her own strength would enable her to make, in the face of those powers who pressed upon her with all the weight of their quadruple alliance. Let us search for the reasons.

Alliance may exist, when the parties to the treaty not only understand each other on certain points, but when their most important general interests harmonize. But an alliance cannot exist when there is an understanding only on some points relative to other parties

altogether independent, and when they depart among themselves from points of the first importance to their own interests. There can be no alliance in this instance, nor where there can be no acting in common, nor when the parties cannot with equal plenitude of power dispose of all their means.

This is precisely the situation in which France found herself with regard to Austria, to Russia, and I may say with regard to all Europe.

France could proceed, in concurrence with Austria, in her opposition to Prussia, for the protection of Saxony—in opposition to Russia, who was projecting the appropriation of Poland to herself: but she must differ from Austria, showing, as that power did, a disposition to convert Italy into an Austrian province; to consolidate the new throne of Naples; and to substitute in the Duchy of Parma a race hostile to the princes of France. France might also proceed, in concurrence with Great Britain, in her opposition to the designs of Prussia on Saxony; but certainly she must withhold her consent to the idea possessed by her, of supporting the new sovereigns of Naples and Parma, and retaining various possessions, the occupation of which rendered the whole marine of Europe her prisoner.

Still more might France agree with Prussia, destined as she was to serve as a barrier to Russia, and to balance the power of Austria. But how could this unanimity be maintained co-existert with the idea of Prussia occupying Saxony, and the country comprised between the Meuse and the Rhine? Thus all the states, experiencing the effects of simultaneous repulsion and attraction, advanced and retreated at the same moment.

On the other side of the question, France, to obtain an alliance, could not offer guarantees comparable to those that other powers could tender. This difference of situation arose from the state of her interior.

For example, the governments of Austria and Great

Britain had not experienced the same checks that had affected that of France.

In the two former countries, every thing is established, and proceeds, in all its branches, according to an old, determined, and fixed impulse. We should perhaps be understood as going too far, even if we were not to say whether France did offer the same pledges to this association. But every association receives its form and consistence in proportion to, and in consideration of, mutual safety; and who could wish for those which are so opposed in their character, and so deprived of strength and guarantee, that they only hold out the prospect of either becoming a burthen, or a broken reed.

From this confined situation of her affairs proceeded the system pursued by France. Her play was forced. Let us see how she acted her part.

Here a new distinction presents itself, which it is very necessary to mark. She dates her birth from the situation of the princes occupying the throne of France. In remounting it, they found every thing, both within and without, altogether changed.

In some places, the members of their family were replaced by their more fortunate competitors.

On one side we see every thing the result of favour or dislike: on others, a prince, allied by blood, had his existence threatened. They would of course feel for him the most tender interest. The ties of blood would give strength, and be productive of favour, to the claim of justice.

Besides, many illustrious but modern names were found. This new fraternity cannot be acknowledged without great difficulty.

If a dangerous neighbourhood should inspire too well-founded fears, the principal care would be to remove the cause of alarm.

Hence, French policy is discovered to be midway

between national and private interests; between the affections of the prince and those of the family.

In setting out from these principles, it will be found that French influence ought to attach itself to them.

First, To banish every thing that gave umbrage to the family reigning in France; and consequently the principal views would be directed against the despot confined in the Isle of Elba, and against all that were attached to him.

Second, To prevent a young plant taking root at Parma, whose shoots would always be abhorred and dreaded.

Third, To purify those thrones that are found so much degraded, and that they should be restored to that species of possessors who are regarded as fit only to occupy them.

Fourth, To establish an order of things in which their own preservation shall be provided for, and to render it the principal dogma of the new policy to be adopted by the kings of Europe.

Hence would proceed the great efforts that would be made to bring back to Naples and to Parma the princes of the royal family of France.

From this circumstance, we may learn the necessity of renewing that alliance with Sweden that a sound policy should prescribe to France, as more necessary than it was in the days of Gustavus and Oxenstiern.

We may also see the propriety of connecting together all the princes who, during the course of the revolution, have experienced the same sufferings as those of France, and demand for them a justice, the effects of which should be useful to them.

France, not demanding any thing of the Congress, and at once willing to cover the inferiority of the part she had to play—an inferiority very new to her,—was obliged to depart from that policy in which she no longer occupied the principal place, in order to recur

to those general principles, the discussions of which belonged to the whole world, and to assume the merit of *justice of peace* to Europe, in place of being able to show herself its *regulator*. It was this circumstance that produced the connection between France and Austria and Great Britain, and her avowed interference in favour of Saxony. By this means, she formed a principal member of the opposition in favour of Saxony. We cannot but render our homage to the force and the constancy with which the French ministers have defended a prince worthy of all the respect that the purest virtue commands; worthy, from his misfortunes, of the interest of every sensible heart.

But in the extraordinary circumstances in which Europe discovered itself to be placed; above all, with the new dangers that the near approach of Russia created; was it well to enter into the discussion of the present and future interests of Europe, by merely considering Saxony as the property of the king, and to show what in this grand question was the side termed legitimate, and on which they could not, if a proper feeling existed, suffer an attempt to be made?

There were many means of avoiding offence, which we shall point out in a succeeding chapter.

Is it necessary on this account to avoid the discussion of the high considerations that commanded the absolute union of Saxony to Prussia? Besides, what have they done for the King of Saxony, in restoring him but the half of his subjects and his states? As little for his virtue as his power.

We may perceive that France made no portion of that resistance to the union of Italy and Austria which she made to that of Saxony and Prussia. However, interest in favour of France, and interest in favour of Europe, were two very different things. The misfortunes of Italy were much greater and more affecting. France, having a wish to make use of Austria against Prussia in favour of Saxony, was obliged to be tender on the score of Italy.

This is the effect of that twofold system that we have before indicated. It will perhaps be said, that there was, on the part of Austria, an opinion so decided with regard to this question, that the attempt to alter it would have been ineffectual. France was more fortunate in the attempts she made for the restitution of the dominions belonging to the pope, and to procure an act, called for by justice, and by the rank that Catholicism occupied in Europe.

Since the peace of Westphalia, France has adopted the maxim of exercising a species of protectorate in Germany, in opposition to the House of Austria. Surely she was correct in endeavouring to renew it with the princes and the sovereigns of the empire.

It is necessary to remark, that there are in Germany three species of states.

In the first rank, are Austria and Prussia.

In the second, the *ci-devant* electorates, erected into kingdoms.

In the third, the petty princes or states, of which there were a great number, and which occupied each their sovereignties, or territories, throughout the whole extent of the empire.

France had to consider these states in various points of view. Thus she could not regard Austria in the same light as Prussia.

The former is always sufficiently powerful in Germany. Sometimes the latter is not enough. France ought no longer to view in the same light the two states, so various are their circumstances: thus it is not her province to mingle in disputes perfectly personal between Austria and Prussia. These two powers possess in themselves the means of balancing each other. The interference of France only begins to be reasonable when either of the two should abuse its superiority, in order to destroy the balance, and lay too heavy a burthen on Germany. Till then they ought to remain uninterrupted.

But France should have a constant and habitual connexion with the powers of the second order: they form a barrier against the two former states, if they should have any idea of encroachment. France did this for Bavaria in 1778; and she ought always to be ready to do it again for all the states of the second order in Germany, without any distinction as to Protestant or Catholic. All these states are equally necessary to the safety of the empire and that of France.

With the states of the third order the case is widely different. They do not possess any strength; they can lend no support to any one; they always require it from others. They do little else but render the machine more complicated, and serve to embarrass its movements.

We have no hesitation in saying, that, with regard to them, France should change the system which she has hitherto observed, and did actually support in the Congress. The difference in the events of the times is the reason. When Austria alone governed the German empire, the existence of this multitude of petty princes, who formerly were the sources of anarchy, might have had an useful result. Then too many obstacles could not be created, nor too many impediments offered. At that period France was the only support of the empire against Austria, and the only corrective of the diminutiveness of the German states. But, since the elevation of the Prussian power; since the states of Bavaria, of Würtemberg, of Hanover, have acquired such an extent of territory, and increase of influence, Austria is sufficiently balanced. The smaller states cannot act against her; it is much more probable that they will act for her, and that Austria will endeavour to create among them an honourable dependence upon her, and support them against the states of the second order.

The interests of Germany and France equally require that this country should be relieved from the load of all the little sovereignties that hitherto have been of no use but to their possessors, and they should be incor-

porated with the states of the second order. This, in proportion as Russia approaches Germany, will become more necessary. The appearance of this new danger should have induced a system of fortifying the German powers, whose care and defence of their common mother is prevented by the consequences arising from the existence of these little states. These powers are, with Austria and Prussia, the rulers of the second order. The reader should not be tired with the repetition of the opinion, that, since unconquerable Russia has taken such a position as to enable her to knock at the doors of the German empire, every thing has undergone a total change in that country. Instead of being interested in the preservation of the petty states, it is rather for their abolition that we should now seek; for the simplification, rather than the complication, and for the concentration, rather than the dispersion, of sovereignties, in order to be able to oppose the largest masses to those masses by which they are menaced. New dangers ought to lead us to seek for new safeguards. The French system has been very erroneous on this subject. But, where its error has been at once the more remarkable and the more melancholy, is in the mode of opposition to Prussia; to give effect to which, she uniformly paid such great attention.

In the system which France should establish between herself and Prussia, there are two invariable principles: alliance and distance. The one gives effect to the other.

Hence, throughout the whole course of the Congress, France only laboured to put Prussia at a distance, and force her to withdraw to her own frontier. In short, to prevent that which at one and the same time precluded alliance, and created hostility. This fatal mistake arose from the warmth with which France defended Saxony: for it is impossible not to remark, that, in proportion to her exertions in favour of the latter country, she increased the difficulties she had to encounter in her opposition to the approach of Prussia to the frontiers

of France. There have been seen a vast number of notes on the subject of the incorporation of Saxony; but we have seen none on that of the inconveniencies likely to arise from the establishment of Prussia, at the very doors of France, between the Meuse and the Rhine, as well as between the Rhine and the Moselle.

On her arrival at the Congress, France found Saxony abandoned by Prussia and Russia, abandoned by Austria, neglected by Great Britain, and by the princes of the empire, who offered her nothing but vain regrets. In this distressing situation it was that France undertook her cause. We have seen her spend four months in setting all the springs of her policy at work to increase the number of the defenders of Saxony.

This system appeared alike contrary to the interests of France, of Saxony, and of Europe.

First; To France it occasioned the loss of the most necessary of her allies, and indeed it changed her into an enemy. It brought near to her a power that ought ever to have been kept at a distance. It has embittered the minds of the Prussians, whose animosity, so active and fatal to France, has proceeded, in a great measure, from their resentment, on the score of an opposition that frustrated the object of their most ardent desires. If France remained silent on the invasion of Italy by Austria, why did she make such a noise on that of Saxony, of importance to the liberties of Europe, while that of Italy cut it up by the roots?

Second; The preservation of Saxony in its integrity being demonstrably impossible, but little service could be rendered to her by attaching so much importance to a question, the most fortunate result to which could not preserve her from being torn in pieces. Saxony should either have remained undivided under its own king, or that of Prussia. In fact, why was Saxony divided into two parts? Whom can the half of Saxony, by the side of Prussia, of Austria, and of Russia, serve or assist? In its state of consolidation it would have

been lost amidst these three colossal powers. What situation will it occupy in its actual condition? Was it not a fine present to make to the King of Saxony, that of his dominions thus parcelled? Was it very consolatory to his subjects that some Saxons should remain to Saxony and its king, while they had to behold their separation from their fellow-citizens, and the division of their country? Was not the King of Saxony a very happy prince in the midst of the shreds of his states, and the wrecks of a family, in which he could only calculate on hearing sighs, and witnessing a flow of tears? Was royalty well defended, most honoured, by being left on the half of a throne? Let us be candid. It is not the title that makes the king, but the power. We can never conceive how they can reconcile the respect due to royalty, with the trifling consideration assigned to it in some countries. The throne should be raised so as to be seen from afar, and afford an imposing spectacle; in all countries it comes within the definition given of it by Napoleon: "*Four bits of wood and a velvet carpet.*"

Third; The opposition made by France to the designs of Prussia in favour of Saxony; which, taking from the latter the means of defence against Russia, has deprived Europe of its principal defensive point. It has now become the great interest of Europe. The colossal power of Russia has changed all its relations: a circumstance of which we must never lose sight.

From all this, what has resulted? That Prussia has been rendered hostile to France; that she is weakened in the principal part of her defensive system against Russia; and that Saxony has been rendered useless either to its own sovereign, who no longer possesses power; or to Prussia, who can reckon, for no great length of time, on the good will of the Saxons. The Congress has taken too good care to catechise them on the subject of the union with

Saxony, in order that the Saxons may, in a few years, become good Prussians. Of the probability of this alteration in character and feeling, we may judge by the circumstances that happened at Liege.

Nothing has occurred to show the proceedings of France in favour of Denmark. This state, that, in the midst of the troubles of Europe, has, for a century, exhibited an example of all the civil virtues, moderation, temperance, justice, and economy: this country, which has only rendered herself remarkable by the peaceable conquests she has made, by means of her industry and commerce, beheld herself on a sudden enveloped in disputes, to which she was, from her character and habits, as great a stranger as by her geographical situation. There never was a more noble nor more impartial conduct, than that which Denmark observed during the whole course of the revolution: however, she has lost her Norwegian dominions, and the very important point of Heligoland. There has only been assigned to her the shadow of an indemnity, notwithstanding the promise she received. The idea which has been evinced of re-erecting the Hanseatic towns, has frustrated the wish she had for two of them, Hamburgh and Lubeck, which, from their locality, appeared to belong to her. We cannot finish this chapter without paying a tribute of respect to the French legation. It was in a situation surrounded with difficulties: inheriting all the errors of French diplomacy for the last twenty-five years, although it was altogether a stranger to them: surrounded by jealousies, coalitions always directed against it, it was necessary for this legation to conduct itself through all these difficulties, and it has effected it with so much ability as to produce the remarkable circumstance, that the power, by far the least considerable as to strength, should have occupied a most distinguished situation; and the voice which had been esteemed the least able, should have brought Europe to listen to it with the greatest

attention : so well did the French negotiators know to recompense France for the difficulties of the part they had to act, by their personal consistency and distinguished talents.

It has been asked, if it would not have been correct if France had not appeared at the Congress? This question gives rise to a vast number of considerations. If her absence had, in some measure, compromised her dignity, perhaps it would have served interests no less precious to her.

CHAPTER XIII.

GREAT BRITAIN.

GREAT BRITAIN has gathered the fruits of her perseverance, of her courage, of her patriotism, and of all her sacrifices. This power offered a most interesting spectacle at the period when she constantly proportioned her means of defence to the attacks which she had to sustain ; attacks of the most violent nature to which she had ever been subjected ; and finished, by victoriously releasing herself from a contest, in which she no longer contended, as in former ones, for a pre-eminence of honour, wealth, or power ; but, for an existence. For it is impossible to deny that the existence of Great Britain was threatened from the opening of the war in February 1793, to the 31st March 1814. During this whole space of time, a single day did not pass, in which Great Britain was not devoted to a complete overthrow. First, revolutionarily, during the whole period of the reign of the Convention and the Directory. Second, politically, as late as 1814.

If the mutiny attempted in the British fleet had succeeded, what would have become of Great Britain? If the invasion should have succeeded, Great Britain would have been divided into three parts; England, properly so called, Ireland, and Scotland. In this case, we may also assert that India would have been lost, her maritime power destroyed, and every species of influence from without, overturned by the neighbourhood of two governments hostile to her and friendly with her enemies.

But a good genius watched over her, and this good genius was that of her adversary. His attacks were so direct, so menacing, that the nation could refuse nothing to the minister, who, on his part, had only to show it the precipice into which it was wished to plunge her. Napoleon furnished the British ministers with talent. They required no other art than to oppose him with all their strength, than to seek on all sides for enemies, to whom he wished to abandon her. Their game was predetermined; and it is truly curious to observe that Mr. Pitt either knew not how, or could not do * what ministers, regarded as very inferior in capacity, have accomplished, by having one regular plan; namely, that of defence.

Thus threatened with annihilation, Great Britain has saved herself.

Great Britain has regenerated Portugal. By her means, the troops of a country that never have enjoyed any reputation, have been brought to the level of all the troops of Europe. The defence of Lisbon, the sacrifices of the inhabitants on all the roads that the enemy had to traverse, form prodigies of resignation on the part of the Portuguese.

In the co-operation of Great Britain, Spain found

* What would Mr. Pitt have said, who so many times declared in Parliament that no attack, direct on France, could meet with success, if he had seen the British Guards standing as sentries at the Louvre, and the Russians at Paris, twice in the course of fifteen months?

powerful means of nourishing and prolonging her resistance; although in the usual state of this nation her triumph would have been as-sure. Such is the nature of the country, that Spain never can be conquered.

Great Britain has covered Europe with her gold: whoever has asked for subsidies to fight Napoleon has obtained them: to her largesses she has placed no bounds. This uniformly appears. Similar to an athletic man, who, from the impetuosity of the combat, does not experience the severity of his wounds, Great Britain arrived at the end of the war without ever casting a look of regret on the load with which she had burthened herself. But the battle is over, the account must be made up; and then it is that Great Britain will be able to form an idea of the extent of her sacrifices, and the injuries it has produced to her in all her social relations. Thus have we beheld her engaged in the abolition of taxes disliked by the nation. She has endeavoured to discover how she can make the products of her soil compete with those of other countries which have a tendency to reduce her markets. In Great Britain there is a contest between the cultivator and the consumer. A combination of wealth and taxes have so raised the price of produce, that it is impossible to continue a competition with the Continent, in the most essential articles, and a portion of manufactured commodities*.

Great Britain was beforehand with the Congress in retaining Malta, Heligoland, the Isle of France, the Cape, and other points, well calculated for her convenience, on the coasts of South America and India. She bore a principal share in the erection of the new kingdom of the United Provinces. Profiting of this opportunity, that hitherto has rarely offered itself to any one, Great Britain has obtained more than at any time she could have promised herself. She has realized that of which

* See the discussions in Parliament on the Importation of Foreign Wheats, and the debates on the Reduction of the Prices of Farms.

her greatest politician, William the Third, had but a glimpse.

The erection of Hanover into a kingdom did not directly concern Great Britain. It was intended to provide for the situation of the future sovereigns of Hanover, in the event of the throne of Great Britain not being occupied by the House of Brunswick, and thus ensure their remaining equal to the Electors raised into the rank of Kings.

Hence, Great Britain arrived at the Congress in the most favourable condition, that of not having even one demand to make. Thus detached from all personal interest, nothing remained for her but to watch over the general welfare of Europe. To this affair she does not appear to have paid an efficacious attention. She seems never to have interfered but on private objects, and neglected the *ensemble* and the elevated views presented by the common interests.

The language of Great Britain has varied.

If the documents that have been permitted to be seen contain the truth, Great Britain seems at first to have acceded to the incorporation of Saxony with Prussia. It was only in consequence of the remonstrances made in Parliament, and the suggestions of France, that this opinion took another direction.

Its system as to Italy appeared also to have undergone many variations: for the proclamations of Lord William Bentinck announcing to the Genoese the return of their independence; and that of General Dalrymple, when he transferred the country to the King of Sardinia, are widely different.

In these two acts we discover a primary and personal direction yielding to action foreign to that foreseen, and which could not be mastered. A fine field of glory for his country and himself lay before the British negotiator, if he had proclaimed the necessity of a general and definitive arrangement of all Europe, as having been the object and the recompense of the labours of Great

Britain : she who has boasted of having been the saviour of Europe. In leaving it a prey to the disorders to which it was devoted by the Congress, she has only performed half her work.

To prevent Russia from passing the Vistula, Austria from invading Italy, fortifying Prussia, extending the United Provinces to the Rhine, emancipating Spanish America——such were the objects of British policy. The negotiator who should have conveyed into Great Britain stipulations so assuring for the whole body of Europe, would have been rewarded with the thanks of all the correctly thinking men of his nation, who must have regretted the occurrence of such a vacillating system, and of the loss of so much time, in order to produce the result which we now witness.

The cries of the British Opposition made the British Cabinet alter its ideas with regard to the incorporation of Saxony. Why did it not exert itself more for the liberties of Europe, and endeavour to assuage the afflictions of the Italians; afflictions much greater than those of the Saxons?

The French legislature felt its humiliation, in being forced to preserve a silence with regard to those very objects upon which its British rival was called to give so unbiassed an opinion, and to exhibit itself using so frequently, and in so honourable a manner, this valuable prerogative; one, from the exercise of which, nations should never in the slightest degree desist. The glory of the Opposition would have been complete, if to the just indignations that it testified against the exchanges and the transfer (*transvasemens*) of people, which present a spectacle so afflicting to humanity, it had added a superior solicitude for the general interests of Europe, which evidently were compromised by the Congress.

For some time Great Britain appeared to give its support to the King of Naples, and to the sovereign then reigning in Sicily. The fact has been attempted to

be discovered in opposition to itself, from the ambidexter interference between two interests diametrically opposite to each other. The reproach is without foundation.

Nothing is so essentially opposite as that system under which Naples and Sicily form two distinct states. For a long time they have rather been separated than united. However desirable may be the union of these two countries, nevertheless we may say with truth, that Naples could exist alone as well as Sicily. Naples can do still more; she can contribute to the general benefit of Italy, of which she may preserve the balance, and to that of Europe, which is interested in keeping the southern part of Italy from the domination of those who prevail in Upper Italy.

Great Britain has done nothing that can imply any contradiction in her conduct. It could not have partaken of the character of duplicity, as in the case of her having contracted at one and the same time engagements with the Court of Naples against that of Palermo, or with that of Palermo against that of Naples. It is clearly to be seen that there was a medium between the two, that of guaranteeing to the two courts their respective possessions. This Great Britain did. The enterprise of Napoleon, and the war of Murat, have given another appearance to affairs in this quarter; and every thing has been replaced in a situation more convenient for the two countries.

It is to be remarked, that Great Britain is the only power, the aggrandizements of which have not been submitted to the deliberations of the Congress, and received its guarantee. Russia, Austria, and Prussia, submitted theirs in Poland, in Saxony, and in Italy. France and Spain were out of the question; the situation of the former having been determined by the Treaty of Paris, and the second having experienced no change in her situation. But the power of Great Britain had experienced an immense increase by the occupation of Heligoland, of Malta, of the Cape of

Good Hope, of the Isle of France, and many other points on the coasts of India and America: of all these acquisitions, not a word was said at the Congress. Was it forgetfulness on the part of the former, or an act of supremacy on the part of Great Britain?

CHAPTER XIV.

PRUSSIA.

A CENTURY has beheld the birth, the elevation, the fall, and the resurrection of this power.

She is now ranked among those of the first order in Europe, and constitutes one of its first necessities.

When, in consequence of a surprise rather than a defeat, Prussia yielded at the first shock to France, it was curious to observe to what cause her fall might be attributed. A distinguished writer goes so far back as to impute it to Frederick the Great.

It was precisely to Frederick the Great that she has to attribute her salvation.

We are ignorant of all the patriotism concealed in the hearts of the Prussians, of all the desire of vengeance with which they burned, of the undefiled honour that had remained so long attached to their flag, since the death of this sovereign. We have seen with what oceans of blood they have washed out the affront. We are ignorant of that mass of intelligence, existing from Königsberg to Berlin. There was the resource. With what vigour has not this state been restored to its rank! It is this which has redressed Europe. It is General D'Yorck, disobedient to his sovereign, but implicitly obedient to the spirit of the nation. Without Prussia, indignant at its abasement, burning with

ardour, and the desire of regaining its rank, Russia could not have pushed so far the pursuit of the victory, that the madness of her enemy and the severity of the climate had granted to her. Without Prussia, Austria would have still hesitated, and Vienna would not have witnessed the meeting of the Congress.

In this assembly, Prussia had to obtain its establishment, and to assure its safety for the future. Ties of the most friendly character united the sovereigns of Prussia and Russia. These friendships are those of ancient times between demi-gods.

In her present state there are three Prussias: Prussia in Poland, Prussia in Germany, Prussia on the Meuse and the Rhine. Her boundaries are not to be defined. Prussia powerfully feels this truth. She has enemies on all sides. No where has she frontiers.

At Memel and Koningsberg, Russia presses her by the point of her states. Austria cuts through the centre of her possessions. Every thing which goes out of Bohemia, is in an instant in the heart of Prussia. France touches on the extremity of her dominions, separated from the heart of the monarchy. She is made up of small parcels, on an immense line, without adhesion and without consistency. The length and narrowness (*maigreur*) of Prussia occasioned Voltaire always to compare her *to a pair of garters*. She resembles the houses at Berlin that are only built on one side of the street. *Even now she has but one aspect towards Europe.* •

France, allied to Prussia at Berlin, becomes her enemy on the Meuse. She would open the war against her by the occupation of that division of her monarchy situated between the Rhine and the Meuse.

Russia, occupying Poland, would commence war against her on the Oder, at the very gates of her capital.

Austria shuts her in as closely, by all the passes into Bohemia.

It is rarely that we see assembled and accumulated such embarrassment.

Prussia powerfully contended for the complete incorporation of Saxony. She appeared to be convinced of the inconveniences arising from the dispersion of her different provinces, and of those that would spring from the want of connection among them. She felt that her approach to France would invert the nature of her relations with those countries, and occasion her to pass from the state of friendship that had hitherto existed, to that of enmity, the inevitable result of being such near neighbours; for to be neighbouring and inimical, are synonymous between political bodies.

Prussia could not flatter herself that the friendly relations existing between her sovereign and that of Russia, would become permanent between the two countries, and pass from age to age to Russians and Prussians. It is not on the affections existing between men, but on their permanent interests, that the relations between states can be founded in a durable manner. The arrangements should be made independent of such transient harmony. Prussia wished to fortify herself for the future, and combine her forces as much as possible. She lost more than a million of inhabitants when she ceded the Duchy of Warsaw. She had to recover, as well as consolidate, every thing. Such were the two branches of her system. We shall see whether or not she obtained her object.

During the latter periods of the last age, Prussia found herself at the head of the Protectorate of the North of Germany. It extended to every part of that country that was attacked. For instance, the war of Bavaria in 1778, and the line of demarcation in 1795. In both cases, Prussia acted without distinction of either Catholic or Protestant league, and afforded equal protection to both.

The states of the North of Germany, such as Mecklenberg, Hanover, Hesse, formed a species of federation

with her. Since the war of 1756, these allies have scarcely ever been separated.

Until the revolution, and during the greater part of its course, the object of Prussia was to maintain the integrity of the German empire, to cultivate a good understanding with France, and oppose Austria.

At present every thing is changed for her, as well as for the others, and Russia is the cause of this change. In fact, in proportion as Russia shall approach Europe, the whole world will experience new cares. It is now only that empire, and the dangers consequent to her aggrandizement, which will now occupy the public attention.

Russia is not like the other states of Europe, that may be beaten and compelled to withdraw. Russia will not retrograde. Late experience will for a long time prevent any attempt of this sort.

When we pass under the yoke of a people of Europe, we remain in Europe. Under that of Russia, we become the half of Asia. This is a truth that cannot be too often repeated; and one, the force of which Prussia will soon most assuredly acknowledge.

She forms the first line in the way of this torrent. Through Prussia it is that its course lies. The road through Austria is more out of the way; more difficult to pass, in consequence of the mountains of Bohemia and Hungary. But Prussia has no defence. The Oder does not commence to be a barrier till below Breslau. Berlin is between it and the Elbe. Prussia Proper remains in the rear of the monarchy. All in that quarter is cut off from the body of the state.

Hence, Prussia is ever in great danger; and, therefore, is not the bulwark of Europe. Of course, it is the interest of Europe to strengthen her, whether by additions of territory, or whether by facilities that shall connect the detached parts of the Prussian monarchy. It is the interest of Europe to deny nothing to Prussia; on the contrary, to give her, and facilitate all the ar-

rangements that shall enable her to procure strength, and a rapidity of movement. Prussia is, in fact, the guardian power of Europe: for her that kingdom is, on the Oder, what the King of Sardinia was at the foot of the Alps for Italy. Prussia never will be sufficiently strong, not for herself, but for Europe, against the Colossus of the north. In this we learn what, in the actual state of things, cannot be too often repeated, nor too often become an object of consideration. Unfortunately, in her own neighbourhood we see nothing that we can give to Prussia. All the situations are occupied; and surely Prussia covets that of no one. She would not wish to displace the sovereigns of Mecklenberg, nor those of Hanover, Brunswick, or Hesse. Saxony alone remained, that would serve to strengthen her. The federation of Lower Germany could not in the slightest degree afford the necessary forces to Prussia. All the inconveniences arising from dependencies are known; their fears, their delays, their jealousies. Those who have to act with them, can never inspire them with the same opinions, nor make them do what is necessary. Every thing must submit to those at the head of affairs.

Prussia will be feebly supported by the Confederation of the North of Germany. In future, it will be difficult to calculate on a perfect agreement between her, and what remains of Saxony, as an independent state.

The acquisition of Swedish Pomerania adds but little to the real strength of Prussia. It was merely well that she should possess it, as it was proper that Sweden should give it up.

Prussia is no longer the enemy of Austria; and, for the future, Russia will make them allies. Former jealousies have disappeared before greater dangers; for in this instance the contest is not, as it formerly was, about some trifling pre-eminence, but for existence itself, uniformly menaced by Russia.

Under a proper system, Prussia ought never to have

passed the Rhine ; for by that step she becomes the enemy of France, an alliance with whom should be the pivot of her policy ; not on the score of Austria, as it formerly was, but on that of Russia. The Prussians and the French are no longer destined to fight on the plains of Rosbach or Jena, but to afford mutual succour and prevent the Russians meeting them in those places.

Prussia ought not to multiply her affairs, nor render her system complicated. Russia is preparing business for her sufficiently important.

When Holland was divided into two parties, Prussia lent an efficacious succour to the House of Orange. This intervention will be no longer necessary. A better order of things is established in that country. But if the state to which the Orange family has been called should be attacked, Prussia ought to fly to her succour, and not to permit her to lose the smallest portion of her territory. In its turn, this country should not permit the slightest encroachment upon Prussia.

It was essential for Prussia, as well as for Europe, that the new state of the Low Countries should at once have received its full and perfect developement, a developement that would have carried it to the Rhine and the Moselle, which are its natural limits.

It ought ever to be recollected, that with France this state forms the second defensive line of Europe against Russia, as she does the first against Great Britain.

The Congress, in opposing itself to the views of Prussia on Saxony, and in offering it indemnities or possessions that had no connexion with the other parts of the monarchy, did not enter into the real spirit of the permanent interests of Europe ; whether from former jealousies of Prussia ; whether interest for an unfortunate prince or a suppliant nation, discussions contrary to the interests of Europe were permitted ; for, in fact, it is ever Europe, not Prussia, whose welfare should be consulted. For example, it appears that Austria, in a consent she gave in the month of October 1814, to the

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incorporation of Saxony with Prussia, prohibited the establishment of a fortress at Dresden. In this, she acted as the enemy of Prussia, not the friend of Europe and of Germany. It is very evident that she only looked to the safety of Bohemia, and not to that of Germany; for, in opposing herself to any thing that should fortify the line of the Elbe, she would weaken the defence of Germany, and leave a channel open for the torrent rushing from the north. When the Russians shall have poured themselves upon Germany, of what consequence to Europe and to this country will it be that Bohemia has been a little more or a little less threatened on the side of Prussia? Before the war in 1806, Prussia reckoned on nearly ten millions of inhabitants. It appears that she is now confined to the same, perhaps a smaller, population: but if as to numerical force there is an equality, there is an inequality of physical strength.

For in 1806 Russia did not possess Finland and her new provinces in Poland.

Austria did not extend as far as Illyria and the United Provinces of Italy.

Prussia then enjoyed, by the evacuation of the Duchy of Warsaw, a compactness of territory. It is now replaced by a division of the monarchy. Then Prussia was not the neighbour of France, as she has since become, in the third division, between the Meuse and the Rhine.

All these considerations indicate the necessity of carrying Prussia as far as the banks of the Vistula. They also prescribe the incorporation of Saxony, and the placing her at a great distance from France. Then would Prussia find herself restored to what ought to be her invariable destination in the actual state of things, that of watching the movements of Russia, and guarding the avenues of Europe.

This fatal mistake will compel Prussia to keep on foot an army much too large for her population and her finances.

In any war, whether with France or with Russia, Prussia must begin by losing part of her states. If with France, she must abandon all her possessions on the left bank of the Rhine. Prussia cannot defend them against France.

If with Russia, she must abandon all her territory on this side the Vistula, for it is cut off from the rest of the monarchy, and nearer to Russia than Prussia. It is an open country.

A worse combination could not have existed, and consequently a state more painful than that in which Prussia has been placed by the result of the Congress. However, it must be acknowledged that Napoleon is the cause of all this disorder. He has done more injury to the north than he has to the south of Europe. Let us compare the state of the case.

The principal feature of his policy was to prevent Russia from interfering so much in the affairs of Europe. He wished also to exclude Great Britain from them. He endeavoured to drive the one back into Asia, as he had aspired to expel the other to the most distant part of the globe. He neither succeeded in the former nor the latter of these schemes. But if it was not in his power to offer a direct opposition to Great Britain, he was not equally deprived of the means to contend with Russia: not, however, that he could have driven her as far back as his ideas had induced him to think was in his power; although he might have raised before her a barrier sufficient to arrest her progress. The means were ready. These means were to be found in Prussia. She then possessed a part of Poland; she sensibly felt all the inconveniences attached to the contiguity of Russia, and only required to be put into a situation to preserve herself from them. It was the policy of the time. Napoleon had a right to calculate upon it. But, instead of making use of what he found ready to his hands, what did he not do, after all his false caresses, that were continued for four years? He fell upon Prussia, and

crushed her with the weight of his power. It pleased him to create a duchy of Warsaw with the spoils. He gave to Russia part of the Prussian possessions in Poland. He amused himself, if we may so term it, by the re-erection of the republic of Dantzic. In the war with Austria in 1809, he enriched Russia still more, by giving her some parts of Galicia. In short, he began to strengthen that which he proposed to weaken. It is true, that it was rather loans than cessions he intended to make to Russia. The benefits he conferred were merely to conceal his perfidy. He fully purposed to return, and demand the surrender of these gifts, as in fact he did. He sought to make them the foundation of jealousies between Austria, Russia, and Prussia. But, in order to seize these donations from Russia, he at last commenced a war, and the war that ruined him.

On the contrary, if Napoleon, faithful to the ancient system of France, had strengthened the ties which united her to Russia; if, instead of plundering and humiliating her, of harrassing her in a thousand ways, he had cultivated a good understanding with as much care as he took pains to oppress her; had he done this, he would have found in her the barrier for which he sought to the power of Russia; he might have calculated on finding a faithful ally, where he met a sanguinary enemy. The King of Prussia would never have left Berlin, nor Napoleon Paris. An important lesson to teach men not to direct their affairs on chimerical plans, nor to gratify private prejudices, nor the dislike of man to man. It is neither by the affections, nor by the contradictions of the human mind, that states are to be governed. Napoleon detested Prussia. Why, he was at a loss to account. The whole conduct of Prussia in the course of the revolution, its constant refusal to enter into any coalition against it from the year 1795, should with him have served as a guarantee for the goodness of her disposition towards France. Well! he wished to crush her. He was pleased in ruining her military reputation, that

dimmed his own; and he went to seek an avenger for Europe. But necessity having brought Russia and Prussia together, the former being able to consider itself the saviour of the latter, nothing could be denied, and Russia has thus remained mistress of all the arrangements as to Poland—a circumstance as much opposed to the natural system of Prussia as that of Europe.

CHAPTER XV.

RUSSIA.

IN many places we have had occasion to show the dangers with which the uniform approach of Russia towards Europe menaces that quarter of the globe. Either by the real or silent consent of the Congress, we see her crossing the Vistula and touching on Silesia and Moravia. By her flanks, by her rear, by all the territory that belongs to her, Europe is kept in a state of apprehension.

Hence, Russia has taken the place of France. Oppression came from the West; for the future it will proceed from the East. Let us explain ourselves.

Every army purely European is civilized. Every Russian army is so in its leaders, and not so in the remainder of its members. Whatever may have been the progress of civilization in Russia, this distance between the chiefs and the subalterns will yet last a long time. This is precisely the danger that we have to fear. A barbarism, robust and obedient, is always subservient to the orders of a refined civilization. Barbarous hands may manage the instruments of the

scientific, and be made to use them as well as those of the learned. Russia resembles Rome under the emperors, finishing the conquest of the world by means of Gallic legions and German troopers. If the Russians were wholly barbarous and made use of arrows, the danger would not be so great. By means of its arts, Europe could preserve itself: but Russia will make use of the arts of Europe against Europe. Education has its effect every where.

What difference is to be perceived between the Russian and French officers? Fifty millions of men, bent by the discipline of the North to the obedience of the East, are at the disposal of others equal in civilization to those of the most polished character in Europe. It is in the establishments of every nature that are formed in all parts of Russia, as well as in its arsenals, that the chains of Europe are preparing. The creation of arts and commerce at Odessa inspire us with more fear than Souvoroff with his army in Italy. Armies pass away. The arts remain.

• Russia has taken the road to the south. She advances with a brave and robust population, with the instruments of all the arts, and under chiefs as polished as Europeans.

We have uniformly declared that the Russians are barbarians. Ah! would to God that it were true, and so many causes for fear would not exist. It is because they become daily more civilized, and their chiefs are as advanced in civilization as other Europeans, that they are unconquerable. The Strelitzers would not have found the road to Paris so easy as did the Russian imperial guard.

Since the occupation of Finland, Russia only comes in contact with Sweden on the polar ices. She has disengaged herself from a troublesome neighbour.

The tranquillity of the Turks makes her easy on the side of Constantinople. They, and not the Russians, have occasion for fear.

Russia borders on East Prussia, and crosses all the line of the kingdom of Prussia. Königsburg is more in

Russia than in Prussia. She also touches on the frontiers of Austria, and, crossing the Vistula, has thus established herself in face of the centre of Europe. Never was there a prospect more threatening. It appears that the friendship and gratitude of Prussia have assisted in making these arrangements for Russia. We may easily be brought to believe, that nothing can be refused to those whom we think it our duty to grant every thing. It is much to be regretted that their connection has not taken a different direction; that, losing sight of themselves, these august friends have not carefully regarded their own states, the time to come, and the social body of Europe, and paid an attention to them that seems to have been absorbed in personal considerations. They would have acknowledged that their states would one day experience great inconvenience from the order of things thus to remain established; they would have seen that to leave a shadow of liberty to Prussia and to Europe, it was indispensable that Russia should not cross the Vistula. Here was her limit, and here Europe commenced: if otherwise, the war of the independence of Europe has terminated by her submission to Russia. The latter did not put herself to much trouble on this occasion.

The engagements voluntarily contracted with the Poles, did not, in any manner, connect them with the Russian empire. She had formed many other connections with Europe, to which she had promised happiness and repose; but never will she safely enjoy them while Russia continues to advance upon her with the steps of a giant. In vain will they say that the finances of Russia are low, and that it is not in her power to go to war. But when were her finances good, and when did she not go to war? Besides, when there are as many soldiers as are to be found in Russia, are not the finances of her neighbours exposed to great danger?

The French supremacy, against which there has been such a cry, and with great reason, was far from threaten-

ing the same danger. France may, as has in fact happened, be restored to order. Will this be the case with Russia? The French nation co-operated in this work, although very much against its inclination; and in fact it was only the instrument. On the other hand, this system of domination is quite agreeable to the taste of the Russian nation. The French never will be attracted towards the North; but the temptations that bring the Russians to the South are great.

Hence, it was against the aggrandizement of Russia that the Congress should have directed all the powers of its intellect, all the force of its representation, and all the vigour of its opposition. It would have been interesting to witness the pleadings of the south of Europe, to hear her demanding that its northern districts should cease to give causes of alarm, and that they should at last be restrained. This would have presented a picture very different to that furnished by Saxony, and other interests still more trivial.

In neglecting this capital point, the Congress has completely mistaken the true interest of Europe. It did not know in what consisted the key-stone of the arch of their own work.

However dangerous might be this establishment of Russia on the Vistula, and precisely because it is dangerous, they should have obtained a barrier at least, in fixing it there; and even then there would not be sufficient distance between Russia and Europe. The public safety demands that this river should be bristled with defences similar to those erected by France in Alsace against Germany; and others, which Germany has erected on the banks of the Rhine against France.

CHAPTER XVI.

POLAND.

THE illustrious Burke declared, that the partition of Poland would cost much to its authors and to Europe. The prophecy of this great statesman has been accomplished.

Already has it cost Moscow to Russia: it has cost Napoleon his crown: and it is about to cost Europe its balance.

It is very certain that Napoleon, wishing to remain master of all the west of Europe, did every thing to expel Russia, and drive her back into the east. To effect this object, it was necessary to erect a party-wall between its two great divisions. For this purpose Poland was destined. The duchy of Warsaw was but a projecting abutment. It had been formed of parts, recovered from Prussia by the treaty of Tilsit, and of those surrendered by Austria at the treaty of Vienna (1809). Some dismemberments of the Austrian and Prussian possessions, such as Byalystock and Tarnopol, had been ceded to Russia. They were in this state at the commencement of the war. This contest has destroyed the power of the founder of the duchy of Warsaw. This duchy has fallen into the hands of his enemy. The grand-duke himself has not been more fortunate. Far from being able to preserve his duchy, he has had much trouble to preserve a part of his own kingdom. This creation of the duchy of Warsaw had roused and roused all the ideas of independence implanted in the Polish heart. In Poland they pant to become once more a nation. All classes, every individual, are inspired with

the same sentiments on this subject. How have they suffered under the new circumstances that have borne down Poland? The consequences of the war have placed her wholly at the disposal of Russia.

This prodigious increase of a power, already too great, injures too numerous and too sensible interests, to be long permitted.

It was attempted to remedy the inconvenience by,

First; To cede to Prussia that part of the duchy which was the nearest to the heart of the Prussian monarchy. The country would have been benefited by this arrangement. The Poles had already had the happiest experience of the Prussian government.

Second; To restore to Austria the neighbouring parts of Galicia, that had been ceded by the treaty of Vienna, in 1809. Cracow had been declared a free town.

Third; To abandon to Russia all that remained of the duchy of Warsaw.

Thus, instead of being united, as many persons expected, the Poles have been still more divided.

Fourth; The Congress has declared that the Poles, the respective subjects of Austria and Prussia, should obtain a representation and national constitutions, regulated into their political arrangements, as the powers to which they belong shall think proper and useful to be established.

This disposition is conformable to the generous sentiments that have always inspired the sovereigns of these countries. In their display of it they have wished to find the means of consoling the Poles, in leaving them in possession of at least the shadow of their country. They entertained the beneficent idea of not altogether separating them from those customs which they are able to retrace.

We must easily see what this simultaneous establishment of constitutions will produce, and that they will be necessary to make the Poles bear the yoke more or less patiently. Time alone can decide this question, as well

as many others ; the agitators of which, when they originated them, knew not, and, perhaps, will never witness their solution.

There were no species of reports that, in the course of the negotiations, were not spread on the subject of the future destination of Poland. They evidently arose from the exaggerated expectations of some ; in the difficulty experienced by others of abandoning a hope, that attached them to recollections too precious to be surrendered : so long, at least, as there remained the smallest probability of seeing it realized. The want of reflection in the minds of many others, had also contributed to give currency to the same reports.

Thus we see that men, who surely only consulting the generosity of their own sentiments, (a generosity very foreign to the ordinary course of business,) did not hesitate to erect an independent state in Poland, reunited into one body by the Emperor of Russia, who would thus be satisfied with having, by such an act, obliterated the injustice of her partition.

Such politicians do not perceive that they re-form the plan against which this prince armed, the plan that had cost him Moscow, and which sequestered him for ever from the affairs of Europe, towards which, if he lost Poland, he would have no road : for Poland, in its integrity, would render Russia an Asiatic power.

Besides, how is it possible to believe that the Emperor of Russia would be willing to surrender his finest provinces, peopled with seven millions of inhabitants ? All this was perfectly chimerical.

It has not been proved that Russia would have calculated correctly for herself in forming, under her sceptre, a single state of Poland ; for Poland united forms a great mass of population and territory. Feeling its natural strength, tormented with the hopes of independence, and the desire of reassuming her political existence, Poland would have run the risk of reassuming her former turbulence. On their part, those powers

who are interested in creating embarrassments for Russia, would not have failed to profit of these circumstances, and again attempt the work of Napoleon. A hatred to an author should never be transferred to his work. This object never was contemptible: and he never entered more fully into the interests of Europe, than when he endeavoured to raise a barrier against a power, on so many accounts formidable. If other projects, proceeding from the same mind, have given the world much trouble, this possessed a character widely different, and wholly tended to the conservation of Europe.

The preservation of the Duchy of Warsaw as an independent state has also been mentioned. In this case we should have more of which we ought to complain than rejoice; for nothing was more unfortunate and more insignificant than this little state, enclosed between the three great powers of Russia, Austria, and Prussia; exposed to the conflicts and the wants of this triple band of neighbours.

A general rule: Poland united, or Poland divided equally among its neighbours. It is only on one of these two conditions that it will serve as a balance for Europe: but, under any supposition, Russia should not cross the Vistula. If she does, the principle of the safety of Europe is violated in a most essential manner. However, it is the state in which the Congress has placed it.

CHAPTER XVII.

AUSTRIA.

FROM the 22d April, 1792, to the 31st March, 1814, Austria has been for more than twenty years at war with France. The contest has only been interrupted by truces of short duration.

In this contest, Austria has shown more constancy than she has experienced good fortune. According to her usual custom, she was always the last of the allies that withdrew from the field of battle. Constancy is the distinguishing characteristic of this power. She hesitates before she contracts engagements; but once made, she tenaciously adheres to them. The same may be said of her schemes; and it is to this pursuit of her ideas, in defiance of the vicissitudes of the times, that she owes the means of extending and consolidating her empire. Austria has participated in the alterations produced by the French revolution. It has beheld her changing her power in Belgium for influence in Italy; cast aside the imperial crown as a burthen, and abandon all her jealousies of Prussia; from whom no alarms any longer spring, but from the North. Austria, as well as Prussia, has now no other enemy.

For a long time Austria felt the burthen occasioned by the possession of the Low Countries. This distant dependency compromised her with all the world; and cost her, in one year of war, more than she produced to her in the course of ten years of peace. Austria felt all this; but as she was not accustomed to cede her territory for nothing, she sought where she could find an equivalent. In 1778, France and Prussia prevented

her possessing herself of Bavaria. She could not forget that she would ever have to meet both these powers on her road to carry into effect any project she might entertain for the invasion of Germany. Italy alone remained to her. She fell upon that as occasions offered. The Treaty of Campo Formio gave her all the state of Venice. She lost it at Presburg and at Vienna, in 1809. She has now recovered it, and with it Lombardy; to which she has also added the Va'teline, and the Valley of Bormio and Chiavenna. Besides these acquisitions, she has obtained the Islands of the Adriatic.

Here, then, we behold Northern Italy nearly become an Austrian property; and Austria crushing or protecting its southern departments.

Also she prevails, either directly or indirectly, from the frontiers of Russia and Turkey, to the shores of the Mediterranean. Never, since the separation of the House of Austria into two branches, those of Germany and Spain, has this house been raised to an equal degree of power. She has gained by yielding the imperial crown, an ancient but useless ornament; a wreath set in thorns. She has as little reason to regret the little properties scattered in the bosom of the empire. By the new arrangement, she has acquired a contiguity and consistency as to her possessions that she never before enjoyed. Mistress of the shores of the Adriatic, from the mouths of the Po to those of the Cattaro, she will find in this extent of coasts, and in the possession of the Adriatic Isles, immense means for the commerce of Hungary and Germany. On the other side, her system is very much simplified. In giving up the Low Countries, she has nothing more in common with the North, Great Britain, Holland, nor with France. Her disputes with Prussia have disappeared, and been changed into a common vigilance, as to Russia. On the side of Turkey she has nothing to fear: a nation pacific in its character, and which will require a

great portion of stimulus before it can be roused. Thus, in place of the great number of enemies that she formerly had, and of the numerous points of contact with other states, Austria has but one, and that is Russia.

Considering the danger of this neighbour, we may continue to ask, how Austria can consent to Russia passing the Vistula? for, in crossing it, the latter touches on Moravia; that is to say, she approaches the gates of Vienna. Instead of raising her voice, as she did, against the incorporation of Saxony, she ought to have employed all the strength of her representations, all her opposition, and all her means of alliance, to prevent an establishment, so injurious, and so near to her, being formed. In this way should she have employed her power.

After having been free and independent, after having entertained other ideas than those which she has been permitted to do, it will require great care to ensure the allegiance of Austrian Italy, weakened as it is by a doubtful fidelity; and her internal administration will be difficult to manage. The number of *Unitarian* Italians are too great not to be an object of alarm. It will be necessary that a use should be made of them for the administration of public affairs, and the tribunals of the country. Hence, at home they will be masters; and masters of their own masters. Surely they ought to be given a particular constitution; but it would do nothing else than aggravate their feelings as to their situation. They would only assemble but to speak of their misfortunes: and it would be with the Italians as it is with the Poles. As soon as there existed a Duchy of Warsaw, then there was no more doubt on the subject of independence. As it is the first want, so it is the first subject of conversation.

At a period when every thing was fortunate for Napoleon, Austria formed confessions with the King of Naples. He was determined at any price to have

a co-operator, and an enemy the less. The possession and increase of his states were guaranteed to him. Almost to the very end of the Congress there seemed to be a perfect agreement between the two countries. In this measure we may conjecture, Austria as much consulted her policy as her personal affections. In her system of universal dominion in Italy, Austria wished to remove the House of Bourbon from Parma and Naples. The reason evidently was, that Austria having approached France, by her acquisitions in Italy, she has endeavoured to weaken the opposition with which she may one day expect to meet in that country. In that case, this opposition will come principally from France; for the House of Bourbon reigning at once in Naples and at Parma, the Austro-Italian states are placed between the possessions of this house; so that some day or other they will experience great inconvenience. This is to be expected in the nature of *things*; the only circumstance which ought to engage our attention. As to the dispositions of *persons*, they are evanescent in their nature. On the contrary, if a prince hostile to France, if, above all, this prince was firmly supported by Austria, and had a great interest in attaching himself to her, then Austria would have nothing to fear on the side of Naples, and would have to calculate on a faithful ally; whereas, under other circumstances, time may create for her a jealous neighbour. Thus may we explain the motives of Austria in her conduct towards Murat.

Austria represented the invasion of Italy as the means of an indemnity for her losses, and a compensation for the acquisitions that her neighbours have made.

But first, as to an indemnity; was it due to her? and was it not to compromise the safety of Italy, and with it the most valuable part of the true system of Europe? This question will occasion much trouble in its solution.

Austria has recovered the two Tyrols, German and Italian; the Voralbourg*, Carniola; what she lost in Carinthia, in Istria, and all Dalmatia. To these we may add the Islands in the Adriatic. Has not the return of possessions so valuable appeared to her an event as fortunate as it was unexpected? Has she not to congratulate herself on having got rid of so troublesome a neighbour as Illyria, converted into a French province? We may then allow, that, without injustice, Austria might have been placed in the condition we assign her. But this was not the case. Not content with what she has recovered, she has returned to her Italian system; and, profiting of the opportunity, she became possessed in gross of that which, until that period, she only possessed in detail. Hence has she pounced upon Italy; and without regard either for her, or France, or Europe, she has adopted the measures against this country that we have stated, and which destroy all its natural relations. Therefore here we discover a circumstance which must be prevented; and, if it should be indispensable not to counteract the views of aggrandisement formed by Austria in this quarter, at least it will be proper to assign it one which shall have nothing injurious to Europe, and which might in its nature have become profitable. This concession should have been obtained in Bosnia, Croatia, and Servia. These countries influence Dalmatia and Austrian Slavonia. They but nominally belong to Constantinople, whose authority is continually disputed and contested. This union would form a superb arrondissement for Austria. It has for a long time engaged her attention; and, particularly at the epoch of the great prosperity of France, she only wished to get to a distance from this formidable neighbour. But the system of Europe would have been as much ameliorated by the annexation of this part of the Ottoman Empire, as it has

* At this time Austria negotiated for the cession of Salzburg and the Brisgau.

been injured by the invasion of Italy. All the dependencies of the Turkish empire are but as a dead weight in their relation to the main body of Europe. In those countries we know that they have no other object in their system of destruction, than to remain masters of a desolated land, and inhabitants brutified and plundered. Consequently all that can be taken from this barbarous system, in order to afford it a participation in the civilization of Europe, will become subservient to its advantage. This is necessary to be well understood in any discussion, the object of which may be the state of Europe. In acting for Austria, and in bestowing new possessions on her, we should also have acted for the benefit of Europe. The Congress would have fulfilled the obligations into which it had entered, if it had ceded these two provinces to the government of Austria.

For ten years Servia has sustained a bloody and successful war against the Turks. The enterprise of Napoleon against Russia having forced the latter to withdraw her support from the Servians, the Turks then became possessed of the means of turning upon them. In a few months the Servians lost all the fruit of their truly generous efforts. They had shown talents and resolution, but what could they do against forces so disproportioned; and, above all, when they found themselves perfectly surrounded? They were compelled to yield. The chiefs, as ever happens, found honours and a refuge in other countries; but the nation experienced all the evils that re-actions produce, and particularly when they spring from the Turks. Therefore the annexation of this country to Austria would have been beneficial to itself, to Europe, and to Turkey. Perhaps also the moment had arrived to put an end to these quarrels, that for forty years have constantly occurred in Wallachia and Moldavia. Even if these provinces had been annexed to Austria, in order to their civilization and moral restoration to Europe, much benefit would have been derived to the whole world, and a new subject for praise would

have been found. For a long time the contest has been carried on between the two countries. The Turks only govern there in name; for what denomination can be given to such influence as the *regime* of the Hospodars, who constantly pass from the palaces of Bucharest and Jassy to the prisons of Constantinople, and from thence to the Court of St. Petersburg? It will be necessary to prevent the ever imminent danger of the invasion of these two countries by Russia. She has, by the acquisition of Bessarabia, brought herself still nearer to them. The loss of these two provinces will not be felt by the Turks. In that case, their empire will be bounded by the Danube, which, in fact, is its natural limit. Advantage may be taken of this opportunity to terminate a desultory warfare that has lasted so long a time; and to obtain, without a contest, a fortunate result to the unanimous representations of the powers of Europe. This conduct will at least be distinguished by candour and generosity, which ever command success.

We have said elsewhere with what object Mentz has been restored to Austria*.

• CHAPTER XVIII.

• THE EMPIRE.

THE empire has never corresponded to the wishes of the negotiators at Westphalia..

Destined to form a balance between Austria and France, it has never been otherwise than an instrument in their hands.

A portion of the quarrels that have imbrued Germany with blood, was independent of the majority of the princes

* See the chapter on the real Spirit, which actuated the Congress.

that compose that body, who possess a recollection of past power, and but little of its present reality.

The debasement of Sweden, the elevation of Prussia, the appearance of Russia, have changed the state of Europe.

In the great wars of Louis the Fourteenth, the empire became divided. The princes ceased to consider themselves as members of the Germanic body, and began to act as independent sovereigns, pursuing those interests that led them either to a connexion with Austria or with France. Owing to this system, the electors of Bavaria and Cologne lost their states for many years.

In the war to which the succession of the Emperor Charles the Fifth gave rise, the empire was neither more wise nor more united. One party fought for the French. They lavished both men and money, in order to place the imperial crown on the head of the Bavarian House,—a scheme which at present would please no one, but it was the policy of the time.

From the middle of the last century the rivalry of Austria and Prussia have agitated the empire. There have been established a higher and lower empire. All the north of Germany, and all in the south that feared Austria, attached themselves, as to a natural protector, to Prussia, without any regard to a catholic or protestant league. This was witnessed in the Bavarian war in 1778. Not only did we cease to hear of the empire, but we heard no more of Germany; for, since the reign of Frederick, Germany, properly speaking, consisted only of Austrians and Prussians: the last had a majority.

The empire was a grave and august body, ever agitated but never acting. It appeared like an ancient palace, unfit for habitation. It had crumbled to pieces under the blows of the revolution. Its chief had abandoned it. One part of its members have elsewhere sought assistance. While masses of authority, such as the electoral and the other ecclesiastical states, have disappeared, other authorities have passed into the ordinary condition

of subjects. Hence, the empire no longer exists; and in this state the Congress found it.

Therefore it appeared that with it they had nothing more to do, but merely with the good order of the Powers of which it was composed, or rather of those who occupied the territory of what was formerly the empire.

These Powers experience the twofold necessity of protecting themselves against France and against Russia; of preventing the recurrence of the invasions of the one and the commencement of the attacks of the other; but with this difference, that if the one assailed their independence, the other would be able to menace their existence.

Germany ought therefore to be so organized, that France and Russia should be for ever excluded. Germany has no longer to fear either Austrian or Prussian ambition. At the very first step that either should take of this nature, all would declare against the aggressor, and find themselves supported by France and Russia.

Some of the sovereigns in Germany have acquired higher titles than they formerly possessed. This is unfortunate for the dignity of thrones,—a dignity that ought neither to be lavished nor its influence weakened. Rarity forms the price of things; and it is because kings are rare that they are honoured.

At the same time, this multiplication of thrones becomes an injury to subjects; for the elevation of the rank requires an augmentation of expense. A king must have an army more numerous than an elector; an elector, one more numerous than a landgrave. The emulation of luxury establishes itself in all ranks of society; and in a short time, people and subjects, all are equally ruined.

Unfortunately there was not sufficient room in Germany to give a convenient extent to the new kingdoms. Every place was occupied. The Congress has shown itself highly forgetful of this part in reducing Saxony, already too small for a kingdom, into one half its original size.

In this state, it is impossible to say which it is that signifies Saxony, or the royalty of Saxony. We cannot too often repeat, that if kings are to be made, they should be great ones. All the petty sovereignties serve but to reduce the general sovereignty; in fact, the general power of Europe. They create embarrassment in its proceedings.

The system of the division of Germany may have been tolerable when they had only to support the weight of one Power, such as Austria; when it was only sustained by the rival of Austria. France was the corrective of the inconveniences of the Germanic constitution. But now that to Austria we may add Prussia, and, above all, Russia, how will it be possible to adapt circumstances to the new order of things? Hence, in the system of the general interests of Europe, it was all lost time that was granted to a crowd of little claims, which the establishment or maintenance of some general principles would at once have been sufficient to dismiss.

General rule: The Germanic system must be simplified. The Congress at Vienna should have endeavoured to finish the work commenced by the treaty of Luneville.

CHAPTER XIX.

ITALY. — THE POPE.

WE have before described what Italy was before the revolution. Let us now see what it has been rendered by that event, and by the Congress.

Italy has undergone a painful second childhood; but at last she has submitted. Better directed, it would have rendered her happy.

France had appropriated to herself a great part of it. She possessed herself of all the shores of the Mediterranean as far as the kingdom of Naples. This establishment was injudicious. It belonged not in the slightest degree to France, who never will be able to establish itself in Italy: indeed where is the occasion for it?

The mass of Italians united to the French were too great not to consider themselves a separate nation. It was too near to its Italian brothers, and the latter too much interested in their union, for the different members of this family not to have a tendency to become one state. Thus Napoleon, in founding the kingdom of Italy at the extremity of his lengthened empire, did little else but create a constant state of war and sinister manœuvres. The empire of France must inevitably absorb Italy, or Italy would absorb that part of itself, detached from the main body of the empire.

This conduct of Napoleon was destitute of foresight and that species of wisdom that assigns to every thing its just value and its proper place.

Thus this acquisition cannot, in a political point of view, be applauded; but, viewed in its moral light, it has purified Italy, and opened the sources of wealth and happiness she possesses. Crime disappeared from a country which to that period it had called its own. On the retreat of the French it resumed its place. Perhaps they never had before received such a mark of homage. The barriers, so carefully erected between its different divisions by the jealousy of sovereigns and the fiscal department, fell on all sides. The communications were free; and the sovereigns themselves, finding their states covered with monuments, the grandeur of which surpasses their ancient power, cannot deny them their admiration, whatever repugnance they may show to their toleration, or aversion they may experience to their existence.

By the partition of Italy between France and the kingdom of Italy, this country has lost the finest oppor-

tunity it ever possessed of becoming an independent state since the time of the Romans. If, instead of precipitating himself with the most imprudent violence on the states of the Pope, on Tuscany, and Genoa, Napoleon had united Upper Italy, this country would then have acquired sufficient force to protect itself, without being in a situation to be attacked or to conquer others: for it could only be assailed by France or Austria; to either of whom, separately or together, it would ever have been unable to offer an effectual opposition. It was with her as has been of late with the kingdom of the Low Countries, which forms a conservative state, only calculated to have friends every where and no where*.

A confederation between the states of Italy, at all times pointed out by geography and the interests of the country, would place all its strength at the disposition of its natural protector, who should be sovereign of this state. Its system was very simple, being formed out of three states, Upper Italy, the Pope, and Naples. No one would have had a pretence to encroach on the other. The whole of Italy was freed from foreign dominion. France had an interest to keep Austria at a distance; Austria the same with France. This state, thus constituted, could afford jealousy to no one.

How unfortunate that this combination, so simple and so natural, should not have been able to strike him who could do every thing. This sad forgetfulness has plunged Italy into a state of chaos.

The Grand-Duke of Tuscany returned home, as if he had but been absent on a short journey. He found every thing again:—he has done still better; for his estates have been completed by the union of many territories and sovereignties, that now form a part of

* The plan of this establishment was traced eighteen years ago, together with that adopted in detail for the kingdom of the Low Countries, in the work entitled "*Antidote to the Congress at Radstadt.*" Vide p. 80, et seq.

it, such as the estate of the *Presides*, the Neapolitan part of Elba, the principality of Piombino, the imperial fiefs of Tuscany, and the reversion of Lucca, which have been granted to him.

Parma has lost its Bourbon princes. They have acquired a title, and lost their estates. By the treaty of Paris, Parma was appropriated to a family midway between past grandeur and present good fortune.

The Congress granted it to the Arch-Duchess Maria Louisa for life, without excluding Austria from the right of reversion.

An act of the 14th of September, 1815, signed at Vienna, definitively fixed the state of this country, and confirmed it to the arch-duchess; and after her to her son, who, by the last enterprise of his father, was placed in an unnatural situation.

Genoa is united to Piedmont, notwithstanding her aversion to the measure. The King of Sardinia has repassed the mountains, and repossessed himself of the territory which was the cradle of his illustrious House.

The last sprout of the House of Este occupies a little sovereignty at Modena. The race being extinct, an Austrian prince will succeed to it.

All that forms the rest of northern Italy has fallen into the hands of Austria.

This new order of things is at once contrary to the welfare of Italy, the wishes of its inhabitants, and the interest of Europe.

In this situation the King of Sardinia crosses the Alps. This never should have taken place. They should serve as an eternal barrier between France and Italy. Nature created them for this purpose. To this intention every thing should give way. Not to do so, will be to renew the sanguinary and bloody wars that have alike desolated the two countries; to create facilities for fraud, and refuge for crime.

Savoy can never be defended against France. This

country every where directs itself toward France, and not on Istria.

The King of Sardinia is too weak against France, as well as against Austria. It is a dwarf between two giants.

When the entrance to his states was defended by the strongest places in Europe, this jailor of the Alps could not keep the keys. What will he now do, with an open and defenceless country, and when Turin cannot hold out a siege?

The acquisition of Geneva does not give him a real strength, still less a strength correspondent to that of his neighbours.

When Austria shall go as far as the Tesino, what will the King of Sardinia do against his powerful oppressor? Will he not naturally have recourse to France? Here we behold Italy again in conflagration by the hands of Frenchmen and Germans, as if this country never could be emancipated by the descendants of the Cimbri and Teutons, instead of those of Brennus.

If it was impossible to prevent Austria taking root in Italy, at least a watch should have been kept, so that it should have been done *ad libitum*. She ought to have been precluded the passage of the Po, on the side of the legations, and her simultaneous establishments in all the little sovereignties of Italy and Modena, in Tuscany, at Parma, prevented. The King of Sardinia should have been aggrandized, as we have stated elsewhere, and some correctives of the evil inherent in the entrance of Austria into this country attempted. It should be the invariable and eternal principle of Europe not to permit either France or Austria to set foot in Italy. The welfare of Europe requires that there should be a kingdom established, to commence at the Isonzo and terminate at the foot of the Alps and the states of the Pope. Then Italy would form three states; this kingdom, the states of the Pope, and those of Naples.

Reason, and, we may say, the nature of things,

adjudge the throne of Italy to the House of Savoy. The Italians would feel themselves honoured in having for their first king, for their permanent sovereigns, the princes of a House that has produced so many illustrious men, who will recall to them so many impressive recollections; and which, in its elevated rank, will show one of its own children to Italy in the person of its sovereign.

To have neglected this establishment is to have abandoned the system of Europe — is to have taken a false step — is to have paralyzed one of its most important portions — is to have created frequent causes of war for Europe — is to have formed great embarrassments even for Austria, in giving her a great mass of subjects, whose affection is doubtful, to protect; and to have created for Italy a source of eternal regret.

If it is not possible to deny that our interest is excited by the circumstance of a people being deprived of their sovereign and sovereignty, to whom is it more due than to the Italians? The day-star of liberty had begun to dawn on them. Its very first rays had cast a new light on a land hitherto held in foreign fetters. The Italians, formed into one family, appeared to have a community of affection, and shone on the theatre of that world from which it had been so long exiled. Introduced into the great family of Europe, they proved that in attainments they yielded to no one of its members; that they possessed talents which could raise them to the consideration of the most important subjects, as well as descend to those that luxury has provided for more frivolous enjoyment. Here behold their rising happiness, their personal existence, the care of their own affairs wrested from them. Their wealth, produced by the sweat of their brows, their laborious and delightful industry, are to be divided between themselves and foreigners. The defence of the approaches to their superb country was no longer to be exclusively committed to their care. But the children of Italy were to proceed to the defence of Teneswal and Cracow, and contend with Russians,

Prussians, and Turks. Ah! if the Saxons complained, how much more reason have not the Italians to lament their bitter lot! The Saxon inhabits a country resembling Prussia: he speaks the same language; possesses the same taste. He is a German as well as a Prussian; under, it is true, a different government: but he is in all situations a German. On the other hand, the Italian is neither Hungarian, German, nor Pole. Born under another sky, struck with the sight of other objects from his birth, the Italian must accustom his ear to the roughness of the German and Sclavonian dialects. He must order his eyes and all his senses not to be disgusted with the homeliness of the places he is to inhabit, and the customs with which he has to meet. Such were the people that called for the interest of Europe and that of the Congress. Hence, their profound and lasting regret!

Italy protested herself against the appropriation proposed by Austria. It is necessary that the latter should be on her guard. This Italy, of which she has disposed so summarily, is no longer that Lombardy which she possessed a century since. At that period she did not possess Venice, the union of which with the Milanese forms a mass of power and population fully equal to the extent of a nation. The Italians are no longer the Milanese, the Genoese, that they were twenty years ago. There, as every where, every thing is changed. Then Italy slumbered; now she is awake. The Italians had not then tasted of independence; they have opened to themselves a new existence, a new world; and the instant that they commenced the enjoyment of their new happiness, it has been torn from them. They are supported by the sentiments predominant in the minds of their brethren, as well as those of the generous men of all countries: they are esteemed, and have appeared with honour, on the field of battle: they are convinced that they possess every thing necessary to the formation and the glory of a

nation. They know it by experience; and find themselves in the service of masters to whom they do not regard themselves as inferior in any circumstances. The Italians have expressed their aversion from the yoke that has been imposed on them. The feeling of independence has made so rapid a progress in this country, that in the course of time a general reunion of Italy, in a single and sovereign capacity, must result from the restraint to which she has been compelled to submit. The necessity of putting an end to all her vexations, of no longer serving as aliment for the avarice of some, and remaining victims to the interested views of others, will lead the Italians to the adoption of a system that the universe will applaud. It was in the power of Napoleon; but he acted with this *materiel* as he did with so many others.

Whatever House may prevail at Naples, it will increase the desire of Upper Italy for independence, in order to diminish the oppressive burthens of Austria, of which Naples will not be long before she has her share. Joachim appeared to guarantee Italy to Austria. In the course of twenty years he would have endeavoured to counteract her designs; to drive her from it, if he should be able, and substitute the state of which we speak. Necessity, it is true, has given another direction to affairs. It was the moment for men; but when that of things should return, they would act agreeably to their nature, and great changes will take place. With the House of Bourbon it will be the same, and even worse. Tranquil as to its family interests, and restored to its own policy, it will not be long before it experiences great inconvenience from this Austrian domination in Italy. In this case, it will not fail to direct its views towards the reduction of the Austrian power in that country, and to call to its assistance the sovereign of Naples, also interested in diminishing the influence of Austria. France could for ever have been separated from Austria, its great

and ancient rival. Here, however, are we again to behold those fields of battle, on the very places which Francis the First, and Charles the Fifth, and their successors, uselessly contested for so long a period. What an inconsiderate conduct! How contrary at once to the welfare of Italy, to that of France, of Austria, and of Europe!

It is far from being certain, that Austria will gain by this arrangement, so apparently advantageous to her. Italy will be difficult to keep. A considerable part of the Austrian forces must be kept there, and this will tend to weaken her on the side of Russia. This system is as Anti-European, as it is Anti-Italian and Anti-Gallican. It is impossible to omit repeating, that Austria as well as Prussia has but one great interest, that of watching Russia. In order to discharge this duty, she must not divide her forces, nor weaken them by retaining unwilling subjects. It is better to have a smaller number, on whose affections full reliance can be placed.

Perhaps they will say, that Austria will give a liberal constitution to Italy, and place it on the same footing that it does Hungary. Well, that which affords Italy consolation, will be the means of raising an enemy against Austria. Let us wait a moment for the embarrassment on the part of Austria; let us permit foreign intrigues to operate, and we shall see what millions of Italians, collected to discuss their own interests and establish their own rights, will do. If Italians are mistaken for Slavonians, Transylvanians, Hungarians, in earlier periods; but it would be as well to mistake Milan, Venice, Bologna, for Italian towns, and for the Gothic towns inhabited by the descendants of Hérules and the Huns. This is the point to which habit would induce us to assimilate times and things in which there is no community either of acts or feeling.

It is with the utmost astonishment that the Congress has been seen pass so lightly over this grand invasion

of Italy by Austria. In their wandering from general ideas, it appears that the negotiators of the North have permitted Austria to do what she chose in the South, on a tacit condition, that they, might do the same in the North. We may conjecture, that this was determined before-hand. After a great number of propositions on the destination of the Papal states, the Congress at last decided to restore them in their integrity. They have not even excepted the principalities of Beneventum and Ponte Corvo. Austria is to retain a garrison at Ferrara. The Pope had ceded these legations by the Treaty of Tolentino. This country has been represented as abandoned by the sovereign of Rome; as reconquered, and consequently a fit subject for indemnification, as well as other territories equally ceded and reconquered. An increase of four hundred thousand souls had been promised to the King of Naples, to be taken from the Marches. This prince strongly insisted on this clause in the treaty.

The Congress took a part much more honourable, and the only one that remained to it. It thought it ridiculous to convey an idea, that the Pope could have made war, that he should become a victim to a war that he had neither entered into nor managed. Under this conviction, things relative to the Pope were placed in the state they ever ought to have been, that of inviolability. All the plunder of the Pope was as contrary to decency as justice; injurious at once to the mind and the heart. In the present condition of Catholicism, all eyes should be dazzled by the brilliancy of its chief. The beauties of this superb tree, that extends so beneficent a shade, cannot be supported on a decayed trunk. The Pope should be in Europe, as the tribe of Levi in Israel, wholly exempt from the effects of war. The Pope has been treated with uniform contempt. Nothing but his hierarchy has been regarded. On the contrary, to the good order in

which he exercised his spiritual functions, an attention should have been paid.

At the termination of a doubtful debate, the Congress determined the re-establishment of the former King of Naples. It is to the invasion of Napoleon that this prince is indebted. This unexpected event dissipated all the doubts and all the clouds with which private interests or private feelings had enveloped certain questions. Thus the King of Naples has been re-established by the person who expelled him; a fate widely different from his competitor, Murat, who has been also dethroned by Napoleon, but who greatly contributed by his own defection to his own overthrow. Wretched calculator! He could not see that he was but the feeble link of a chain, the rupture of one part of which ensured the destruction of the whole!

If the return of the King of Naples has gratified all the wishes of the prince and of his family, it has also gratified the minds and hearts of all those alive to sentiments of public convenience, and who possess the sympathy due to misfortunes. His re-establishment is also the commencement of a signal benefit to Naples and to Sicily. The division of the sovereignty of the two countries rendered them hostile. While there were Bourbons in Sicily, and Murats at Naples, the two countries would have remained in a state of permanent hostility. The enmity of sovereigns affects their subjects in every thing, and on all occasions they are too near each other; and the pretensions and jealousies that exist between the two sovereigns would make their separation very injurious to both. Besides, this division rendering commercial communications difficult, would have still farther restricted the trade of the Mediterranean, which the Barbary Powers have already rendered too difficult.

Hence, the re-establishment of the King of Naples is not alone a benefit for himself and his family, but

for Sicily and Naples. It is still more beneficial for Europe, that has the greatest necessity for a facility and enlargement of the channels of commerce. In future, the mariner will proceed from Naples to Sicily, without the fear of falling from Charybdis into Scylla. It is under this general and European idea that we have from the first regarded this question. It was not without surprise that we witnessed the long plea for and against Murat; so true it is, that we live in a time when general ideas have little influence, and in which questions of public interest terminate by family or personal considerations.

CHAPTER XX.

SAXONY AND NAPLES.

WE now proceed to discuss delicate points. Our disinterestedness in the cause, the freedom with which we have expressed ourselves, will, we trust, place us above every suspicion of partiality. We are fond of recollecting that it is for Europe, and as Europeans, that we write, regardless of persons or countries. If we could for a moment abandon this course of inflexible impartiality, doubtless nothing would render it more pardonable than when it yielded to the interest inspired by the King of Saxony; a prince, the object of his people's affection, and the veneration of Europe. But we cannot think of men, but of Europe, and its permanent interests.

Of Murat we know nothing, neither during or before his reign. He is no more, and his relations have disappeared. No prejudice, arising from attachment or gratitude, shall influence the decision that we are about to give. Had we reproaches to address to this prince,

perhaps we should have sought them in other sources than those whence were drawn the grossest invectives that it is possible to accumulate on the character of a man, elevated to a rank that violence ought never to reach. The king hides the man, and the royal mantle the humble garb of the shepherd. All thrones are marked with the blows struck at those who occupy them. If we were to attack the character of the King of Naples, it is not the commencement, but the latter part of his life of which we should speak. We should not reproach him for having been the son of an obscure man; for there exist laws, emanating from Heaven, to prevent men continuing to be obscure*; but we should reproach him in having forgotten his origin in allying himself with the enemies of France. We should reproach him for having separated himself from her, and from him, to whom he owed every species of obligation, the forgetfulness of which never can be forgiven. The situation of Murat was not similar to that of the Prince Royal of Sweden. He in no degree owed his elevation to Napoleon, who only permitted it: but he had done every thing for Murat, in introducing him into his family, and investing him with supreme rank, which, in fact, he held by virtue of this alliance: for, correctly speaking, it was rather to the sister of Napoleon than to Murat that the throne of Naples was given.

On the other hand, Napoleon did not take advantage of the error of Murat after the fruits of it had been reaped. If the King of Naples had equalled Prince Eugene in his fidelity to Napoleon, and uniting with him, had given his brother-in-law the support that he did to his enemies, many of those who have addressed him in language so insulting and so haughty, would have been more moderate in their expressions. The

* Who ever dreamt of asking of whom Washington and Franklin were the sons? It would be as much as to say, that before we can do any thing great we must prove our rank.

freedom of these preliminaries will permit us to resume this discussion.

The Augusti of Saxony became kings of Poland. Hence Saxony was crushed. The first Augustus connected himself with Tzar Peter, drew Charles the Twelfth into Poland, and ruined both countries. The second Augustus took part against Prussia. He left his army in the hands of his enemy at Pirna, his states a prey to the conqueror, and went to enjoy himself in pleasure at Warsaw. He died, and, in order to indemnify her for the dissipation of others, bequeathed Saxony another treasure. This treasure was his son. This wise prince, in the course of a reign of fifty years, and a government as mild as it was insensibly felt, repaired all the disasters of the seven years' war. The bank paper of Saxony was the most current in Europe; commerce made a daily progress, and Saxony became one of the most happy countries in the universe: a new proof that, to render people happy, it is necessary only to spend little money, and exercise as little power as possible.

For nearly forty years, Saxony, almost unperceived in Europe, flourished without *eclat*, but also without envy, tranquil as she was happy, and silent as she was contented. During the first war of the revolution, Saxony furnished the contingents fixed by the laws of the empire. She profited, as did all northern Germany, of the opportunity offered by the line of Prussian demarcation, from 1796 to 1801. The war with Prussia precipitated her into the abyss. It is the third time, in the space of sixty years, that the same cause has produced to her the same effects. The morning after the battle of Jena the Saxons fought in the ranks of those who had been their enemies the day before. The Elector of Saxony received the title that had so long been attached to his ancestors in Poland. The treaty of Tilsit made him a Grand-Duke of Warsaw. By this

step he at once raised himself in Saxony, and lowered himself in Poland. There commenced his misfortunes, and those of Saxony. In this country, filled as it is with enlightened men, there was a general repugnance shown to this possession of the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw. The Saxons had not forgotten what Poland had cost them in the course of two reigns. On its part, the Duchy of Warsaw suffered from the absence of the prince, the slow progress made in public business, the Saxon influence experienced there, and the division of attention necessarily produced by the separation of the two countries. Saxony and the grand-duchy had a community of government, without a community of interest; the worst of combinations: and although the parts may remain in a state of reciprocal dependence, not, perhaps, to be expected from those who are unknown to each other. This furnishes another source of inquiry.

By a creation of the Duchy of Warsaw, Napoleon wished to oppose Saxony to Prussia. By its locality, and all the circumstances of the country, Saxony is a Prussian province, under a prince who is not a Prussian. At Dresden the King of Saxony nearly resembles the Kings of Orleans, under the first race of the Kings of France.

The possessions of the two states were not only mixed, but, so to express it, confused. Lusatia cut off Prussia from its finest province, Silesia. The Prussian custom-house officers surrounded Saxony. The principal wars of Prussia being with Austria, Saxony always furnished a road, and a field of battle, for the armies. In this situation did Saxony take that direction calculated for her? She was at once too much without and too much within; too much detached from, and too much dependent upon Prussia.

It was only the long calm that Germany enjoyed from the peace of Hubersburg in 1763, that rendered this state of things at all supportable. The only reason why Saxony

existed independent for so long a time, was because the Kings of Prussia were as yet but Electors of Brandenburg; but when by successive accessions of territory, owing to the genius of these princes, to fortunate events, to the force of arms, the House of Hohenzollern, so long a time inferior to the Princes of Saxony, became more powerful, then their relations mutually changed: correctly speaking, Saxony has no longer existed, but a Great Prussia.

Prussia has become a preponderating Power in Europe, necessary to balance Austria, more necessary still to restrain Russia. Her possessions are cut asunder by those of a foreigner. This foreigner, placed in the heart of Prussia, naturally inclines towards the enemies of Prussia. It belongs to them more than to her; but, if attacked, who is to defend it but Prussia? If in the actually approaching state of Russia towards the centre of Europe, what should Prussia, the advanced guard of Europe, do, if she were attacked by Russia? Does not the *interposition* of a state not belonging to her weaken the means she ought to possess, in order to protect the post assigned her for the general benefit? If she should happen to be attacked on the side of Saxony, what use would Europe derive from having taken so much trouble to preserve that which thus would contribute to her destruction? Prussia was perfectly correct, both for herself and for Europe, in demanding the incorporation of Saxony. She asked for an existence being given in public law to that which had already an existence in fact; she asked Europe not to weaken its protectress: above all, she asked France not to promote the interests of a state, whose existence did not concern her, in preference to those of her ancient ally;—a state that she could no more be defended by than defend: she asked her to look at Europe, and not at one member of the family; she asked her not to compel her to come and settle in her neighbourhood, which would necessarily cool the friendship so mutually necessary to preserve. Instead of this

what has taken place? The interests of Europe have been out of the question: they have given the preference to the establishment of what is called the legitimacy of an order of succession, rather than that of a political order: they have talked of sensibility: above all, and it is singular enough, they mentioned the rights of nations. To hear all that took place for three months, a casual observer would have thought that the Congress was specially assembled to save Saxony, and the King of Saxony. For three months we uniformly read in the public papers, and under the same head, "*The King of Saxony is saved; but he has ceded the two Lusatias, the circle of —, the Lordship of —, the Duchy of —;*" that is to say, the King of Saxony is saved, but Saxony is lost. And how have they saved him? By taking from him almost as much as his whole kingdom. Is not the King of Saxony in fact separated from his best provinces? What is to become of the King of Saxony if the King of Prussia almost touches the suburbs of Dresden? How bitterly will this sovereign lament, in the midst of the cutting regrets that they have prepared for him, his remaining attached to the mutilated body of his states! Will not his heart be more afflicted with the cries of that part of his family that they have taken from him, than consoled by the affections of those still left to him? And the Saxons, separated from Saxony, will they be more happy? Will they be more affectionate subjects, after all that has been said about the rights of the people? Will they be less connected with Saxony remaining such, and less preserved by them in their primitive attachment to Saxony and its sovereign, than those which are opposed to their new duties?

Therefore all this arrangement is improper. It should have been with Saxony as with Poland: she should have remained entire, or have altogether disappeared. Half measures spoil all great affairs. They are only useful in preparing the way for troubles, discontents, and finally, for wars, the most decisive part of which

is, at least, that which most spares the greatest portion. Besides, whatever may have been the sensation that they wished to excite, on the conclusion of the business of Saxony the public remained quiet, and only answered all these appeals by a silence that spoke loudly enough, that they did not misunderstand the nature of this arrangement.

In a future page we shall point out what ought to have been done for Saxony.

Since the year 1740, when Admiral Mathews forced the Court of Naples to separate itself from the cause of France, this state disappeared from the political theatre. It became, as did many portions of Italy, the object of travels, which a taste for the arts and a want of health induced those classes of society to undertake, who, by their leisure or their fortune, were enabled to gratify and amend them. Naples has not been more than any other state, exempt from the attempts of revolution.

In 1793, the troops of this country appeared at Toulon. She furnished some contingents to the army of Italy in the great campaign of 1796. They were not long before they detached themselves from the Austrian army. French policy, in order to weaken Austria, successively separated Naples, and many princes of Italy, from that alliance. Thus was formed the Cisalpine Republic, the prelude to the kingdom of Italy. In December 1798, the Court of Naples, outstripping the coalition, made much ado about France. It was premature. The Neapolitan army could not bear the sight of the first French *corps d'armée*, disbanded itself, and the French entered Naples with them. The king went to Sicily, the common place of refuge for his court. The success of Souvoroff enabled him to return to Naples; and his return was distinguished by conduct that alienated many minds from him.

Some years passed tranquilly enough. At last, in 1805, when the short war of Austria terminated by

the peace of Presburg, in consequence of the battle of Austerlitz, the Court of Naples, that had just signed a treaty with France, thought it had a favourable occasion to distinguish itself: but, badly informed as to the moment, she declared almost at the same instant that the House of Austria yielded. To occupy Naples, and compel the royal family again to seek an asylum in Sicily, was but the work of a day. The brother of Napoleon was placed on the throne. A short time after, he left it, to seek another that daily shook under him. Murat replaced him. We know what has happened since.

This prince took part in the war against the coalition. However, he eventually combined his interests with it, and rendered it great service, but on conditions.

When in a state of danger or of want, men are not nice: when it is passed, they reassume all their boldness, and all the urgency it produces. Let us understand the subject. Is a prince, whose states have not been conquered, who has made peace without stipulating for the cession of his states, subject to be dethroned for private convenience? It is a question of public right that well deserves to be considered.

But if the prince of whom we are about to speak has lent a decisive succour, on the express condition of the integrity of his states; and farther, on one, the object of which is the increase of his power: if this engagement has become common to all those acting with the contracting parties; if all have experienced the happiest influence from this succour, and perhaps owe to it their success, then is it not a good contract, and binding on all parties? Is it for loyalty, for dignity, for royal faith to say, that, after they have received the benefit, they no longer have occasion for the benefactor; that they only yielded to circumstances, and that they should dispense with the exercise of sincerity in this engagement? To avoid one inconvenience, do not they fall into one still greater, into the greatest of all, a breach of faith? The King of Naples already recognised by his own country,

had he not, previous to the period, been acknowledged in the college of the kings of Europe? Had he not his representatives with them? Had he been expelled from his states, like the other princes of the family of Napoleon? Then what signifies the vulgar question, *Shall the King of Naples be driven off?* for it is in thus confounding all notions and sentiments of convenience, that we learn to speak of kings. That this royalty at Naples might have soon offered, in the person of Murat, a considerable inconvenience; that the exiled family should be preferred, all the world will allow; but in treating of principles and public affairs, a circumstance essentially different, they represent as *ipso facto dethronable* the sovereign who had been acknowledged by all Europe, who had co-operated in the event on which it congratulates itself so much—an event which perhaps would not have taken place without that co-operation. Can this mode of proceeding be justified on any principle? That they should have gone so far as to demand this surrender with a repetition of the grossest invectives, in stating their wish to subject this monarch to the most humiliating treatment, is it not in good truth as contrary to sound policy as to good manners? In short, as has in fact happened, if acknowledged and confirmed on his throne by the general consent, neither ignorant of nor able to forget the extent to which it had been carried, any more than the sentiments that, lurking in the heart, this sovereign should have unreservedly delivered himself to the enemies of France, and obtained a guarantee for the possession of one of those dominions in Italy, so prejudicial to the former country, added to the other commercial advantages of which she was so much in want. This conjecture does not appear chimerical, when we recollect the support lent to Murat by Austria; for it was not against *him*, in whom we only behold Murat, that Austria armed herself, but against the conspirator ready to attack Italy. If the King of Naples had exhibited a conduct that would have inspired confidence, and if he could have tendered suffi-

cient guarantees for his present and future intentions; if he had not threatened for so long a time; if he had not exercised odious vexations in the Papal territory; above all, if he had not been imprudent enough to ally himself with Napóleon, Austria never would have attacked him, and she only could have crushed him. Russia was nearly indifferent in the cause. Prussia, foiled by the House of Bourbon in its project on Saxony, would not have attached much value to satisfy her on this subject. Great Britain sought to *indemnify* Ferdinand; a certain proof that she did not think of removing Murat. Lord Castlereagh did not conceal in the British Parliament, that Murat owed his disaster only to the irresolute conduct he evinced; and that if a dependence could have been placed on his integrity, his right to the crown would not have been questioned. In this case, we perceive that the provocations offered to this prince presented a very dangerous appearance.

To give to the King of Naples more direct and more certain blows, the sacred words of legitimacy and the honour of thrones should have been resounded. No one would have dared to deny their sanctity; no person could have wished that nations should have sovereigns who were obscure, nor thrones that were degraded. He must have been the enemy of society who could entertain such an idea: but, also, let them not be hurried away by a zeal in which intemperance may overcome intelligence. The word *legitimacy* sounds great and profound, but it is enveloped in thick mists. How are we to find the sources of *legitimacy*? Who confers it? Who takes it away? Where does it commence? Where does it terminate? Are the nations whose sovereigns have been driven from their thrones destined to remain eternally without a legitimate government? To reign, is it necessary that a king should always have reigned? Can they begin to reign? Have they never commenced nor finished a reign? Also, are elective thrones destitute of honour? Is the throne to receive it from him

who occupies it? Where does the honour of the throne begin and terminate? Is it that they should have acknowledged him as king, before or after he had reigned? Is the honour of thrones better preserved by covering those who occupy them with dirt, or with a veil of respect and silence; in seeing honour conferred on the man by the throne, rather than dishonour imprinted on the throne by the man? Besides, is it well in this age, in which all ideas and all rights are so scrutinized, that questions should be put to the mass of men that inevitably produce a dangerous examination: and can they, with any prudence, tell them, after all that has passed, and of which they have so many monuments still before them, that there is one rank in the universe, to which some privileged mortals among their fellows have an exclusive right?

In latter times there has been by far too much said about legitimacy.

They have done for legitimacy that which the writers of Napoleon did for the warlike and anti-commercial system; the more they would persuade the public of its excellence, the more the public disbelieved it. The senate, the council, the legislative body, and authors, either seduced by gold or induced by their own folly, (and there were a great number,) uniformly recommended these exalted ideas to the admiration of France and of Europe. But, the more they talked, the less they were heard; or, at least, they found a diminished degree of attention. The case is the same with the principle of legitimacy. They have talked of it even to satiety, they have written about it in so tiresome a manner, they have sought to agitate the most difficult of questions at the very time that, as far as regards nations, it is one of the most personal nature; for, eventually, it is reduced to the inquiry, of whence comes the power of the prince to reign over them? and, consequently, as they are its objects, and pay for its expenses, it is right that they

should know its origin. Hence, as may easily be seen, it is one of the most important questions of the social compact; and, as it enters into the most sensible interests of the nation, there is no doubt but that they will make such a use of, and so resolve it, as shall suit themselves. I have no doubt but that there are now in France a great number of men who have opposed that *legitimacy that has been presented to them*, who never had and never would have thought of it, without these incitements. That friendship is highly imprudent which induces all these men, who are so ill provided with argument, to precipitate themselves headlong, and at the first signal, into questions of which they know neither the beginning nor the end, and which they generally terminate by ruining. There are sovereigns who honour nations by their original nobility, by glorious recollections: let us enjoy this benefit—let us preserve them as our property without debating about titles; for, in so doing, we shall be liable to find what we do not seek, and to seek that which we shall not find. What happens to the property of individuals will happen to that of sovereigns. A discussion inevitably produces law. Apply it to the latter, dissensions must happen in states. Rather let us imitate wise architects. They conceal the foundations of their buildings in the earth; and, so to express it, hide the secret of their solidity in its bowels.

Let us now return to what passed at Naples.

The expulsion of Ferdinand did not proceed, as that of Gustavus, from a conspiracy formed against their sovereign by his subjects; or, as in Spain, by a plot contrived by a foreigner: but this prince lost his dominions in the ordinary course of war, which places the conqueror in the situation of the conquered*. The

* Montesquieu says, "In public law, the most severe act of justice is that of war, because it may have the effect of destroying society: to make war on any one, is to endeavour to punish him with death."

royalty of Naples in the person of Murat, was not like that of Spain in the person of Joseph. The nation had not recognised the latter: on the contrary, she repulsed him with all her power. The dethronement of the King of Spain was founded in so odious a principle, that nothing could palliate it; and his prison sufficiently explained his silence.

It appears that a manner of proceeding, much more eligible, presented itself with regard to the King of Naples. It was evident that the fate of Napoleon created a palpable incompatibility between Europe, in the shape into which this event had converted it, and the sovereign established by Napoleon, and forming part of his family. He was his own work, and the work must perish with the workman.

It was also evident that Murat was in a state of perpetual conspiracy against the peace of the South of Europe; that he would be the rallying point of all the discontented, the supporter of all the conspirators, and the pivot on which would turn all their schemes; which had for their object the injury of France, or the return of Napoleon. Experience has but too well justified their conjectures.

It was not less evident that Murat, the object of ridicule at Paris, the victim of rapacity in the Grand Duchy of Berg, the spendthrift and buffoon at Naples, was not firmly established in the good opinion of Europe; and that his bravery as a soldier could not compensate for what was deficient in his character as a king. He should not therefore have been attacked on the score of legitimacy, but on that of the general interests of Europe. The interests required the deposition of this prince; and justly considered him as an unnecessary appendage in its actual situation, and as a source of continual danger. Then the Congress would have proceeded against him with a view to the general happiness of Europe, as well as with an authority, which we have assigned to it in a preceding chapter. .

This would have been an excellent foundation for discussion, the best that could have been chosen; and on which, in a detached discussion, the King of Naples would have enjoyed many advantages. Murat has been dethroned, and no one will regret him. He has lost his throne, as it was obtained, by war. Nothing is more just. He has paid by his fall for the imprudence of his attack: he died like General Mack, who thought the Neapolitan could withstand the French troops. In the same manner Murat believed that he could conduct the Neapolitans against the Austrians; and he has in like manner failed. Murat supported himself, in a great measure, by the hope of a great insurrection in Italy: an idea at once criminal, and which made him deserving of his dethronement. It was an illusion resembling those which led Napoleon to his fate. This insurrection itself, when it had burst forth, could not have had any important effect against the Austrian arms. On a nearer inspection, Murat ought to have known, that definitively it could never have taken place; for the Italians, better advised than himself, would not wantonly have exposed themselves to the consequences of a general attack against the armies which Austria could always command at their frontiers, in opposition to Vienna. Every country is not a Spain!

It follows, that Murat was dethroned very *apropos*. The arguments used against him have been as *mal-apropos*; and the prince who has been most ably attacked in the field of battle, has in that of logic been weakly combated. The catastrophe of Murat has been brought on by a defective judgment. He wished to give us a second representation of *the farce of the descent at Cannes*. He did not know, that nothing was so difficult as to make the same enterprise succeed twice; that there is always some difference in things which appear to resemble each other, and that it is in consequence of this difference that they deceive. The

greater part of mankind endeavour to show their talent in tracing resemblances: it would be much more sensible, and much more advantageous, to distinguish differences.

CHAPTER XXI.

FREE CITIES—HANSE TOWNS.

THE allusions that we have made to the empire, may be very powerfully applied to the free *Hanse Towns*. They are not considered in a political point of view, on account of the little strength they possess, and the only design of their creation having been commerce. These cities have no ally but the consumer, and no enemy but the custom-house officer. They exist but in commerce and profit. The free cities of Germany are the great marts of trade, and the most flourishing towns in that country. The necessity of protecting commerce gave rise to that league, of which vestiges are still to be found in the towns called *Hanse Towns*.

These towns, governed by their own magistrates, enjoy all those advantages which a paternal government will uniformly procure in effect as well as in name.

Ease, opulence itself, and intelligence, were generally diffused among the inhabitants of these towns. The most perfect and most beneficent institutions in Europe do honour to some of these cities. Gratitude will never be able to find expressions adequate to commemorate, as they deserve, that infinite number of generous and humane actions, which, in periods of misfortune, the virtuous and sensible inhabitants of these towns performed for those who had become victims to the events that took

place in France. But, in their turn, these places have experienced similar misfortunes.

For ten years has Hamburgh been burthened with extortions. We cannot at all conceive by what right the Directory so uniformly applied, in moments of emergency, to the peaceable Hamburgh for continually increasing contributions. It did not differ from what we witness in Asia, in the midst of the plunders exercised by the pachas. But in a short time their seizures were not confined to the wealth, but extended to the towns themselves. Hamburgh, Bremen, Lubeck, were taken, and discovered themselves, to their astonishment, in the possession of France. Dantzick has experienced a similar fate. Thus commercial have been on a sudden converted into fortified towns, which, in the hands of experienced generals and French engineers, have become formidable to Europe. All these misfortunes are the consequence of the imbecility of these states. To appreciate fully their consequence, and the conduct pursued towards them, we must trace their origin. The barbarism of Europe was their source; its civilization has rendered them unnecessary. Seas swarming with pirates may have created a necessity for associations, the object of which would be the protection of commerce: seas, governed by the general laws of civilization, ought to have removed the same associations, which fell of themselves, in the same proportion as people becoming polished, formed laws under which commerce flourished. The guarantees which were the objects of the institution of the Hanse Towns having become the common right of all trading nations, there is no longer any necessity for supporting these associations. From that period the Hanse Towns have lost their importance. They had preserved none, but by the tradition of commerce, and by the wealth which, in the lapse of time, they had accumulated. Commerce does not often change its habits.

It naturally returns to the place which it has once occupied.

We may apply the same observations to the free towns. When Europe was a fenced field, and its inhabitants thought of nothing but war; when every part was covered with turnpikes, constituting the financial science of the time; when commerce, confined to speculations, and an extensive change of its commodities, was concentrated in a fixed number of privileged places; free towns were necessary for the intercourse of people: an intercourse that, however opinions and affections might divide them, could never wholly be interrupted. Then the free towns were open asylums of commerce, the magazines and rendezvous of the merchant; for, at this period, Europe did not calculate on the idea of the multitude of commercial towns, merchants, and places of exchange, which, universally diffused, have opened sure and easy sources for satisfying all the wants of society, and the various tastes of the consumers. Every person has now the means of satisfying each wish and each want: then, on the contrary, such things were to be had only in a privileged place, or at some particular period. The Free and Hanse Towns may date their origin at the same time as the fair, known in the ancient annals of Paris by that of *Lande*; to which, in order to enable the students of the University of Paris to procure pens and paper, the Kings of France granted so many privileges. At present there is not a street in which these articles are not to be purchased.

Hence the free cities were produced in the infancy of commerce and civilization. They were to Germany what the fairs of Saint Ovide and Saint Lawrence were to Paris. Germany has acted in the same manner as Paris, and Paris as Germany; and all the world, like them, by civilizing themselves in the same manner. Every town has become a permanent fair, and all the world a magazine, which is replenished merely to be emptied.

The great fairs are accommodating only to those, who, trading from a distance, and living in ill provided countries, are obliged to procure large quantities of commodities which they came from a distance to seek. This is what has given rise to the great fairs in Russia, and those at Leipsic and Beauclaire, which attract merchants from the remotest parts of Europe and Asia. It is upon these principles that the Congress ought to have determined the fate of the Hanse Towns. The use to be made of them we shall indicate.

CHAPTER XXII.

PORTUGAL.—MALTA.

THERE are two states, the situations of which are a little similar.

Malta has lost its sovereignty; Portugal its sovereign.

England retains Malta in its possession, and proposes to make it the principal mart of its commerce in the Mediterranean. Its vessels will be able, in case of necessity, to defend it against all Europe; in the same manner as the valiant knights, who humbled the arms of Solyman.

This possession of Malta, so offensive to all the trading nations of Europe, time only will enable it sufficiently to appreciate.

During the struggle with France every thing appeared useful if her chiefs were beaten and humiliated. The period of reflection has arrived. We shall soon discover that the British are at Malta.

The seizure of Malta deprived the order of its chief residence, and that to which it owed its title. At the

same time that this order has lost its possessions in some countries, its constitution does not square with that of others already formed, and will accord the less with those about to be established. How, indeed, could any nation admit the existence of a sovereign order? or permit any of its subjects to become members of a foreign supreme order? How could they keep their doors shut to any person who could not fulfil certain conditions, as necessary in order to obtain admission. It is very evident that the same Power which granted its legal protection to this order of things, without a constitution, will refuse its protection when it has one. On the other hand, the order having lost all its possessions in great states, with what could it provide for its support, and to find for its members the advantages they formerly procured for them? Thus, in France, the order of Malta will not find more than a million of funds unsold.

Add to this, that out of Malta the order loses the greater part of its importance. There are some situations which make the merit of an establishment: this is the case with Malta. Its situation, in the middle of the Mediterranean, makes the island of a similar use to Mount Cenis, a refuge for travellers: level it, it loses its value, and is attached to nothing. This would be the case with Malta. Situated as it is, it is the refuge of all who sail to, or return from, the Levant. In this position, the destination of the order was valuable to all the world.

Some mention has been made of ceding Corfu to it. There the order would no longer be serviceable to all the sailors of the Mediterranean, because they pass Malta. It would indeed be difficult to avoid it. Instead of which, a search must be made for Corfu; and it is only to those who are traversing the Adriatic that it can be at all serviceable.

Moreover, the vigilance which the order maintained with respect to the Barbary corsairs is to be considered; for the Turks hardly ever committed piracies. The situa-

tion of Malta is instrumental to their suppression. The Barbary corsairs do not cruise except in the square formed by the borders of Africa, of Western Italy, of the Gulf of Lyons, and of Spain ; so that Malta is admirably situated for their *surveillance*. All that is beyond this to the east, is not within the navigation of the order.

Besides, let us say a word in behalf of Europe ; — a word so long expected ; — and the scandal of the Barbary Powers threatening the whole world will disappear ; and the importance of the marine of Malta will disappear at the same time.

Were they to institute a supreme order of Malta in every state, without unity, without a chief residence, and without a marine to protect the Christian states ; this illustrious order would gradually sink into the same obscurity that those orders of knighthood of which it was the parent, and which the ravages of time, together with the changes of society, have reduced to mere emblems of honour ; but without effective power and special destination.

Even to this day the Congress has settled nothing with respect to Malta ; because, being in the possession of the English, it was no longer a subject of discussion. It appears to have been quite abandoned. Portugal has preserved its dominion, but lost its sovereign. The departure of the prince regent for the Brazils has given rise to a new order of things. It is of him alone we intend to speak. Ought Europe to permit one of its portions to receive laws from America ? This is a question which the residence of the sovereign of Portugal in the Brazils suggests.

This is a question, not only of the sovereignty proper for a prince, but its object is to ascertain whether America shall have colonies in Europe, and those colonies shall receive laws from America ? if, in fine, the King of Spain should, as Philip the Fifth and Charles the Fourth were on the point of doing, establish himself at Mexico, and the other princes live in their colonies,

Europe would become dependent on America, and the metropolitans would submit to the colonists. In such a case, could Europe tolerate this change, or suffer laws to be transmitted by her own children from another hemisphere? Ought Europe to assume the right of attending to her own interest in this affair, or is the question to be decided by the natural right every one has to choose that part of his dominions for a residence that suits him best? If the King of France should settle at Martinique, and the King of the Low Countries in Batavia, what would become of Europe*? Surely I am not in the number of those who would threaten Europe with being one day conquered by America.

Whatever may be the rapidity of its increase, it will never be able to gain such an ascendancy; and Europe, with its arts and population, would soon punish an enemy from such a distance. America could attack us only with a part of its population: Europe would be defended by the bulk of hers. Europe will never submit to any yoke imposed by America, but that of its rich productions. Such a conquest is not very alarming.

Portugal could give laws to the Brazils, thinly as it is peopled, in habits of obedience contracted in its infancy. On the other hand, Brazil has not yet such a population and such a commerce as Lisbon. Brazil may have been necessary to Portugal, but Portugal could never have been necessary to Brazil. Therefore it is impossible that there can exist an union between two countries in such opposite situations. In future the same sovereign cannot govern both. A choice must be made.

If he remains in America, Portugal can never submit to become a province of Brazil: if he return to Portugal, Brazil, which has experienced the comfort and value of a local government, would always wish to enjoy it. Portugal, as well as Spain, would no longer

* When Louis XIVth threatened Amsterdam, the government of Holland and the citizens were in readiness to embark for Batavia.

have any subjects in America ; and as Brazil is placed in the midst of the movement that agitates the American continent, it is very evident that it will be affected by it. In all these cases, a separation must take place between Portugal and Brazil *.

The attack on Portugal has renovated her armies. The Portuguese have displayed their character, and have not been deterred by any sacrifice ; and as impartial justice ought to be rendered to all the world without a regard to country, we must recollect that to the English it is indebted for the regeneration of its people. They found them dispirited and beaten. Happy is Portugal to have found in their allies such an example of order amidst the disorder of war ! such models of humanity in the midst of its calamities ! Still more fortunate in having yielded to their solicitations, in preventing those odious re-actions that have injured a neighbouring country ; as if the evils of civil war had not been sufficiently great, and the return of peace was to be regretted.

We shall state the conduct necessary to be pursued by this country. The determination of the Prince of Brazil to fix his residence in that country, enforces the necessity of the arrangement we had proposed for Portugal, even before the resolution of this sovereign was made known.

* Since this article has been written, the public papers have announced that the Prince Regent has fixed his residence at Brazil from the above motives.

. CHAPTER XXIII.

SPAIN.

SPAIN, separated from the rest of Europe, having been at war only with France, and having concluded it with success, having neither lost nor gained any thing, consequently had nothing to demand of the Congress. This is a situation most favourable for deliberation. Spain, holding her territories but by the means of France, is from her situation but an *appendix* to Europe: with regard to her, Spain is insular. Hence, she has no direct influence in Europe; and to obtain any, must connect herself with France. Thus did she act at the Congress. The houses reigning in these countries, united in blood by the same alliances, by the same misfortunes, and consequently by the same wants, ought to show themselves united in sentiment and opinion. Therefore, the voice of Spain at the Congress was no other than that of France. When France made claims for Naples, for the Queen of Etruria, for Saxony, Spain ought to have joined her. It ought to be the same as to the principles of legitimacy, which are equally important to the interest of the Spanish as of the French Bourbons. This is sufficient to show the manner in which Spain acted at the Congress.

We shall now conclude on the subject of European Spain. For the future, it is only in America that we are to seek for her.

CHAPTER XXIV.

CESSIONS AND INCORPORATIONS OF NATIONS.

A CLAIM has arisen, which may be termed general, relative to the cessions and incorporations of nations. In no arrangement whatever could this have been avoided.

The Parliament of Great Britain, to which alone, in Europe, belongs the power of expressing its opinions and speaking in an elevated tone, on the subject of the general affairs of Europe in the same manner as it does those of its own country, has availed itself of this glorious privilege, and been the cause of severe complaints having been made against this facility of dividing nations, of altering their situation, and of transferring them from a dominion that they liked, and to which they were familiarized, to one with which they were unacquainted, and detested ; and all this for the mere purpose of giving sovereigns new subjects, and subjects new sovereigns.

This manner of proceeding in the affairs of nations, has been introduced by the military and diplomatic operations of the last French government : what she has not given, exchanged, retaken, and incorporated, to conclude by losing all ———

The division of Poland furnished the first example of these attacks on the existence of nations ; attacks scarcely known in Europe since the fall of the Roman Empire, and the great invasions of the barbarians. The changes which hitherto have taken place, have almost uniformly been the result of marriages, successions, and pacific arrangements : and it ought to be particularly remarked,

that these changes were limited in their effects, and their results continued for a great length of time. Let us look at history, and we shall see that the least important incorporations have cost much time and many efforts. At present it is quite the contrary. It is suddenly, and all at once, that nations lose their existence. Thus Norway, Genoa, Venice, the kingdom of Italy, Poland, part of Saxony, and other countries, experience an alteration at the same instant.

We must attend to three things:

The number, the mode, and the motives of these operations.

Surely it will not be pretended that the world does not change its appearance, that the sovereign power ought always to remain in the same hands, and that war cannot enrich the experienced or powerful with the spoils of the inexperienced and feeble. The archives of the universe contain a multiplicity of proofs to the contrary*.

War never leaves a nation where it found it, said Mr. Burke. This idea may be particularly applied to the effects of the war which gave rise to the Congress. Never did the conclusion of any war leave nations farther from where they set out.

We must not mistake the nature of the appeals which the incorporation and cessions of nations have occasioned. It is because we perceive that they have no other object but the gratification of personal interests, and discover nothing occurring that has the general benefit in view. Neither the price nor the indemnity of the sacrifice are discernible. Assent never will be refused to those things, the aim and

* La Fontaine has said,

“Jupin, pour chaque état, mit deux tables au monde:

L'adroit, le vigilant, et le fort, sont assis

A la première, et les petits*

Mangeant leur reste, à la seconde.”

end of which is the general good. But with an opinion equally just towards themselves and others, those sacrifices are refused which appear to be merely made to consult the interests of individuals. No one, and with reason, thinks so little of himself, as to consider that he is destined to serve as the victim and food of another.

If the Congress had in its cessions and incorporations shown itself impelled by the irresistible motive of great public utility, there is no doubt but that the noble consolations offered by Europe to one portion of her children, sustained and favoured by the general opinion, would have been thankfully accepted.

We too much distrust the empire of reason, and its influence over the heart. When once the justice and reason of any thing are well determined, there is no longer any point to dispute; to demonstrate it is sufficient. But, when it is evident that no one thinks but of himself; that the security of Europe is no longer the subject of discussion, but the indemnities of such a prince; that it is requisite that such and such a prince should have so many millions of subjects; that such and such a one has retained such and such a nation; another has some other nation; then appeals have been made, and ought to have found as many assenting voices as there were auditors. The pride of mankind has answered the inquiry, whether they were herds to be divided among a certain number of shepherds?

This is an egregious error. It cannot be sufficiently deplored. It leaves the germ of discontent in the mind; it furnishes answers to those who complain that the people will become mutinous and difficult to govern: wonderful, indeed, that they should do so, when they perceive themselves reckoned as nothing by governments.

At what period are attacks on the dearest property of a nation to be permitted? Is it after Europe has resounded with the complaint against those which

Napoleon permitted; is it after the repeated homages paid to the rights of nations; after formal declarations to make every thing accord with their happiness? They could perceive this happiness in general interests, but never in those of individuals. How can Italy be persuaded that its happiness depends on its being in the possession of Austria; Genoa, that it should form a part of Piedmont; the half of Saxony to be induced, for its own advantage, to increase the size of Prussia? They might much sooner have persuaded the whole of Saxony to believe it; for, at least on the part of those who are opposed to the incorporation, an advantage might have been discovered, such as forming the integral part of a state sufficiently strong to afford an efficacious protection. •

While the public spirit of Europe evinced these illiberal dispositions, members, even of the Congress, talked of the rights of the people in a high tone; and, in order to oppose certain projects, affixed the seal of reprobation to the proposed incorporations*. It is true, that at the same time they condemned a part of the same incorporations: thus, in opposing that of Saxony, they consented to its division. They have maintained the strictest silence with respect to the incorporation of Italy, which was also very important.

The Congress then has erred in this part of its conduct by what it has and what it has not said; in what it has and has not done.

The cessions and incorporations of nations having ever been as painful a task to those which have been ceded as to those which have not, more attention should have been paid to the forms which accompanied those sanctioned by the Congress. This should have been done in a grandeur of character and a nobility at once worthy the cause, the authors, and the destination of these arrangements. Instead of this, we have heard nothing

* See the Note of the French embassy.

for three months, but arithmetical calculations most humiliating to human nature.

Of this inconvenience advantage has, naturally enough, been taken at a period when to alter the appearance of subjects, and to change that of actions and words, was so much the object. This violation of the dignity of men and of the rights of nations has aroused a sense of feeling: they proved themselves attached to them in proportion as they beheld them forgotten; and the indignation which this forgetfulness excited, has been extended further than the regrets for cessions still more extended would have produced, if they had been accompanied with greater formalities.

In reckoning by souls, they have represented the most noble part of man as the *materiel* object of the least noble thing, destined for the use of another. Thus the revolution which originated in the opinion of the head, has been concluded by the division of the affections of the heart.

CHAPTER XXV.

PERMANENT POLICY OF EUROPE.

THE general principles of the permanent policy of Europe have been already pointed out in the various articles on which we have treated: let us endeavour to unite them under one head. Three principles ought to direct Europe.

1. To incorporate her force, simplify her action, and organize it according to the wants and convenience of nations.

2. To separate her means of defence into two grand divisions, in opposition to the two Powers which menace Europe, viz. Great Britain and Russia.

3. To extend general civilization in its relations with the interests of Europe.

It is evident, that by the accumulating strength of Great Britain and Russia, Europe will be between two domineering masses of power. The former threatens all the wealth; the latter, all the liberty of Europe. By this means Europe will be separated into two grand divisions; the one maritime, that of the West, extending from Norway to the straits of Gibraltar; the other continental, comprehending the states situated between Sweden and Constantinople, from the Vistula to the Rhine.

Let them refer to the map.

This picture is not overcharged if we examine the unity of the assailing parties, and the dissensions of those who are to be assailed. We ought to extend the same opinion even with regard to Great Britain. Its position separating the North of Europe from its southern divisions, the unity of its councils, language, interest, tactics, finances affords it advantages over the league of any of its adversaries, more than sufficient to compensate for the inferiority of its physical force. Surely France, Spain, Holland, and all the North, combine and possess more of the means that form the *materiel* of power than England can possibly contain. But these states cannot make use of them with the same facility, and are consequently less powerful. Therefore we must endeavour to balance these two Powers as nearly as the elements of which they are possessed will allow. We consider that Sweden, Prussia, the Empire, Austria, and Turkey, ought to be firmly allied, and in a state to offer a permanent barrier to Russia: let it be remembered, that we say a state of permanent barrier, not enmity. Till now in politics nothing has been heard but this detestable idea. The point

is not, whether we are to dispossess Russia of any of her present territories, to foment troubles, to solicit the assistance of the Poles, or to allure Sweden by a prospect of Finland. These subtle practices belong to what is properly called craft (*le metier*), odious manœuvres, which should be banished for ever from the conduct of affairs. Our aim is more elevated, our means more simple. Let every one preserve what he has; let him keep it in security. But as we do not live on words alone, let him have those securities that are necessary to protect the weak against the powerful.

After having committed the egregious error of allowing Russia to possess the Vistula, we must employ all the means of correcting it, of which the unfortunate situation in which we are placed will allow. They will be found in the alliance we have just pointed out. The uniformly transcendant power of Russia has changed every thing. It has made those allies who had passed their lives in hostility. For the future, the Turks will never lay siege to Vienna; but the sovereign of Vienna will be united with them, in order to prevent the master of St. Petersburg from besieging Constantinople.

This continental alliance will have for its second line France and the Low Countries; for the instant that Russia shall attack Germany by the route of Prussia, the defensive operations will be carried to the line of the Rhine; and that it will then be the turn of France to advance, in order to stem the torrent.

Russia having Austria and Prussia in her front, Sweden and Turkey on her flanks, is as it were put in a state of *tolerable* restraint: we say *tolerable* restraint, because she could not be kept sufficiently in check, without the formation of a grand limit like that of the Vistula, covered with fortresses, in the same manner as the line of the Rhine in Alsace: instead of which, the defence of Austria commences in the open plains of Moravia and Silesia, and consequently is of no avail.

The division of the West ought to be formed of all

the Powers on the sea coasts. On this side, likewise, is another Russia, to which, with a continual coalition, no check can be afforded. Thus Sweden, Denmark, the Low Countries, France, Spain, should have, if we may be allowed the expression, but one flag, that of alliance. Every dissension on their part would produce a common slavery. These Powers have nothing to envy, nothing to demand, among themselves: they are rendered natural allies only in consequence of the pre-eminence of the marine of Great Britain. It is their inferiority that unites them, not against her, nor with a view to her annoyance, but merely to their own protection.

The policy of Europe will in future turn upon the pivot, of the circumstances of which we here give the principal points of view.

If to these general ideas it were permitted us to add some that have been suggested on the subject of the system which the Congress should have established, not in the latitude in which it possessed the power and right to act, but in the limits which it has prescribed to its jurisdiction, we would say,

1st, That they annihilated Italy by parcelling it out as they have, and, above all, by rendering it Austrian. It will enfeeble Austria, by the jealousies which it will excite, for a long space of time, and force her to appropriate part of her troops to garrison it. On the contrary, in a system even not accordant with that which we have pointed out, Italy would have become a very efficient member of the grand European association. They have committed a fault very injurious to the general strength of Europe. It appears as if it was the regulation of the affairs of some prince, but never of those of this quarter of the globe.

2dly, That certain arrangements adopted for Germany are to be also regretted, as they occasion a similar waste of strength. This country relies much on its sovereigns, and little on its own power. Each division has its private policy, and occupies itself with its own little interests;

without attending to the main body, or the principal interests of Europe. Much is lost by this system. There must be extreme danger in suffering the secondary states to return to it. Hence, it was essential to diminish this inconvenience by strengthening the kings of this country, in order to make them more European. There are too many kings in Germany: a circumstance as disadvantageous to the thrones themselves as to Europe.

3dly, That a suitable establishment ought to have been made for the King of Saxony, as an indemnity to him, and in conformity to the policy of Europe.

When we insisted on the incorporation of Saxony into Prussia, in order to give a barrier on that side to Germany, we were far from wishing to condemn a prince, as much distinguished by his personal virtues as by the *eclat* of his rank, to the loss of his possessions. God forbid that such unworthy ideas should exist in our minds! but, convinced that as the hour of sacrifice for the general benefit of Europe had arrived; and as it was shown that a part of Saxony must fall into the hands of Prussia, a compensation equal in dignity and power to the offering which he would have made to the political constitution of Germany, should have been found, and that this compensation should be the cession of the Prussian territory between the Rhine and the Weser. This territory, erected into a kingdom, would have been more powerful than Hanover and Würtemberg, and at least equal to the kingdom of Saxony, without having any of its inconveniences. This arrangement presented many great advantages: the first, for Germany, inasmuch as it fortified the barrier against France; the second, for the body of Europe, in preventing the dispersion of the Prussian territories, and placing them all in front of Russia; the third, as it permitted the Low Countries to reach the limit of the Rhine and the Moselle, which form their natural barriers. This state will remain without frontiers until such an arrangement as this shall take place.

4thly, That it was necessary to restore to France the countries comprised by the Rhine and the Moselle, and in the whole of Savoy and the country of Nice. The treaty of Paris has despoiled her of it. The Congress of Vienna has delivered the country between the Rhine and the Moselle to several German princes, for whom they could find no other indemnities; the German territory was exhausted. This country has been taken from France for three reasons:

1st. Because it had not always been French. This is an idea of habit, but not of policy; and it was not at the moment when other nations were appropriating to themselves countries that never had belonged to them, that the rigorous application of this wholly arbitrary principle should be made to France.

2dly. Because they wished to separate France as much as possible from Germany. This is an idea which fear may have induced, and partaking of the terror yet existing which France once inspired. The effect follows the cause. On a closer investigation, this fear might pass for an anachronism. They have applied the ideas of one period to another. They always behold France arrayed in the terrors of its revolution, with the twofold strength which this revolution lent to it: whilst a consideration ought to have been had to France, returned to the ordinary habits of the governments of Europe, pacific by nature, and still more pacific if an arrangement more appropriate to circumstances had left her without any thing for which she could wish. The future prospects were discussed, and they have been regulated by the past. All the space delivered in this country to princes at a distance from each other is lost. Besides, it is not these petty sovereigns that could oppose France in case of an invasion of Germany on her part. If Mentz was too great an object of terror in the possession of France, it might have been demolished, or counteracted, by the erection of corresponding defences in its front.

5th. That it would have been proper to have given to

Denmark, to which, nothing has been assigned but the shadow of an indemnity;—the cities of Lubeck and Hamburgh, with that part of the Hanoverian territories which are on the right of the Elbe. In vain they urge the importance of the freedom of Hamburgh to Germany. What! do they fear that in becoming Danish it would cease to be commercial? Does not Altona, at the entrance of Hamburgh, enjoy an extensive commerce? Do not both banks of the Elbe belong to Hanover and Denmark, without injuring the commerce of Germany? This is another antiquated idea, and inapplicable to the present times. The same opinion must be given concerning that which has induced the belief that republics are more beneficial to commerce than monarchies. Are not all the capitals of Europe, capitals of monarchies? Are Petersburg, Stockholm, Copenhagen, London, Lisbon, Naples, Constantinople itself, a republic? Paris carries on the principal commerce of France. Commerce will flourish every where, provided this government will give it the only protection it requires, which is to avoid any interference with its concerns.

6thly. That Portugal, abandoned by its sovereign, fixed in another quarter of the world, ought to be assigned to an European prince, who would reside in it. Thrones require a residence. The mutual good of this country and Spain, requires that this prince should be a Bourbon. They have not been able to assign the Queen of Etruria any other indemnity than that which appears a mockery, and by no means desirable to her. Why has not the king, her son, been called to govern this dilapidated state? This would have been the means of extinguishing a part of those jealousies which rage between the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal.

7thly. That the Grand Duke of Tuscany should have been appointed King of Sardinia; and Corsica should be a part of his new *apanage*. These two islands, situated in the centre of the Mediterranean, would have

experienced a new existence, by the presence of a sovereign, whose attention would have been devoted to them. Sardinia will suffer from the absence of its sovereign, in the same manner as Corsica does by its distance from France. Otherwise, of what service was Corsica to France? In 1789, it cost her annually 800,000 francs. This establishment was useless and expensive, and induced the belief that she held it not so much for her own benefit as to prevent any other Power possessing it. In consequence, Sardinia should receive Lucca; and Tuscany would possess all the coast of the Mediterranean, which connects Genoa with Piedmont.

Such is the order we have considered most suitable to circumstances, and as easy to be established as every other:—it depended on the will of the Congress:—it insured the accomplishment of the three conditions we pointed out as indispensable to the new state of Europe.

1st; The simplification of its system. 2d; The union of its strength. And, 3d; The distribution of the European Powers adapted to the public wish, and political and moral state of nations.

Let a comparison be made of this plan with that which the Congress had before it, and then let it be considered which would have accorded best with the attempt which has occasioned this assemblage of Europe, in all the brilliancy of its majesty, in all the extent of its power and of its intelligence.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE TWOFOLD STATE OF EUROPE.

AFTER having treated in succession of all the states of Europe, would not the picture be incomplete, were we not to remark a singularity amidst them, for the first time since the creation of the world. Every thing almost exists in a twofold state. Europe may be called twofold, politically ; civilly and religiously.

At the opening of this Congress this twofold existence was more discernible than at present. Some of the decisions of the Congress, the enterprise of Napoleon, and the particular arrangements between some princes, have obliterated many traits of this singular position.

Let us take some pains to pursue this subject.

Sweden has an acknowledged king, and one who prefers his claims to the throne.

A little time ago there were two competitors for the throne of Naples.

The Spaniards were divided between Charles the Fourth and Ferdinand the Seventh*.

Many men now living have reigned where others reign now.

Sweden and Norway,
Holland and Belgium,
Russia and Poland,
Prussia and Saxony,
Austria and Italy,
Piedmont and Genoa,

present total or partial unions and incorporations, often

* See the treaty between the father and his son.

on the pretence of equality, sometimes even of superiority. Some of these states have their original laws: thus Norway has a separate diet; the divisions of Poland, attached to Russia, Prussia, and Austria, according to the terms of the treaty, ought to have a representation and national institution. Italy is not to be governed by the laws of Austria and Hungary.

If from Europe we pass to the colonies, we shall find that the white and black flag dispute the possession of St. Domingo; that the ancient white proprietors demand of the new black masters the restoration of this fertile island, and that they cultivate it anew for them: we shall find the immense American Continent all in arms, the blood flowing on all sides, for the liberty of the new world, in opposition to the dependence in which the old wishes to retain her, in order to the maintenance of that superiority and domination claimed by Europeans, in contra-distinction to the equality and emancipation sought for by their trans-Atlantic children.

Portugal and Brazil are still united in name; but in an inverse position to that which existed previously to the prince departing for America: the difference in their former and actual state is so great, they can no longer maintain their ancient ties.

Surely the sun has never shone on such a scene in the natural world. If we look to the events of the moral world, they present the same spectacle. In how many countries is not the land considered as belonging to two proprietors?

What place is there that has not had many claimants, to be met with every day?

It has been said that a twofold spirit animates and has taken possession of mankind. Words have twofold acceptations, actions twofold operations; and to make these balances less just, party always holds the beam.

The dogma has ceased to be a subject of discussion: it is consolatory to consider that it has remained an object of respect for all the world. But divisions have ..

been established in a manner to protect religion, by its relations with society. Some wish to make it of consequence by the rigorous maintenance of legal observances: others, without weakening them, consider morality as more peculiarly the safeguard of society.

Particular actions, useless in this place to allude to, have given rise to this line of demarkation: it ought to show the imprudent, how the light in which they view a subject may be different from that of the rest of the world.

We will hasten to a conclusion, though it would be easy to go still further. But our point will be carried if we have shown how necessary discernment and prudence are to prevent so many elements of discussion becoming the principle of discord, and the means of giving rise to great moral conflagrations.

CHAPTER XXVII.

ERRORS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE CONGRESS.— RELIGION.—COLONIES.—COMMERCE.

Religion.

IT is not only the political order of Europe which has been distracted in the course of the revolution; it is not only territories and governments that have been affected by those subversions, intended by the Congress as a remedy: the whole even of its social order has also been affected by disasters similar to those experienced in the political world. In short, the moral has been as much disturbed as the political world.

• This observation principally applies to three circum-

stances: the state of the Catholic worship; Colonies; Commerce. Great misfortunes have, at least, had the effect of bringing men, who remain much divided in their opinion on other topics, to be united on this; namely, that religion is the basis of society. The principle is recognised, and there will be no more opposition on the subject. The consequence of the establishment of this principle is, that the civil state of worship will be permitted to remain uncertain and precarious. The Catholic religion is that of the greatest part of the inhabitants of Europe. This quarter of the globe contains little less than a hundred millions of men attached to this mode of worship. Its civil state has been entirely changed by the revolution.

The Catholic clergy throughout Europe were raised to a high rank, both as to honour and to fortune. A great number of its members, as well as ecclesiastical bodies, ranked among sovereigns. In all political society, the clergy assumed the first rank. It was the general law of Europe. It is that of Great Britain with regard to its peers. The clergy has now almost every where lost its rank and its wealth. In France, in Germany, in Poland, it occupies no space in the political world, and is confined merely to the exercise of its spiritual functions. We have since beheld this exclusion attempted in a country that has always shown itself very much attached to the Catholic religion, and to its ministers. The fundamental law of the Low Countries, that grants distinctions of nobility, has assigned no rank to the clergy, in the new organization of the state*. In France the clergy finds itself in a situation very different from what it was when the Sugers, the d'Amboises, the Wolseys, the Richelieus, the Mazarins, the Grandvelles, the

* In France we have gone still farther; for, at the two latter meetings of the Electoral Colleges, not a single clergyman has been nominated. This is truly an unique example in the history of a modern nation, that lives under the administration of the Christian religion.

Fleurys, so powerfully, wisely, and with such *eclat*, administered the affairs of the greatest states of Europe.

The clergy, in order to serve as intellectual guides to the people, ought to be very intelligent. Those to whom is confided the business of instruction, should know more than those who are to be instructed. Also those, whose business it is to regulate and correct the conduct of others, should not be in a state of dependence upon them; otherwise the ministry is connected with that which is considered as inferior. Thus intelligence, and independence, are distinct and essential attributes of the existence of the clergy. But, in its new state, it is attacked in two principal sources of its existence.

First; By the nature of the elements that contribute to its renewal.

It is necessary to consider well the constitution of the ecclesiastical state.

The ecclesiastical education is tedious and expensive. The Catholic priest is naturally sequestered from all the lucrative occupations exercised by other professions. He cannot, like them, add to, or vary his pursuits. For him there is but one, and that is for life. Therefore, viewing him in this light, he is placed in a condition very inferior to that of the other orders of society. The numerous and various degrees of rank, of which the ancient hierarchy was composed, exist no longer. The number of situations is so uniform and so small, that it leaves but little difference between a poor bishop and a curate still more poor. The means of obtaining situations, and the motives to emulation, are thus at once taken from the clergy. Consequently, those classes that formerly beheld in this mode of life, means of existence as honourable as they were certain, have no longer the same attraction. Parents, who regard themselves as more immediately charged with the fortune than the vocation of their children, will have no temptation to put them into a way of life that offers such a slender recompense for the sacrifices made to it. The compo-

sition of the clergy will necessarily be affected; and, consequently, the existence of this body will experience an alteration. Its virtues will remain the same. There is, and always has been, much among the Catholic clergy; but, in its renewal among less enlightened classes, in occupying their attention with objects less elevated, they will not attain the same elevation as their predecessors.

Second; The means on which the clergy subsist are drawn from the taxes paid by the people. It was Joseph the Second that furnished this great example of relieving his own wants, and derogating from the laws and habits that Europe had for ages supported and followed with respect to the clergy. The Catholic worship is defrayed like all other branches of the public service. But it is necessary to observe,

First; That, in a moment of necessity, the clergy is most in danger of being neglected, as they are supposed to be the most passive. This is the second time, in the course of two years, that the ecclesiastical payments have been so far in arrear as to make the members of the Church of France experience the greatest inconveniences.

Second; That the clergy being generally composed of younger sons of poor families, almost all uniformly living from their respective homes, and not being able either to add to, or change their occupations, is still more dependent on the state, and filled with persons unable to support the weight of this inconvenience. Men placed in so high a situation of the state, require a greater degree of certainty, as to their means of subsistence, than those who live under a less severe discipline.

The contrary is the case at present.

This exposition should be sufficient to show that the state of the Catholic clergy is affected in such a way, that it ought to engage the attention of governments. Religion, and all that belongs to it, are objects of too high importance to be neglected by any of the parties that contribute to its maintenance. It is not necessary

to replace the clergy in the rank of sovereigns, any more than to restore them to the enjoyment of the wealth that they had acquired as legitimately as they have relinquished it. courageously : but it is necessary that their situations should be so regulated, and independent, as to leave them equally distant from their former opulence and actual indigence ; for, after having been an object of envy, they should not now become one of pity. The clergy ought not to be in a state of uneasiness on account of their daily support, independent of the exercise of the functions, of which nothing ought to vary the freedom and the dignity. It may easily be believed that we were justified in expecting that this subject, so important to the social guarantees of Europe, would have found a place among the discussions of Congress.. The state of the Church was referred to it, and was the initiative of this important question. But, in a short time, the appeals were confined to the great chapters of the churches of Germany. As these bodies are not precisely the most solid supports of religion, we shall confine ourselves to an observation, that nothing resulted.

To these general considerations on the state of the Catholic clergy we must add two others.

The first, concerns the exercise of the papal authority.

The second, the new spirit that animates the clergy.

All the world has been disgusted with the violences that the two last pontiffs have experienced. The proceedings were so destitute of those habits of respect that should have protected the father of all Christendom, and which should have supplied the place of the sovereign power which he had lost, that there was no one that did not feel himself injured by the outrages of which he was the object. To personal ill-usage was added the plunder of his property. To see its chief clothed with the most respected attributes among men, and which, after so many ages of grandeur, was sought after with anxiety, is a common benefit to the Christian world ; and, perhaps, the finding it in a state inferior to the

idea that had been formed of it, as well as destitute of the rank that had been assigned to it for ages, gave rise to errors. At Rome, the Pope should be the inviolable sovereign of all his states, having nothing to do with any political quarrel. His safeguard should be found in the morality of the Christian world. In that alone ought to be his guard and his army.

But it is also necessary that the Pope, on his part, should only see in all Christendom a society to be kept tranquil, not to be governed; that every pretension, every return to that antiquity, of which the vestiges and signification are lost, should finally disappear. This is not antiquity. (*La vétusté n'est pas l'antiquité.*) But without anticipating the events of the times — without pressing at least their advance, we should not retard but follow their progress. Let the bounds between the temporal and spiritual interest be so ascertained, that they shall be no longer confounded. How, in fact, in these times, can we expect to attach men to any thing under the name of religion, when this very thing occasions the churches, situated in those states, the sovereigns of which are not of the same opinion on the subject of the temporal interests of the Pope, being left without pastors? How are men to be made believe that the spiritual power should be sustained by the temporal, and the temporal avenged by the spiritual; and that religion passes for nothing in this manifest contradiction of the nature of things? On the contrary, nothing can be more injurious. How are the men of the present age to be made understand that acts most necessary to the government of the church, such as the institutions of primitive pastors, should be considered but as a simple favour?

The Court of Rome will surely return within those limits, the overstepping of which will lead to the most serious inconveniences. It will not push its victory, a very great one, so far as to be charged in its turn with ambition and a spirit of conquest. Thus, in latter times,

have we seen bishops submit, on a simple order from Rome; and changes that should only have resulted from the observance of forms at once recognised by the church and the state." These invasions have, as was to be expected, been checked by appeals. They are surely sufficient to put the Court of Rome on its guard against the effect of similar enterprises, and to prevent their recurrence*.

This court will soon discover itself in a position that will compel it to alter its conduct. It will provide for the changes that are taking place in a part of Christendom. Catholic Poland is divided between two sovereigns, who are not of that persuasion. The acquisitions of Prussia on the Rhine have given it for subjects those of the former electors or ecclesiastical princes. Belgium is governed by a prince, not of the same religion as the ancient sovereigns of the country. However, the spiritual wants of these provinces, and the relations consequent to them, will not change with the government, and they will continue to address themselves to Rome. Therefore, there will be established between the Pope and these sovereigns, communications of a nature very different to those that have heretofore existed. Thus the King of Prussia will be considered at Rome, as a simple Marquess of Brandenburg. Holland will be no longer restricted to the government of the Austrians. The powerful sovereign of Russia, reckoning among his former and present subjects in Poland many millions of Catholics, will be regarded by the Pope as the head of the Greek Church of Russia. It will be the same with the Catholics of Ireland. They are become too numerous, too turbulent, too much patronized by a party in Great Britain itself, to avoid obtaining a footing, which will give rise to the constant intercourse of the British Government with the Court of Rome.

* See what passed in 1814, relative to the Bishoprics of Constance and Basle.

The King of Würtemberg erects bishoprics and founds Catholic universities. The Grand Duke of Baden has acquired Catholic provinces. All is changed in the relations of the Court of Rome with a great number of sovereigns, to whom it has hitherto been a total stranger. The existence of this new state of things is worthy of observation, and requires a great attention on the part of the Court of Rome, not to offend princes bred in ideas foreign to its own, and who will attach no great degree of importance to things that heretofore have been considered as highly so in the sacred college.

A part of the European clergy has submitted to the most cruel privations for fifteen years. It has come out of it covered with glory; and a glory still more pure, as it is entirely personal; for it passed the whole time without chiefs, without hope, without country, without fortune, without any other ties than those of duty, and from none of which has it strayed.

In all countries, the clergy has proved itself much attached to the governments under which it has been in the habit of living. In Poland, in Belgium, at Venice, in Spain, in France, every where has the clergy proved itself equally faithful. In Mexico it is the clergy that supports the cause of Spain. Governments may calculate on its zeal. They will find it religiously observing all the engagements which it contracts. But to these titles to glory, the clergy adds that of being able to penetrate the spirit of the times, in the midst of which it exercises its august functions; that to add more efficaciousness, let them be always presented as a benefit, and their acceptance rather induced than commanded; let them penetrate to the heart as a mild light into delicate eyes. Let the clergy, in continuing to be enlightened by the intelligence of Bossuet, prove itself to be also penetrated by the benevolent morality of Fenelon; let there be banished from the midst of it all sorts of contention, all of those melancholy divisions that give the appearance of there being two

churches, when in fact there is but *one*; being no longer the exclusive source of intelligence, let it always find with them an hospitable asylum; let their understandings be ardent and lively, but never violently exercised; more directed towards the present and the future rather than towards the past; and, that nothing may weaken the respect that in all countries, and at all times, is paid to talent and virtue, in diverting the attention from the changes that have every where taken place; a change that has assigned it a wholly new situation in the human mind*.

COLONIES. — *St. Domingo.*

Colonies have opened sources of wealth, that have changed the face of all Europe. Let us recollect that the epoch of their discovery was but the sixteenth century. But two principal streams proceeding from this source, are diverted by the events of St. Domingo and Spanish America. It is an elementary principle; and applies to colonies, that that which belongs to one, concerns all others, the principal wealth of Europe proceeding from colonies, and distributing itself generally among its inhabitants. They serve as channels to convey fertility into the centre of Europe. Colonies are the Nile of Europe. But in what state will they find themselves after the ravages of which they have been the victims for the past twenty-five years?

* It is with regret that we have seen the Belgic clergy foment, by its example, considerable opposition to the acceptance of the law proposed by the king. The pretext on which it supported itself was destitute of foundation, and made it run the risk of losing its consideration in the opinion of all Europeans. As to any thing else, all that has passed on the part of the Belgian, Italian, Spanish, or Irish clergy, merits the attention of governments, and of the men who administer them.

St. Domingo threatens to become the Algiers of the West Indies. Her chiefs have induced us to fear that, if attacked, they will leave but a heap of ashes moistened with blood. There, destruction and extermination will form the means of defence; there, we cannot calculate on abdications, on arrangements, that in Europe amicably terminate so many affairs: at St. Domingo all is to be devastated. If such is the situation in which we expect to find it, it is much better to leave it as it is; for, in fact, however deplorable may be this order of things, in its commercial relations it has fulfilled the great end of every colony. We may, at least, buy and sell at St. Domingo: and this twofold communication between the metropolis with the colony, and the colony with the metropolis, may be preserved. We are far from entertaining the opinion of those who would prefer seeing St. Domingo swallowed up by the sea, than possessed by a black population. This much resembles the idea, "*Perish our colonies, rather than our principles.*" But, in case of an attack on St. Domingo by an armed force, if the negroes are killed, if they withdraw to the *Mornes*, it will require numerous corps of troops to confine them to this situation, and prevent them rushing out with fire and sword; we cannot perceive how St. Domingo would be more profitable for France than for its proprietors. The slaves destroyed, others must be purchased. At what price? In what number? Will those who are disembarked from Africa in this land of insurrection be for ever ignorant of the ideas of independence, that have roused and armed a population similar to themselves? It is very probable that with these very recruits we should do nothing else than find soldiers for Christophe and his descendants. The whole business of St. Domingo is within a circle of crimes committed and crimes to punish; a labyrinth of difficulties, formed to engender difficulties still more formidable: the fetters with which Laocoon fell encumbered were less inextricable; and the

head of the Furies, beset with serpents, does not cause the terror occasioned by this more monstrous assemblage.

Trans-Atlantic Spain.

It is also in the name of independence that the vast continent of South America is shedding its blood. From the straits of Magellan to California, a dreadful conflict exists. It is the most terrible civil war at which humanity has ever shuddered. Spain has exhibited herself in America as she has in Europe, firm and ferocious; although often generous, inflexible in her opinions, invariable in her determinations, equally immovable and inexorable. To Spain, blood, ruins, all signify nothing—she triumphs, and that is a sufficient justification. Thus in Caraccas and in Venezuela, the same towns have been taken, retaken, and sacked ten times. Monte Video resisted to the last. Buenos Ayres has shown itself indefatigable in the pursuit of independence. The Spanish character, ever the same in all climates and situations, is truly remarkable.

America, separated from Spain, resembles a vessel floating on a tempestuous ocean that has lost its crew. It was Napoleon who, in attacking Spain, cut the cable which attached the vessel to the shore. But, while Spain was throwing off the yoke of France, America, on her side, prepared to throw off that of Spain. This evidently was a natural conclusion. The ideas of independence that for a long time have fermented in the bosom of America, could not fail of exploding on receiving the first spark of liberty. Never was there so favourable an opportunity, and a good use was made of it.

But, while this dreadful contest continues, who is to cultivate the fields of America? Who is to buy the merchandises of Europe? Who is to explore the mines that Europe and the whole universe pay for them? If

they fight in Mexico*, we suffer in Europe. This evil should have been remedied; and to what subject could the Congress have more profitably turned its attention? What better could they have done, than have thus proved that they acted not only for Spain, but for all Europe, which is visibly affected by these trans-Atlantic commotions. It was according to the same order of general ideas, in which may be discovered the means of preventing the ruin of St. Domingo. Its resistance will continue, because it expects that it will be France alone with which it must contend. Perhaps it would alter its opinions, if it discovered that all the colonial powers were combined against it, and had determined to inform its leaders, that no assistance could be expected by them till they had returned to a state of good order, and furnished a guarantee for the enjoyment of the advantages that would be assured to them.

Considering the stage at which the business has arrived, America belongs no longer to Spain. Directly she only belongs to herself; and, indirectly, to the main body of Europe. Thus, it is not without the liveliest sentiments of regret, that we see Spain engaged in expeditions which terminate in their own ruin, and have no other object but the extermination of their American brethren, aspiring to liberty, by the means

* In ordinary times Mexico sends annually to Europe :

In money	32,000,000
In 1814, there was only coined in Mexico ..	7,624,132
In 1813, they have coined in copper	6,124,132.

It is the first time since the Conquest that copper has been coined.

The diminution of the quantity of merchandise has been still more considerable. In 1786, Mexico consumed annually more than five millions worth (*we presume sterling, but M. de P. does not state. Translator*) of European merchandise. For this it remitted a large sum. This traffic is stopped: What a loss to the two countries! This will explain the reason of the scarcity of specie in the United States.

of some thousands of soldiers who have reconquered that of Spain. What can it think of doing with a few regiments, landed on this immense continent, and having to contend with its whole population, which the announcement of the attack will not fail to unite? The councils of Spain, always so pre-occupied with an idea of the importance of the tributes, of Mexico and Peru, which they believe should supply every want that Spain experiences from the folly and defect of her administration, are strangely insensible to the state of the two countries. Do they figure to themselves that these are the same Indians who could not resist the handful of men led by Sortez, Almagro, and Pizarro? Are not the Americans, whom they would thus insult, the descendants of these illustrious warriors? Can the cabinet of Madrid conceal that the arms and the animals, before which the Indians, shrunk with terror and affright, fell on their knees, are in as common use in South America as they can possibly be in Spain? It is just as if they were to attack the Russians, in hope of not finding them armed with any thing else than the arrows used by their forefathers. If we could feel any other sentiment than those inspired by the calamities that these fatal mistakes inflict on those who are their victims, we could not avoid smiling, to behold the great confidence placed in similar enterprises, and see the authors of these plans with an handful of men scarcely sufficient to retain one point, trace a triumphal route on the surface of the globe. It is like a train of ants clambering up a mountain. Has it not thus uniformly happened? The expedition of Morillo, so long and so extensive in preparation, the language of whose leader was so arrogant, has yielded to all the inconveniences universally attached to distant expeditions, and particularly the Spaniards. Their delay, their carelessness, their diet, are the principal enemies to their success. At the moment of arrival, disease has already reaped its harvest of part of the troops. Another por-

tion has perished, with its valuable effects, by one of those defects in management so common amongst Spaniards. The remainder will be consumed in these burning regions, while expecting the reinforcements, destined to experience no better fate. All those which have landed find themselves opposed to forces infinitely superior in a system of unconquerable defensive war*; and the very chief who, before he left Europe, had, in idea, already engulfed America, was seen trembling, submissive†, and not daring to set his foot on shore. Every expedition fitted out by Spain against America will share the fate that its invincible armada did against another enemy. The British power, even assisted as it is by the ability of its sailors in expeditions of this nature, would be far from adequate to an attack on the Continent of America. What, then, can be expected from tardy and necessitous Spain‡? Far from these expeditions having the power of restoring her colonies to Spain, the only effect will be, that she will irrevocably lose them. All the Americans will unite against her, as they did on the appearance of Morillo's expedition||. Again, people annoyed by the attacks, by the intrigues of the mother country, and emboldened by their own success, will finish, by destroying the connexion with her into which opinions, the ties of blood, the similarity of manners, of language, and habits, would have led her, and have continued to assure to her a lucrative preference; the only one of which Spain is in want.

* The Spanish Americans carry on the war against the European Spaniards in the same manner as the latter did against the French.

† See Morillo's Proclamation on the departure of his expedition from Cadiz.

‡ Spain is attempting to effect, against the whole population of South America, with one of ten millions what Great Britain could not effect with sixteen millions, against two millions and a half of North Americans, aided by German troops. •

|| See the Buenos Ayres Proclamation, and that of the Mexican Congress.

Therefore Spanish America is for ever, and wholly, separated from Spain. She need only have been partially so; but will finish with altogether losing her. These are two very different things, and Spain should have distinguished them*.

It has been often said, that the conquest of America has depopulated and ruined Spain. We may be assured that another conquest would inevitably finish the work of the former. To terminate this sanguinary scene should have occupied all the attention of the Congress, and a most desirable end would have been obtained. By this act alone it would have rendered itself the benefactor of the universe.

There are other considerations well worthy our attention.

First; That when even, in order to pay an unseasonable homage to the possessive rights of a nation, Europe had abstained from an interference between the metropolis and the colonies, the former would not be more its mistress: she would only be in that situation in which she was placed by the separation of the United States and Great Britain. Hence, in forty years two similar cases will have presented themselves. At that period, American agents were spread over every quarter of

* Since the above was written, it has been announced that Morillo has begun the siege of Carthage. It calls to our recollection the result of Admiral Vernon's attempt against the same town.

The object of this enterprise is to furnish Spain *points d'appui* for the troops she proposes to send to America.

Whatever success may attend a few actions, (success is generally various in war,) the result of this contest is the no less certain. The misfortunes of Spain and America may be prolonged; but the lot to be found in the very nature of things will not be changed.

In the course of the war between the United States and Great Britain, Generals Howe, Gage, Clinton, Burgoyne, and Cornwallis, commenced their operations with great success. The two last finished by surrendering as prisoners of war, with their whole force.

A general rule: Every war carried on by a metropolis against an extensive and well-peopled colony, must terminate to the disadvantage of the latter.

Europe. Spain herself received them, and a short time after assisted them with all her power. Europe will soon discover the new sources of wealth that will be thus opened to it. In the latter, the envoys of Mexico, of Lima, of Buenos Ayres*, are expected. The citizens of the United States support in every way their brethren of these countries. A triumphant insurrection cannot fail to add to the assistance of that still in progress. On their side, a great number of Europeans form temporary and permanent establishments on the American continent†. These are constantly annoyed by the attempts of Spain, always ready to present themselves with their exclusive right, the only regimen with which it is acquainted. Will not all governments finish by taking part with her subjects? The commerce of this country is so advantageous, that for the future no government will possess means of preventing its subjects taking part: therefore the interference of governments will become indispensable, and we may easily see the part that it will take.

Second; It is probable that the reiterated attacks of Spain upon America will embitter the minds of its inhabitants, induce them to reject the monarchical form of government, and uniformly give themselves up to a republican administration, of which they have, at their very doors, a very seducing example. If it is too true that the principles and example of the revolution of the United States have, in a great measure, produced that of France, what will not be the effect produced in Europe, when all America, excepting the Brazils, shall be governed as a republic; and, above all, when the representative government shall become nearly that of all Europe? And did not subjects so new, dangers so great, and advantages so important,

* The Buenos Ayres' deputies are already in London.

† See the accounts given of the produce of American commerce for the years 1812 and 1813.

not form a subject worthy the attention of Congress? The moment that this great question will occupy the public attention is at last arrived. Would it not be fortunate for Europe to be able to imitate Great Britain at the termination of her troubles, when she threw a crowd of men, rebellious in principle as well as habit, on her still savage colonies, and in an half century after they opened new sources of wealth and prosperity on these fertile shores, and with the same hands that had torn in pieces their own country? Europe experiences the same want. She would experience the same relief from an order of things that would attract to the colonies a great number of the persons whom the chances of revolution have deprived of those habits of quiet and security that society expects from its members, and that, in their turn, its members should receive from itself. The States of the North have the greatest interest in the solution of this question, and particularly Great Britain*. Spain herself, who, by a spirit of prejudice to system, is frightened at what she terms the loss of the Americas, and, in endeavouring to retake them, spends so much, as to make their loss more certain and more quick. Spain is not less interested in the immediate independence of her colonies.

First; Because it was very evident that she could no longer reign there. They are inevitably lost.

Second; Because the prosperity of America, the inseparable fruit of her emancipation, will turn to the profit of Spain as well as to that of Europe.

The more her colonies prosper, the more will Spain be benefited. America will enrich her former metropolis, to whom then she will cost nothing. The United States have enriched Great Britain, since the supposed misfortune of her loss.

We have attended closely to this question, it having

* See "The Three Ages of Colonies."

occupied our whole life: since the more we compare its elements with those facts that we have been able to obtain, the more are we convinced that, in a few years after the independence of America, Europe will possess neither strength nor materials with which she can furnish the markets of America. But let her hasten to succour the latter. Each man whom war destroys in America is a consumer lost to Europe; and, in the state of depopulation in which she is at present, it is an irreparable loss. Let America be free. Let her ports, like those of the Brazils, be opened to all flags without exception or preference, and Europe has no more to desire.

Commerce.

However military Europe may have been, she is about to become commercial. If, of late, her attention has been diverted from this course, she is about to return to it; in order that she may be enabled to remain in that situation, and protect herself from the injuries and misery that this deviation has occasioned; that she has made those truly prodigious efforts which have led to her release. For the future it will be in the power of no one to arrest her flight. An elegant and judicious writer (M. Benjamin de Constant) has placed this subject in a very clear point of view. It is not difficult to foresee that for the future, war will have commerce for its object. We fight for territory, when all wealth proceeds from it. We shall fight for commerce, because it will be found still more productive of wealth than territory, and that the latter owes all its value to it. All nations are called, and at all times, to assemble in this arena. May it never be stained with blood! May God confine their peaceable contests to a pursuit of industry;

as admirable for the developement of their talents, as the increase of their wealth! But this tendency to commerce throughout Europe is favoured by many motives and various means. Commerce should be employed to increase civilization, and civilization in its turn will tend to the increase of commerce, and, by its means, to the augmentation of the general wealth. Let us explain ourselves.

Europe is covered with a commercial population, which much surpasses all the wants of commerce. There are more merchants than there is commerce. All the intermediate classes of society have pursued it; a circumstance widely different from former times, when it was confined to a smaller number of persons. This change proceeds from the diffusion of intelligence. Since the middling and lower classes have so generally participated in the education hitherto reserved for the higher ranks, the increase of wealth has induced a desire for the increase of fortune. The expense of education is not incurred, except to reap its fruits. These fruits are fortune and social consideration. Employments cannot be multiplied as much as the intelligence produced by education; therefore they must be sought in some other channel, not to be found in the social order, and this channel is commerce. The elements, the language, the relations of commerce, having become a common science, those men of whom we speak have found, in this new kind of occupation, the means of obtaining fortunes that society otherwise would wholly deny them. Thus is created that multitude of persons that in all great cities direct their attention to commerce; but in its ancient condition it was not extended in the same proportion. It is no longer sufficient to employ all the persons wishing to pursue it; therefore we must labour to give it the required extent. But, where are to be found the means? In a better colonial order, and in the efforts that Europe should make

to carry civilization wherever it has not yet reached; and, above all, to extend the taste for the enjoyments of Europe, which spring from the produce of her territory and of her industry. Every country which neither buys nor consumes any thing produced by Europe, is to her as if it had no existence. Every European taste communicated to a country is equal to a new discovery of this very country. Then it is, in this sense, that we extend the mutual relations of commerce and civilization, and yield the support that should be afforded them.

St. Petersburg rose, and was civilized. The commerce of Europe penetrated thither. St. Petersburg was thus, at that period, born as to Europe. Civilization attracted commerce to it; and commerce, in its turn, extended and confirmed civilization. One hundred and fifty years ago North America was savage, uncultivated, and a forest. In 1810, it possessed twelve thousand commercial vessels, and its shores exhibit the finest cities in the universe. Was this produced from any thing else but the combined operation of commerce with civilization?

When Egypt was occupied by the French, what European ought not to have rejoiced to behold this fertile country, hitherto so degraded, about to become subject to the dominion of Europe, and to see the habits of Europe established among its new inhabitants, and the manners which they would adopt. Did it signify what European people prevailed in Egypt, provided the tastes, the industry, the wants, and the activity of Europe were introduced there, and assumed the place hitherto occupied by idleness, ignorance, poverty, and that debasement of mind and fortune by which the descendants of the people that erected the pyramids and formed wonders which ennoble the country of Sesostris and Ptolemy are distinguished? The same observation applies to colonies. When we insist on the necessity of hastening their separation

from their metropolis, what is our opinion as to its final result? Is it not to furnish them, by means of the civilization that the presence of a local government, similar to those of Europe, will not fail to introduce amongst them—to give them, I repeat, European tastes, the gratification of which will tend to the increase of European wealth? for, of this we ought never to lose sight. Of course, each step that civilization makes in the yet new countries, will turn to the profit of Europe. For example, see the sovereignty of the Brazils transplanted and fixed in that country. What an increase of benefit of every kind will not his presence produce? In twenty years we shall not be able to know the Brazils—they will proceed from one increase to another: but who will profit by these ameliorations? Will it not be Europe? Why? Because to her will it belong for ages to supply Brazil. The more it prospers, the more of European commodities will it require. When the Prince of the Brazils quitted Lisbon, that very day was the furniture of his new palace ordered in Europe, at London, in Paris, and Lyons. Extend this idea, and place at Mexico, at Lima, at Buenos Ayres, governments like that which exists at the Brazils, and we shall discover what will be the result to Europe. What new movement, what new wealth, what new enjoyment, what new intelligence, will not spread throughout Europe by the exploration of these unknown lands, by the innumerable and ever increasing relations of these new countries! In a little time it will be impossible to recognise them.

We have before expressed a wish to see Servia and Bosnia united to Austria. With similar satisfaction should we behold Wallachia and Moldavia attached to an European government. Why? Is it to increase the power of this government? Assuredly not: but it is to reattach to Europe countries which are in her neighbourhood, without forming a part of

ber. Thus, when short-sighted politicians congratulated themselves at seeing Egypt wrested from the French, and Moldavia from the Russians, what did they do but congratulate Europe on her beholding countries disinherited, into which civilization was about to enter in the effects of an European domination? It is the absence of civilization and European tastes, which foils Europe in these countries. Consequently, their presence will produce them. Therefore carry to them the tastes of Europe, the civilization of Europe, and they will be valuable to Europe. There is no necessity for domination, but only to communicate our manners, and what is wished for will follow: it is an error which has lasted too long, that of believing a domination over a country gives the only means of possessing and deriving advantage from it. The contrary is well demonstrated, and particularly in the case of colonies, the commerce, not the property of which, is of importance to the *metropolis*.

We have passed fifty years in demanding the expulsion of the Turks from Europe. This is not so easily to be achieved; for the Turks will defend themselves like the Spaniards, whom they very much resemble. We should inflict, and truly without success, a horrible evil on humanity. Well! when the Turks should be massacred, when they should become wanderers and brigands, when their cities should be destroyed and their fields desolated, what will have been done for Turkey, and of what use would Turkey be to Europe? What would be the fruits of this horrible idea? We should commit an error as absurd as it is cruel. It is not the territorial, but the moral conquest of Turkey, that ought to occupy our attention. It would be rude and savage habits that should be attacked: not the arms of Europe, but its arts, its manners, its tastes, that should be made to penetrate thither. The edifice of Barbarism, that weighs down this unhappy country, and renders it unproductive to Europe, should be overthrown. The unfortunate Selim

has marked out this transition to the manners of Europe; and the latter has the greatest interest in seeing that empire resume its march.

Therefore it is demonstrable, that the combined operation of commerce and civilization should become the principal and common occupation of Europe; and that, in its actual state, the latter has the greatest interest in labouring to increase their united influence*.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

UNFORTUNATE CONDITION OF EUROPEANS, AND CONSEQUENT DANGERS.

THE revolution has added much to intelligence, and the means of obtaining it. Whatever dispute there may be on this subject, relative to the points in which it ought to be viewed, and the suggestions that may be offered, this fact remains the no less certain. Whatever may be the nature of this intelligence, and the effects rightly or erroneously attributed to it, (a discussion, into which it is not our intention now to enter,) it exists. It is only necessary to reflect on the character of the men that now inhabit the world. It is but to hear and see what they are in common with their predecessors. It would evince too much simplicity, or rather blindness, to believe that so many events, so many discussions, as well as so many

* We read, in "The Three Ages of Colonies;"

"If it is acknowledged that the affairs of Europe can only be arranged in a congress, it is evident that those of the colonies still more urgently require the same assistance: for it will be necessary on these accounts to discuss all the questions attached to European states more than those involving their peculiar interests."

exertions made by every one, should leave mankind where it was twenty-five years ago.

There have been changes. These are undeniable. But have we reaped an advantage from them? If more general intelligence, and of a superior nature, does exist, is there to be found more happiness, or is it more diffused among men? On the contrary, does not Europe offer the appearance of a society more perfect in its nature, but more miserable in its existence?

We are much induced to believe this. Four principal causes appear to us to produce these misfortunes.

First; The military character of all governments.

Second; The still increasing burthen of taxes.

Third; The oppression of subjects by governments.

Fourth; The inequality between the fortune and the intelligence of the majority of Europeans.

Europe has become a barrack; and this miserably furnished barrack exhausts her population.

Europe, with the exception of Turkey, possesses about five hundred and fifty millions of inhabitants. This population amounts to nearly three millions of soldiers and sailors.

It is one man out of fifty, or the double proportion of that assigned to it by the best calculations, which the state of human nature will allow to the military character.

Five hundred and forty-seven millions of men are born, and labour during the whole year, in order to pay, feed, clothe, and lodge three millions. It would be curious to ascertain what each soldier cost in comparison with a private individual. A frightful difference would be discovered. The one destroys and desolates; the other builds and fertilizes*.

* "A new disease has extended itself throughout Europe. It has reached our princes, and made them retain a disproportioned number of troops. It has its paroxysms, and necessarily becomes contagious; for as soon as one state increases the number of its troops, others suddenly augment

That every state should keep up the number of troops necessary to its internal and external safety no one can deny, but that the number of troops should have no other bounds than the national ability to support them, or the example of the neighbouring Powers, is truly inconceivable, but the idea unfortunately exists.

Louis the XIVth braved all Europe, confiscated and incorporated all that came within his reach; wished to reign at Brussels, at Madrid, and send the Dutch to Batavia. Hostile to all the world, he armed against it; and, in return, every one opposed him. Europe fell on him with its whole force, and he defended himself with his whole people. If we read his story, we shall find, that with eighteen millions of French he kept up armies* comparatively more numerous than Napoleon did with forty-two millions. He supported this expense for a great number of years; and the dying monarch thought he expiated his errors towards an almost breathless and depopulated country, by saying to his successor, "*I have been too fond of war.*" It appears that these words made no very profound im-

theirs, so that nothing but the common ruin is achieved by it. So much is Europe injured, that individuals, who would be in the situation of the three most opulent Powers of this part of the world, have not whereon to live. We are poor, with the wealth and commerce of the whole universe; and soon, in consequence of having so many soldiers, we shall have still more soldiers, and shall be like Tartars. The consequence of such a situation is the perpetual augmentation of taxes; and that which prevents all future remedy, we can no longer calculate on revenue, as war is made with the capital. *The prophecy has been accomplished.*" —MONTESQUIEU.

* From 1689 to 1695, Louis XIVth kept up an army of more than 400,000 infantry and 60,000 cavalry. At the same time his fleets amounted to more than one hundred large vessels, many of which mounted above one hundred guns. This was the age of the French marine.

During the same period, from 1689 to 1695, there was created for extraordinary affairs 470 millions, *le marc d'argent à 32 francs*. It is certain that this was owing to the bankruptcy of Law and a French revolution.

pression on the latter; for we find him keeping up, in the war against Maria-Theresa, 400,000, and 350,000 in that he waged on her account; for those two wars offered but the appearance of one being but a passage into the other. Louis the XIVth died insolvent, to the amount of what would now be equal to four milliards. At his death, Louis the XVth was in no better situation.

In the course of the war just finished, the military efforts of Europe were carried to a pitch that almost exceeds belief. In short, Europe has become a camp.

Great Britain*, which has never supported large armies, has kept up a very numerous one. Its marine, has been much increased: and we have seen a country, the population of which does not exceed seventeen millions, devote more than 400,000 men to its land and sea service, and support it with, who can believe it? an expense of 800 millions!

It has been with troops as with luxury. Emulation operates upon both objects. Because one has so many troops, the other must also obtain them. Hence, conscriptions that trade in Europeans; taxes, and all their inevitable consequences, oppress the people. While an equality exists, what effect do numbers produce? The greatest interests may be decided by the most trifling armies. Numbers signify nothing.

An army of twenty-two thousand men gave Cæsar the empire of the world in the field of Pharsalia.

An army of ten thousand gave to Henry the Fourth the throne of France on the plain of Ivry. The multitude of soldiers have nothing to do with the decision of affairs; and if princes assemble such large ones, it does not arise from an actual want.

Europe has been flattered with the hope of seeing a

* Adjutant-General's Office, 25th Dec. 1814.

In 1814	324,971
Peace Establishment ..	91,185
1814, Militia.....	63,753

correspondent reduction take place in all states. The idea was salutary and humane, the execution of which would have honoured the decisions of Congress. This is the reason we read of Austria reducing her force to 300,000, Prussia to 200,000; so that, from reduction to reduction, Europe would be disarmed.

It appears that in this, as in many other things, we act not in proportion to the sources of popular strength, but the use that we can make of it.

One evil ever inevitably involves another. Soldiers occasion taxes. Governments are well acquainted with this circumstance, and that it is not the least part of their business.

The moment we have soldiers, that instant we must have taxes; and, reciprocally, the more taxes the more soldiers. This is inevitable. Therefore nations have not been asked, what they consider as necessary to their prosperity: it has been only ascertained how much they were able to pay. The exigences of the state have not been regulated by the welfare of the people, or the capability they are supposed to possess of supporting burthens.

Behold the financial state of Europe. It inspires terror. For twenty years there have been nothing but bankruptcies, paper money, another species of permanent bankruptcy; confiscations, requisitions, forced loans, anticipations; the present time always advancing towards a previously exhausted futurity.

Great Britain, in the midst of her triumphs and her wealth, offers a spectacle well worthy of our attention.

An interest on her National Debt of 800,000,000 francs.

A Military Establishment of 500,000,000 francs.

A Naval Establishment of 600,000,000 francs.

In this statement we see the nature of the discussions that occupy the attention of Parliament. By the mere dint of taxation and wealth, by this combination, that at first view appears contradictory, things are arrived

at a height, that agriculture is threatened with being abandoned, if a protection against foreign competition is not granted. This is necessary to enable the farmer to subsist: if he gains a profit, the consumer must die of hunger. This evidently is contrary to all social order. The clashing of the interests of the producer and the consumer is manifestly occasioned by taxes; which raise the price of land, and all the means of its cultivation, to a rate infinitely higher than it would have been, without the accumulation of the charges to which it has been subjected.

In Austria, for twenty years, her finances have not been placed in a state of order. This country, ever possessed of a regular supply, but never a superabundance, has not been fortunate in her financial expedients. Every three months some admirable plan for the amelioration of the finances is announced; and as regularly, under the operation of these plans, they become worse.

All the Princes of Germany are in debt.

We do not speak of some of the Italian states, nor of Spain. This country has something else to do, than attend to the details of administration*.

France, without possessing the most extensive funds in Europe, has the most real and solid basis. This circumstance results from the proportion of the receipts effected at a fixed expense, and annually discharged. France, peculiar for being in this unexpected state, after all the pictures that have been drawn of her exhaustion, furnishes this abundance of public treasure by means of the greatest sufferings†. The

* We must recollect the forced loans made in all the commercial towns of Spain, and the financial state of that country, as well as every thing that has been published on the state of the Pope's finances, and those of the King of Sardinia: •

† We truly feel that this picture is only that of the finances, previous to the evils produced by foreign invasion, as well as the last treaty.

land-tax takes from the proprietor the greatest part of his income; so that almost every where the proprietor is little more than a cultivator for the benefit of the revenue (*le colon du fisc*). Such an inequality between the produce of taxes and the price of all the objects either of commerce or consumption has been created, that no proprietor who does not add to his landed revenue one arising from industry or a public situation, can bring up his family, or live in common comfort. All the departments situated from the left bank of the Loire, to the Alps and Pyrennees, are filled with proprietors of an annual income from three to five thousand livres, the fee-simple of which is worth one hundred thousand francs, or thereabouts, who live in wretchedness, and experience every difficulty in the education of their children. The disorder in this respect is very great, and wholly arises from the excess of taxes.

The indirect taxes in France on consumption, and in certain transactions, are also very heavy.

The Salt Duty subjects the article taxed to a duty many times heavier than its original value.

The Assessed or Consolidated Taxes (*Droits Reunis*) excite universal horror. The detestation of which they are the object, is diverted by being attached to those who assess or collect them. They should be reduced to those which have the supply of the real wants of the state in a moment of emergency for their object; but governments do not think how much they can spare the people, but how much they can extract from them. Provided the rope does not snap, (we may be pardoned for the vulgarity of this expression,) it is of no consequence to what length it is stretched.

Ideas of luxury and emulation in public monuments

It is fair to presume, that the consideration of this abundance, continuing after such a crisis, has confirmed the severity of foreigners relative to an opulence that they fear as much as they envy.

have gained ground in some countries. We seem to wish to form towns into monuments. Shortly the idea will be adopted as to whole countries. Self-love is flattered by this demonstration of power; but the people pay dear for this satisfaction*. True monuments are to be found in the good taste of individuals and the comfort of nations. An opulent and happy nation is of itself a sufficiently fine monument; but, unfortunately, one of the most rare. It gratifies the eye at least as much as domes and columns.

France has expended, in a few years, one hundred and fifty-five millions of francs in public works and monuments.

The City of Paris has absorbed almost all this enormous sum. Many of these works are really useful; others are only distinguished embellishments. But, what a charge upon a whole country for a single town†!

London is the finest city in the world; and in it there are fewest monuments erected at the public expense. To the good taste and wealth of the inhabitants it is indebted for those it possesses.

The cities of Holland and Belgium are superior to any other in Europe. The respective governments have done nothing for them. There the inhabitants have furnished for their own gratification, what in other countries is done at the public expense.

America presents, in her cities, habitations the best.

* After the battle of Wurchen, in May, 1813, Napoleon ordered that a monument should be erected on Mount Cenis, to commemorate the names of all those who had been engaged in that affair. This monument was to cost twenty-five millions. What a subject for reflection does not this facility of disposing of the wealth of nations create, in order to gratify such ridiculous fancies!!

† Unfortunate is that country of which artists take possession. What have they not cost to France, to Spain, to Italy, to Saxony, to Bavaria, where their masters have given way to a profuse taste for the arts, and have in consequence patronized artists to an injurious excess, in consequence of listening to the poets and academies who have celebrated these *chefs-d'œuvres*!

calculated for the convenience of men that have hitherto existed. With some exceptions at the new capital, the public purse has contributed nothing.

It is remarkable, that it is in the south of Europe; that is to say, in Catholic and despotic countries, in which the condition of the people is the worst, where the most expensive monuments are to be found. It may be said that they are but veils, behind which the public misery is hidden, in order to divert the attention from a contemplation of what must disgust it.

For twenty-five years past the results arising from the conduct of governments has been to accumulate on their subjects the heaviest burthens that war could produce, and most especially by the way in which they waged it. Men are become a species of projectile force, destined to be used one against the other to their mutual injury. By taxes, paper money, bankruptcies, and requisitions; a practice well worthy of the Turks; by a thousand other arrangements that governments have made use of to obtain possession of the fortunes of individuals, men have at present no property. In the course of one month we have seen Russia declaring the whole property of the empire mortgaged for the maintenance of its paper; and Austria, on her side, avow that the tenth part of the property of her subjects was necessary to her wants. At what point things have arrived in Great Britain we may discover, as well as how much the wants of the government have surpassed every thing hitherto known in that land of true liberty. For twenty-five years every thing in Europe has been made to square with politics, and nothing has been allowed to yield to individual comfort, which is the true object of all human associations*.

* We may apply to Europe in general what Mr. Burke said of the revolutionary government in particular.

"Individual comfort is entirely left out of their system of government. The state is all in all. All belongs to it that will produce power. Afterwards all is entrusted to the use of power."

The light in which society has been viewed is changed, and the nature of things is wholly altered: the political world no longer exists for the social system, but the social system for the political world. The action of government has been always rapid, inevitable, and too often inflexible. Individuals have been too much separated one from the other; or, so to express it, confined to themselves: then, comparing individual weakness to the power of government, no man could feel himself disposed to enter into the unequal contest. States have been divided into a multiplicity of parts; authority present every where, but the subject is never permitted to partake of it. These governments are become like so many nets in which men are to be caught. From hence, has arisen an impression of terror on the score of government. It lasts still, and will require a long time to efface. It is terror that explains how France has always obeyed, with the same facility that she permitted the various governments, in their turn, to render themselves masters of the supreme power. As they all proceeded in the same manner, with the same *gens d'armes*, with the same punishments, with the same commissaries, with the same removals from authority, the public mind, oppressed under an equal weight, has ever found itself in the same situation. It has not varied for twenty years. Properly speaking, there have only been dictatorships in France from the 14th of July, 1789, to the obtainment of the charter in 1815. The Constituent Assembly was a dictatorship of thirty months. It would be going too far to say, that it was a legislative assembly; the passage of a monarchy impossible to be maintained, into a democracy as impracticable to be defined: a democracy rendered hideous by its conduct, frightful by the horrid grandeur of its acts, incessantly bordering on the extremes of courage and ferocity. The Legislative Assembly could occupy but a small portion of space between these colossi, of which it rather marked the separation that became the bond of connexion. • •

• The Directory seized, lost, and regained the dictatorial

power. It availed itself of the 18th Fructidor to repossess itself of it. The 18th Brumaire was made subservient to the measure of its removal. The same absolute power has uniformly prevailed till the 31st of March, 1814. It reappeared under Buonaparte the 20th of March, 1815. Each dictator has commanded, terrified, taxed, displaced at his pleasure, has been obeyed with the same facility, we may say with the same ardour. Whence arises all this? From the reign of terror. It survived its authors. Men pass away, but an impression remains, and the same disposition exists in the mind. It has its essential principle in the twofold state of legislation. There are two codes. The number of laws being infinite, each individual in power having created his own, by the preservation of those that he did not repeal, the whole of legislation was but a labyrinth in which a regular system was no longer to be recognised. Safe on one side, we did not think ourselves so on the other: In the midst of the farrago of laws that bore down France, who could possibly act according to all of them? Exception is always on the side of the law, and in its favour. For example, individual safety is guaranteed by the charter: still more, by all the constitutions that have been made for twenty-five years. But in the same codes are to be found laws that are not repealed; and they are such as, after the most formal guarantees for individual safety, grant, as heretofore, the right of suspension. (*Senatus Consulte organique, an 12.*) The press is declared free; but we have seen a four months discussion to ascertain whether to repress abuses was the right of suppression by the previous censure. We have attached to a certain book (*volume déterminé*) the power of printing without the previous censure, and the legislation on this subject has not been yet ascertained. The liberty which the press now enjoys is much more a matter of fact than of right, and the magistrate contributes more to it than the legislator. It is owing to the complication of law that we have seen additions to the constitution, called the Constitution of the Em-

pire, although no one observes nor knows how to apply them. To this first consideration we must add that of the increase of the armies. The greatest enemy to the mild spirit of civil life is that of the military one. History is false if this assertion is not true. The more soldiers are formed, the more enemies are there to liberty; the more numerous the elements of despotism. The Pretorian Band at Rome, the Janizaries at Constantinople, the Imperial Guard at Paris, were all equally incompatible with the liberty of the various nations, and did not permit any idea of liberty nor independence to exist. In such a condition nothing remained but resignation. The military profession having been so much extended in France, it having become the only road to honours and to fortune; a taste for, and fear of its members, combined to form the national mind; and in this state is it now to be found a condition perfectly anti-civil, and wholly subversive of the great object of society*.

The uncertainty attached to places under government is an aggravation of the misfortunes already remarked. It is impossible to have an idea of the facility with which they are dismissed by government, who discharge these public officers, deprive them of the means of subsistence,

* There exist many good men, who, guarded by four invalids, have been, for a great number of years, regarded as legislators. If a prince is furnished with a numerous corps of troops, blindly attached to him, he may, in an instant, become the master of the state. It was the imperial guard that formed the foundation of the power of Napoleon. He augmented it in proportion to his wish to augment his power. When he was at the head of a phalanx of 40,000 men, entirely devoted to him, when it is known that the great ambition of the soldiery was to form a part of this guard; that it was the sole end they had afterwards in view; he imagined that he had the right to menace, with this guard, both France and Europe, and that behind this rampart he could dare to do any thing. We may well recollect the renown of this corps, and the tone it assumed. It was the idol of the people, the terror of every thinking Frenchman, and made Europe tremble.

It was this guard, which, in 1812, was employed in searching for those conscripts, which the repetition of conscriptions had made desert throughout the empire. At this period we could reckon more than 160,000 deserters.

and refuse to fulfil the engagement contracted with them; interpret in their own way, or annul the contract always formed between him who performs, and him who has services performed for him: also the world is filled with a number of men who have held situations and employments, who are capable of attending to public business, and who suffer, in all respects, most essentially from being deprived of them, in consequence of a want of employment, and the means of reaping its fruits. Nothing is so much calculated to keep up sentiments of dislike and factious dispositions in a state.

Government being the centre of all interest, attracting every thing towards it, teaching every thing, selling every thing, mixing in all transactions, there necessarily results a multiplication of agents in proportion to the complication of interests. This *bureau cracy* is become the cancer-worm of states, the leprosy of modern society. The number of persons who form these administrative armies is immense. It has contributed to extend that unrestrained taste for public offices, which is to be remarked every where. There is not one of those agents that is not a tax. But, how are they treated? With what facility are they displaced, thrown back into obscurity and misery! New arrangements succeed to new parties, and gives rise to an incessant change. If the state should be the least in want, reductions take place; payments are suspended; nothing is fixed; forms vary every hour; delays are created; the least error in execution suspends the most lawful claims; life passes in attendance and dependence, and concludes at last in misery. This is a frightful condition, and unfortunately it is that of a great number of Europeans. It would be dreadful to enter into a calculation of the number of those persons, who, in the course of twenty-five years, have lost their fortune, their rank, their situation; and who, in hopes of repairing some portion of honour or of fortune, exhaust themselves in pushing through the crowd; which, in consequence of having suffered so much itself, regards them with as little curiosity as pity.

Let us consider that, with the exception of that of Great Britain, all the public banks have failed; that a great number of governments have been many times renewed; that the administrations have been also changed; that their agents are comprised in these alterations. If we do this, we may form an idea of the number of victims.

The education of all classes of society is nearly the same, and all the world can obtain it. But all persons are not possessed of the same fortune. Among those persons who participate in the means of instruction, some in quitting their studies meet poverty, with its horrors; others wealth, with its enjoyments. But, it also frequently happens that these persons, out of favour with fortune, are not so with Nature, and that they are equal, or superior in faculties, in information, to those who possess a larger proportion of worldly advantages. What are the sentiments which are then excited within them? What attempts are not made to establish an equality between fortune and talents! Again, if the best means present themselves the first, as, for the welfare of society, should always be the case; but, on the contrary, what hateful comparisons, what envious and ambitious projects exist in their hearts, and inflame their passions! It is in this crowd that are to be found men, ever prone to mischief, at the service of every person in power, and who obstruct the avenues of all the places in which it is to be found. It is not to be doubted, as we have seen so many persons eagerly endeavour to obtain stations in those classes of society that are superior to them; the distinctions of which they cannot obtain, in the wealth of which they cannot participate; it is to this principle that we must attribute the evil. Avarice has assumed the mask of patriotism, and man has become sophistical, plundering, ferocious, in order to establish a balance between his interests and the talents he supposes himself to possess.

From this picture of the different causes, it is evident that the whole social order of Europe is deranged. The evil increases daily, and must produce melancholy conse-

quences. The situation of Europe is therefore far from good. If we consider *en masse* it is very wretched. More intelligence than happiness is to be found in it. There are some persons who conclude, that it is this intelligence that has occasioned the loss of happiness. On the contrary, it is because it has been governed in defiance of this intelligence that it has become unfortunate. Thus the multiplication of troops, of taxes, of constraints of every species, are not in consonance with intelligence, but in direct contradiction to it. The appeals made against these acts are the consequence of this intellectual light: and if this intellectual light, the object of so many absurd and ridiculous complaints, has been unable to arrest the course of this disorder, it is because it meets on all sides with an opposition of interests, of passions and prejudices. These, armed with power, are incessantly occupied in endeavouring to overturn or destroy the salutary effects that those intellectual lights cannot fail to produce, if suffered to preside in the government of man.

CHAPTER XXIX.

OF POLITICAL WRITERS, AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE.

WAR has been made for twenty-five years, and we have always spoken of peace. There were those who would have persuaded us that they wished for peace, and it was their adversaries that desired war. All feigned a desire for peace. It has been by constantly keeping peace in view that people have been induced to support the war. To make war, in order to conquer peace, has been the universal cry. At last this peace, so ardently desired, so long expected, has arrived: but, in order that the world should enjoy it, it will be necessary to banish that tone

and language which embitter the actions of man, and ulcerate his heart. They have succeeded too well in dividing the interests of men, and in rendering those enemies who are in fact members of one family. The custom of the Eastern sovereigns on their accession to the throne, with regard to their unfortunate brothers, has been too much adopted in the political world, and by those who occupy it. Not being able to overcome our enemies, we appear to think that we cannot sufficiently hate them; that we cannot sufficiently insult them; that we cannot sufficiently provoke them; and that it is not in our power to treat them with sufficient atrocity and perfidy. In consequence of being constantly repeated, the language has become universal. There are nations of whom we can only speak with insult, because we have insulted them for twenty years*. The most odious imputations have been received into general usage, and become a part of our vocabularies. We have even gone so far as to represent the happiness of some as incompatible with that of others. In short, we have seen professors of national hatred.

This doctrine proceeds from the school of Caen.

It is time to put an end to these detestable practices. The cure must proceed from whence the malady sprung — politics and political writers. These are the interpreters of nations with regard to one another. They speak but through the organs of this class of men, and the sentiments with which they meet in their writings pass as the legitimate expression of the sentiments of the nations to which they belong. They become responsible and bound with the writers who speak in their name. They are exposed to submit to the effects that arise from those feelings, to which these writings shall give birth. Now that our *materiel* armour is cast aside, let that armour which may be termed moral armour be also cast aside, this armour still more envenomed

* Recollect the language used relative to Great Britain for the past twenty years !

in its effects than the former. Let the language of peace succeed to that of war. Let us act like the Romans, when they deposited their military vestments and assumed the habits of peaceable citizens. In vain will "peace" be inscribed on the public records, if the feelings of war still exist in our hearts. In vain will the language of peace have been used by the representatives of nations, if only the language of war is to be found in the mouth of their interpreters. Let us understand the matter. Do we wish to lead men to mutual extermination — to believe that a good neighbourhood is impossible — to grieve at the prosperity of others — to seek in all their actions for causes of criminations and sinister designs? If such is the intention, it is in vain that we speak and think of peace. What sign of reconciliation does it present to men, visiting a country, if they hear only incessant complaints of the ambition, perfidy, and malevolent views of their hosts? Let this dishonourable and murderous language have a termination! Let all provocations, suspicions, and imputations, disappear. Let each nation find in the writings of others, the same safety offered them by their territory. Let dignity preside in our judgments of the actions of other nations, for none can with propriety be assailed or condemned. Let benevolence either palliate or conceal past wrongs. Let our mutual envy be that which we can exercise without offence; — that of virtue and talents.

Unfortunately we are far from this point. Works that have attracted the public attention, (and we take these works for our sanction,) have too powerfully imbibed those hostile sentiments. In them, in order to support propositions that, to say the least, are forgotten, full half a volume* is dedicated, to form a complete

* The work of M. de Bonald, in which he shows: —

1st. That the left bank of the Rhine ought, three months after the treaty of Paris, and while the Congress was sitting at Vienna, to have been given to France.

2d. That the Pope ought to have been placed at the head of the European republic.

treatise on the inconveniences of a ceded possession, which they well know will not be given up, and which if attacked would be protected by all Europe; as if the loss which they had sustained had not been the source of sufficient regret; and that in thus renewing their afflictions, they would find a remedy for them. Hence, after a long train of imputations more than severe, they conclude by affording advice which places a nation almost in ambuscade against another; and which would induce her seriously to prepare herself for the re-possession of a benefit that had just been wrested from her.

Is this really peace, or only a hollow truce obtained merely in order to prepare for war? What will be the consequence? The display of these sentiments will alarm those whom they threaten, who will always be on their guard; precautions will be redoubled; and we shall live in peace, as if in a state of war, behind a rampart erected to protect a country menaced with attack.

To the events of the epoch that has just passed, we may apply the same observations. The writers on affairs relative to the interior of France, afford us no greater prospects of peace than those who have published their sentiments on its external relations.

These portraits of past disorders are always the same, and contain the same imputations — the same reproaches. It is always the whole nation that is represented as

3d. That the regulation of all public affairs should be superintended by a body of the nobility; all other classes having nothing more to do than attend to their own, and at the same time be grateful to the body thus willing to save them such unnecessary trouble.

4th. That the existence of Europe will cease when the *atheistical dogma of the sovereignty of the people* shall prevail. Whatever respect may be due to the talents as well as the habitually elevated ideas of this author, we may conjecture that when he permitted himself to form such combinations, his genius was (for once) slumbering. There is another volume, the work of M. Bignon, which, on account of much valuable information, demands our attention. It relates to the different states of Europe; but, unfortunately, contains accusations of England, and opinions hostile to the interests of Belgium.

blamable for those events at which almost all the nation has shuddered. How many innocent men find themselves thus assailed by a single ill-defined word! How many men, repulsed and chagrined by these general, unqualified, and promiscuous attacks, withdraw and separate themselves from those objects which they desired, from those objects on which they had begun to place their affections, but, in the pursuit of which neither justice nor happiness were to be found.

Men are lightly and undeservedly brought before the tribunal of history, under an imputation of charges of which they were ignorant. The bar resounds with the complaints of some, and the envenomed defences of others. Party accusations re-echo party accusations; and as nothing conduces more to the formation of parties than a supposition of their existence, the frequent mention of them soon occasions their formation.

Without noticing the little genius indicated by these declamations, repeated as well without limit as without taste; as fatiguing to their hearers as they are useless to their object; it is sufficient that we observe their effects; and the fruit which they have produced to France — discord instead of the peace which they expected — which they invoked — which would have constituted the happiness of all; clouds instead of that serene sky which might have been expected on a day which had commenced so fair, and whose dawn had been hailed with such joy and gladness. Every Frenchman who employs himself in writing ought ever to have in view these circumstances:—

1st. That it is as profitable to tire a Frenchman as to amuse a Lacedemonian.

2d. That every opinion too strongly enforced, has always an air of imposition (*l'air imposée*), and by that means loses its authority.

3d. That the true Frenchman may be compared with the Athenian who voted for the banishment of Aristides, because he was tired with hearing him called the Just.

CHAPTER XXX.

THE LAST TREATY.

THE act connecting the affairs of France with the Powers of Europe not forming part of the Congress of Vienna, has not engaged our attention. Besides, the period of great pain is not that most calculated for reflection. We shall confine ourselves to the following observations :

1st. However *sombre* and well founded may be the grief into which France has been plunged by this treaty, nevertheless misfortune ought not to make her unjust, in suffering a government, whose reputation has immediately suffered by it, to be blamed for an act, the necessity of which it has not itself created, and of which it could only moderate the severity. On those alone who have been the cause of this dire necessity should the censure fall. What crime had France committed to induce them to involve her in this disaster? •

2dly; The transition from the rank which France occupied, to its present degradation, is well calculated to warn other nations of the danger of unreservedly yielding the charge of their government into the hands of one individual. Previous to the 18 Brumaire, France was powerful, victorious, the mistress of Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine. She never aspired to more; and if she has proceeded farther, it was owing to the personal views of her chief; for if even his conquests had been made without the assistance of France, he would at least have conquered in spite of her. She has ever been the *instrument* and the *subject*, but never the object of what has been undertaken. To what may this be ascribed? To the want of a constitution in France. Had she been supported by institutions so sufficiently powerful as to prevent her learning from the gazette one

day that she was at war with such a prince, another that such a family has ceased to reign, France it is true would never have assumed the character of a conquering nation, (for this there was not much necessity;) but she would not have been twice invaded: of this there was much less necessity. Whatever constitution France possessed, having been merely formed to give power to the prince, he found himself enabled to dispose of the resources of a nation, active, intelligent, and brave. With means like these, much might have been achieved—and much certainly has. But what are the consequences? A good constitution would have equally prevented victory and defeat. France would have had less brilliant acts to commemorate, but her future prospects would have borne a less gloomy aspect. Snares or calamities lurk concealed from the gaze of nations beneath the laurels gathered by warlike princes. Besides, there is no excess to which there is not a termination fixed, and a punishment assigned.

5d. We find in this treaty a justification of the fears we intimated on the subject of the approximation of the Prussian to the French frontiers. Behold Prussia taking possession of Saar Louis; and the frontiers of France, which extend to the possessions she has just obtained on the Saar. This is the result of the system which deprived the former of Saxony. She has very soon gathered its fruits. Prussia, stationed at the entrance of France, has endeavoured to prepare herself for warding off the first blows which this powerful body could strike at that division of the monarchy which lay at so great a distance from its centre. To accomplish this, it was necessary to enlarge and fortify her frontier; and as France was alone able to contribute to it, Prussia has formed this frontier at her expense; a frontier not to be obtained from any other source. She has availed herself of the first opportunity to apply the dismemberment of France to her own advantage, in expectation of benefits arising from other circumstances.

4th. Whatever may be the amount of the pecuniary

sacrifices made by France, it will not exceed her powers of liquidating it; because it will not exceed her wishes to fulfil her engagements. There is no country that, as long as it has the wish, has not the power to discharge its debts. As long as the sun shall shine on France — as long as her soil continues fertile — as long as the industrious hands which support her manufactories are not chained, the wounds received may be found to be severe; but they will not prove mortal. We are far from participating in the vulgar fears as to the squandering of money. M. Necker has informed us that the sum of 500,000,000 was expended by France, in 1756, on the states of Lower Germany, in a war as vain in its design as it was disastrous in its result. This sum of 500,000,000 was equivalent to more than 700,000,000 now. The expatriated French, in 1790, have been able to ascertain that French capital formed the basis of pecuniary transactions in these countries. But in what way has this migration of the precious metals impoverished France, or affected the circulation necessary to the exchanges? The same will happen again. Then let us carry our views still higher, and let us not restrict our search to the resources to be found in the coffers of France. *Public order is the foundation-stone, and let this order be universally established*; let it be rendered firm; let it every day unite still more public and private interests; let there be but one. Let the value be given to property, of which it is susceptible, by an increase of that sentiment of sincerity, that will permanently fix in France that capital which, springing from the bowels of the earth, will return with equal facility under an obscure or serene sky. Let every species of industry continue free; let every controversy cease: and, above all, let division be banished from this great family. The weight of calamity will then become tolerable. Above all, let not the interest of the state be betrayed by any of its members. We are not now to think of the sacrifices that have been necessary to our safety. When the vessel of the state is tossed about by the tempest, it is relieved by throwing over-

board part of the cargo: the cargo, and not the rudder, is cast into the sea, and which they offer as a sacrifice, to appease the angry ocean.

5th. The military possession for many years of a vast extent of country, and of the fortresses which constitute the defence of France; the renewal of treaties, which originally were defensive, and which, in their actual state, become threatening, sufficiently show the jealousy Europe entertains of France, whether considered as a political or a social body. By it, France (we are compelled to allow it) is placed in a state of *surveillance*, and excluded in some measure from the great society of Europe. Such a state contains too much constraint to be long borne. But what is it necessary to do to bring it to a conclusion? We must labour to cure the evil by the means that produced it. Thus Europe testifies her fears of the possibility of an irruption of the French into those territories which they have been obliged to surrender; she suffers the same distrust to extend to the state of her public mind. It would be easy to show that these fears are exaggerated, and that they arise from causes which no longer exist. During the revolution, strangers have not unfrequently been deceived with regard to the interior of France. It is because they have been unable to understand its internal system.

It is a thorough conviction of the probability of its 'enjoying internal and external security, which will produce confidence in the minds of strangers. Now nothing is more easy to achieve, if but a wish for it is entertained. To obtain this end, let every Frenchman imitate and second the determination announced by government, religiously to fulfil the condition of an act which was called for by a necessity for *preservation* of the body of the state. Let every regret for the past, and every improper view to the future, be carefully discarded. Of what service will they be? When all Europe can believe that the French have really given up all pretensions to Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine; that they are firmly resolved to

confine themselves within their own territories, and to remain there without ambition and without fear; then what motives can Europe have to nourish hatred to France? In this respect, great and frequent improprieties have been committed since the treaty of Paris, and the greatest care ought to be taken to prevent their recurrence.* But this is not all: for more than a year past, one half of the French have endeavoured to get the other considered as a people hostile to authority and morality; the other half is sure to recriminate. Thus is the nation forced by its own conduct to go before a tribunal of foreigners. What confidence and consideration can they allow to those who do not allow it to themselves? If they wish to calm the fears of others, let them cease to evince any themselves. Let us display to Europe a people reunited in the same sentiments of attachment to her government, to the honour of the nation, and its prosperity; let them rely on the same principles; let them speak the same language, equally a stranger to the exaggerations which elevate the minds of some and depress the spirits of others, and let them re-enter that family from which misfortune has separated them; then there would be no source of fears for foreigners, and France will be in a condition to demand that a period should be put to those jealousies, the continuance of which can only be considered as an insult.

Frenchmen! If, at the close of a work in which your interests have uniformly been the objects of our tenderest solicitude, we were permitted to address you, we would say, console yourselves; your misfortunes are not your own work, success alone is to be attributed to you. It is your chiefs who, by abusing those powers which in other hands would have insured to you a long train of prosperity, have produced your calamities. One of your sovereigns has immortalized himself by saying, after a catastrophe, the result of which was more disastrous than the present, *Every thing is lost but honour.* This sentence obliterated the memory of his defeat, as long as sincere expression shall possess influence among you. Well, nothing is

lost, and honour still less than any thing else. You have not been defeated, for you have not even had to fight. All that you feel is the effect of an action which, in its commencement, in its progress, and in its conclusion, defies definition. Twice has Europe in arms traversed your cities and your country decked with the emblems of peace; through the midst of citizens, anxious to avoid all resistance, and eager to show submission. If any of your ramparts have been attacked, the courage of your warriors has commanded the homage of the enemy, who could not reconcile such resistance with such feeble means of supporting it. You have filled the world with sufficient monuments of your genius; perhaps too many of your warlike valour: a new species of glory now awaits you, that of constancy and dignity in misfortune. Show that you are superior to it: the only way is to meet it fairly, and support it without complaint. Turn your eyes from the political field in which you have gathered nothing but thorns, and in which you find all Europe in arms against you. For years to come, think of nothing but how to fertilize the soil on which you live, and there to establish the virtues which placed your forefathers the first in rank among the people of Europe. Then reconcile yourselves, and you will be enabled to offer a truly brotherly hand to all nations, and require them to lay aside their unjust suspicions, and for their own interest even to add to the means of your prosperity. That land, which has given birth to men such as Montesquieu, Pascal, Bossuet, Fenelon, and to a hundred others who have diffused lights pure as they are brilliant, will always be esteemed the country of true sociability and reason. Sheltered by these great and illustrious names, you may equally defy comparisons and reproach.

THE END.

